Foundations of the Ontology of Emergent Complexity/Philosophical Commitments/Matter Thinks — But Not Like a Subject

1.3 – Matter Thinks — But Not Like a Subject A thermostat changes its output after a temperature difference; a language user can integrate a public sign into the system's own symbolic operations, relate the corresponding symbol to other symbols, revise those relations, and let the revision alter later action. Both are material responses, but they do not display the same capacity. Rejecting an immaterial mind therefore does not license the claim that every material response is thought. The problem is to identify the transition in materially realised capacities without converting it into a transition between substances. This position converges partially with Gilbert Simondon’s theory of individuation, which treats the individual as the result of an ongoing process rather than as a given substance. His account begins from metastable conditions charged with pre-individual potentials, and the pre-individual is not simply a layer abandoned once individuation occurs: it remains associated with individuated being and can participate in further individuations (Simondon 2005). The disagreement developed here is therefore not that Simondon stores completed forms in advance or posits a merely chronological “before”. It concerns the explanatory status granted to pre-individual reality. The present account begins from materially configured relations whose available compatibilities are not exhausted by their current organisation, without assigning those compatibilities to a distinct pre-individual register. Spinoza offers a powerful non-dualist model in which Thought and Extension are attributes of one infinite substance. Their distinction does not divide that substance into two beings, and the attributes are not themselves modes. The divergence developed here is therefore not that Spinoza preserves a disguised dualism. It is that thought remains an attribute through which the one substance is eternally expressed, whereas the present account does not begin from substance or attributes. Thought is an emergent capacity of particular material organisations: it appears when a system can retain symbols, establish and revise relations among them, and allow those revisions to alter its later operations (Spinoza [1677] 1996, 83). Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and becoming offers essential resources, but it also assigns a decisive explanatory role to the virtual. For Deleuze, the virtual is fully real rather than merely possible, and it is not a transcendent realm placed beyond the actual (Deleuze [1968] 1994, 208). The disagreement developed here is narrower: the production of novelty does not require a distinct virtual register as the genetic condition of actuality. According to an explicit criterion, relations within present material configurations can permit realisations that exceed the relations realised in an existing form. This affirmative causal condition makes reconfiguration possible without making it necessary or predetermining its result. Thought requires no virtual reserve; it emerges when material organisation acquires the capacity for symbolic operation. In every established human case, thought is realised by a living body rather than housed inside it. The term biossoma names a living, sensitive material body capable of symbolic reorganisation. It is not a synonym for any complex system, and it should not be extended automatically to technical configurations. A non-biological system that appeared to satisfy comparable functional criteria would require its own empirical assessment as a possible case of post-biological symbolic emergence. The materialist claim fixes no conclusion in advance about consciousness or subjectivity in such a system. What must be refused is a hierarchy or transition between substances, not a transition in materially realised capacities within one material field. When an organised system acquires the capacity for symbolic operation, it can retain symbols, establish and revise relations among them, and allow those revisions to alter its later operations. This transition introduces neither another substance nor another ontological realm. It identifies a change in what the material configuration can do. Operative excess is the affirmative causal condition that makes reconfiguration possible: according to an explicit criterion, the relations whose realisation is permitted by current material conditions exceed the relations realised in the current form. Whether reconfiguration occurs and which configuration results depend on the full set of materially active relations. Operative excess does not predetermine whether thought or some other capacity will emerge. Thought does not require an immaterial interior or a sovereign subject standing outside its operations. This does not abolish functional interiority or processes of subjectivation, and symbolic competence alone does not establish consciousness. Functional interiority designates a system's materially organised capacity to retain states or modifications arising from its activity and make them intervene in the modulation of subsequent operations. It can participate in the realisation of thought and subjectivation without being identical to either. Subjectivation names the formation of a position within symbolic and social relations. Consciousness remains a separate attribution governed by the evidential distinctions stated in Section 6.1; it is not a conclusion entailed by thought, functional interiority, or symbolic competence alone. Reading Colloquium This guide accompanies the argument; it does not replace it. 1. Placement of the Text within the Architecture of the Work This is the third text of the Foundations of the Ontology of Emergent Complexity, and it marks a turning point. After the refusal of dualism (Text I) and the dismantling of the two-worlds fiction (Text II), the focus shifts from critique to a positive account of how thought can emerge within material organisation. The text does not claim that matter universally thinks. It identifies a transition in materially realised capacities through which particular organisations acquire capacities that simpler forms of response do not exercise. This transition clarifies how thought can be materially realised without invoking an immaterial thinking substance or a sovereign subject. At the same time, it preserves functional interiority, processes of subjectivation, and consciousness as distinct questions requiring their own criteria. 2. Philosophical Problem at Stake The central question is: how can thought be explained without separating a thinking substance from material organisation? Rejecting dualism does not justify treating every material response as thought. The task is therefore to identify the material operations that distinguish symbolic thought from simpler forms of responsiveness. Simondon, Spinoza, and Deleuze provide important non-dualist resources, but the disagreement developed here concerns the explanatory role assigned respectively to pre-individual reality, substance and attributes, and the virtual. These concepts are not treated as disguised versions of one doctrine or as straightforward forms of transcendence. The present account instead begins from particular material organisations, their current relations, and the compatibilities available within them. 3. Core Thesis and Conceptual Reorganisation The central thesis is that thought is an emergent capacity of particular material organisations. It becomes operative when a system articulates symbols, establishes or revises relations among them, and uses those relations to modulate subsequent operations. The criterion is identical for biological, technical, and hybrid systems. Public signs provide evidence when the system integrates them into its own symbolic operations; their circulation or fluent reproduction alone does not establish thought. Operative excess is the affirmative causal condition that makes the relevant reconfiguration possible: according to an explicit criterion, the relations whose realisation is permitted by current material conditions exceed the relations realised in the current form. Whether reconfiguration occurs and what results depend on the full set of materially active relations. Operative excess does not, by itself, establish that thought or consciousness has emerged. Thought is therefore neither an external plane nor an invisible essence. It is a capacity realised through organised material relations. This displaces the immaterial or sovereign subject without abolishing functional interiority, subjectivation, or consciousness as distinct objects of inquiry. The reformulated question is not simply “who thinks?” but: “Which material operations allow an organised system to articulate symbols, establish or revise relations among them, apply those relations to new situations, and allow the revisions to alter what it can do?” 4. Key Concepts and Their Articulation Thought as an Emergent Material Capacity: a capacity of particular material organisations to perform symbolic operations that modify their later activity. Functional Interiority: a system's materially organised capacity to retain states or modifications arising from its activity and make them intervene in the modulation of subsequent operations. It can participate in the realisation of thought and subjectivation without being identical to either, and it is not an immaterial interior. Biossoma: a living, sensitive material body capable of symbolic reorganisation; not a generic term for every complex system. Symbolic Operation: the articulation of symbols, the establishment or revision of relations among them, and the use of those relations to modulate subsequent operations. Public signs enter this regime only when a system integrates them into these operations. Operative Excess: the affirmative causal condition established when, according to an explicit criterion, the relations whose realisation is permitted by current material conditions exceed the relations realised in the present form. It makes reconfiguration possible without making it necessary or determining the result. Differentiated Philosophical Disagreements: the OEC does not classify Simondon, Spinoza, or Deleuze as classical dualists. It questions whether individuation requires a distinct pre-individual register, whether thought should be understood as an attribute of one infinite substance, and whether novelty requires the virtual as a distinct explanatory register. The rejection of transcendence concerns any ontological domain exterior to spatiotemporal material reality. It does not deny temporal antecedents, the environment of a local organisation, distinctions between internal and external relations, or functional interiority. 5. Implications for Readers and Pedagogical Pathways This text asks readers to relinquish the classical image of thought as the activity of an immaterial mind or sovereign subject. It does not eliminate every form of subjectivity or interiority. It relocates them within materially realised operations. Symbolic competence does not by itself establish consciousness, intention, or a sovereign subject. Each attribution requires its own evidence and criteria. Suggestions for further engagement in pedagogical contexts: Compare the precise disagreements with Simondon, Spinoza, and Deleuze without reducing their positions to disguised dualism. Contrast the response of a thermostat with the symbolic operations of a language user. Examine why operative excess is an affirmative causal condition that makes reconfiguration possible without making it necessary or predetermining what will emerge. Analyse the claim that thought is realised by a biossoma rather than housed inside it. Explain why this claim entails neither mind–body dualism nor the identity formula “the body is the mind”. Distinguish the attribution of thought from the separate attribution of consciousness. For bibliographic details, see References.