Lentis/Drone Warfare

Background The Drone Revolution Drone Warfare in the Russo-Ukrainian War Historically, military airpower was defined by multi-million-dollar platforms reserved for superpowers. However, the Russo-Ukrainian War has dismantled this paradigm, creating a battlefield defined by the unprecedented consumption of cheap, expendable drones. In this conflict, drones have grown from being used primarily for reconnaissance to delivering ammunition, directing artillery fire, and carrying explosives.2025-10-14 Game of drones: the production and use of Ukrainian battlefield unmanned aerial vehicles https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-10-14/game-drones-production-and-use-ukrainian-battlefield-unmanned 2026-04-30 OSW Centre for Eastern Studies en They are responsible for destroying 85% of Russian military targets, causing 70-80% of Russian casualties, and initiating the withdrawal of heavy weaponry from the front line. It is estimated that 2.2 million unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) were produced in Ukraine in 2024. Ukraine's drone industry has boomed with startup drone companies and production, but Ukraine also relies heavily on foreign support.Chávez Kerry February 2023 Learning on the Fly: Drones in the Russian-Ukrainian War Arms Control Association https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-01/features/learning-fly-drones-russian-ukrainian-war In response, Russia has developed a greater internal drone production capacity than Ukraine, but still relies on Chinese, French, and Iranian drone designs and suppliers for smaller, lightweight drones.FOUNDATION OBSERVER RESEARCH The Evolution of Russia’s Drone Warfare in Ukraine https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/the-evolution-of-russia-s-drone-warfare-in-ukraine 2026-04-30 orfonline.org en Both countries have integrated drone warfare into their doctrines and have created branches exclusively for overseeing drone usage. Because neither side could independently sustain this industrial appetite, doors have opened for external actors to proliferate drone warfare on this front with their own competing agendas. We begin by examining how actors outside of Russia and Ukraine have contributed to this proliferation. Chinese Manufacturers Chinese drone manufacturers supply a substantial portion of Ukraine's UAVs, especially lightweight drones, which are advantageous for easy maneuvering and transport. Outside of assembled drones, they supply most of the parts used to make drones. These companies use drone warfare to advance their financial, political, and commercial interests persistently; despite sanctions, Chinese drones continue to show up on the Russo-Ukrainian front.Pettyjohn, S. (2024). Evolution Not Revolution [Review of Evolution Not Revolution]. Center for a New American Security (CNAS). https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.cnas.org/documents/CNAS-Report-Defense-Ukraine-Drones-Final.pdf Da-Jiang Innovations (DJI) As of 2021, privately-owned DJI held 76% of the global market share for drone manufacturingDeveloper 2021-06-09 China’s Thriving Drone Industry - ARC Group https://arc-group.com/china-thriving-drone-industry/ 2026-04-29 en-US, supplying to clients including but not limited to USA, Ukraine, Russia, ISIS, China, and Israel. Their DJI Mavic drone is popular on the Russo-Ukrainian front because, according to CNAS thinktank advisor Samuel Bendett: “DJI Mavic is an easy-to-use drone right out of the box.”Hambling David DJI Mavic Consumer Drones Are Still Russian Soldiers’ Favorite en Forbes https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2025/03/10/dji-consumer-drones-are-still-russian-soldiers-favorite/ 2026-04-29 Since the war's beginning, DJI has released statements condemning the use of their products to cause harm.DJI Statement On Military Use Of Drones - DJI United States https://www.dji.com/media-center/announcements/photo 2026-04-29 DJI en However, DJI drones have remained prominent on the front years after such statements when the war began. Autel Robotics Autel Robotics is another privately owned drone supplier to both RussiaZoria Yuri 2025-07-08 Bloomberg: China helped Russia build drones now hitting Ukraine https://euromaidanpress.com/2025/07/08/china-helped-build-the-drones-now-hitting-ukraine-bloomberg-traces-the-parts/ 2026-05-01 Euromaidan Press en-US and Ukraine.Analytics Ukraine War 2025-06-01 Autel Evo Military Use https://ukraine-war-analytics.com/drones/autel-evo-military-use.html 2026-05-01 ukraine-war-analytics.com en It has been sanctioned by the UKAUTEL ROBOTICS CO., LTD. Sanctions Finder https://sanctions-finder.com/sanction/b72c95a8-2f33-4f47-a709-d7cf29b5de51/AUTEL%20ROBOTICS%20CO.%2C%20LTD. 2026-04-29 sanctions-finder.com en and the United StatesMugo Maurice 2025-01-13 How Pentagon Blacklist Affects Autel Drone Users https://abjacademy.global/news/how-pentagon-blacklist-affects-autel-drone-users/ 2026-04-29 ABJ Drone Academy en due to suspected ties to the Chinese military and Chinese affiliates, such as Shenzhen Huasheng Industry Co. Ltd. Ukrainian Foreign Intelligence reports: “They use so-called shell companies, change names, do everything to avoid... sanctions for their activities."2025-06-05 Russia plans to produce 2 million FPV drones in 2025, Ukrainian intelligence says https://kyivindependent.com/russia-aims-to-produce-2-million-fpv-drones-in-2025-ukrainian-intelligence-says/ 2026-04-29 The Kyiv Independent en Autel is under suspicion for many ties to shell companies aiding Russian UAV production.Staff This article was posted by TLB 2025-07-08 Unmasking Russia-China Kamikaze Drone Supply Chain In One Map The Liberty Beacon https://www.thelibertybeacon.com/unmasking-russia-china-kamikaze-drone-supply-chain-in-one-map/ 2026-04-29 www.thelibertybeacon.com en-US To avoid these sanctions, Aero-HIT, a state-affiliated Russian drone manufacturer, seeks to develop Autel’s EVO Max 4T drone in Khabarovsk, Russia, near the Chinese border.WhereIsRussiaToday 2025-09-16 Partners in Crime: Russian and Chinese Efforts to Avoid Sanctions in Drone Operations https://whereisrussiatoday.substack.com/p/partners-in-crime-russian-and-chinese 2026-04-29 WhereIsRussiaToday’s Substack Autel continues to be sanctioned despite its statement that the “company has never participated in any military-related activities and firmly rejects the improper use of its products."Statement https://www.autelrobotics.com/news/20250107/ 2026-04-29 www.autelrobotics.com Iranian State Actors thumb|right|Diagram of a Shahed-136, a low-cost loitering munition exported and localized for mass production in Russia. Operating independently from Iran's conventional military, the IRGC-AF plays a critical role in the development of Iran's drone program, positioning itself as an asymmetrical equalizer against Western air superiority. This military branch and its commander, Amir Ali Hajizadeh, were directly sanctioned by the United States and the European Union for facilitating the supply of drones to Russia for use in Ukraine.Amir Ali Hajizadeh: Commander of IRGC’s Aerospace Force https://www.unitedagainstnucleariran.com/amir-ali-hajizadeh-commander-of-irgcs-aerospace-force 2026-05-01 United Against Nuclear Iran en Because Iran is subject to extensive economic restrictions, it also relies on decentralized procurement networks. Coined by the Atlantic Council, the "Axis of Evasion" refers to the network of adversaries that bypass global sanctions to illegally source commercial Western technology (like navigation components and semiconductors) from global markets, funneling them into Iranian weapons manufacturing.Vogel B. 2024-04-18 From drones to rocket fuel, China and Russia are helping Iran through supply chains https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/from-drones-to-rocket-fuel-china-and-russia-are-helping-iran-through-supply-chains/ 2026-05-01 Atlantic Council en Agendas Behind the Arsenal The IRGC-AF’s contribution rapidly evolved from off-the-shelf hardware supply to exporting raw intellectual property and technical expertise. By transferring blueprints, materials, and engineering techniques to the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, they enabled Moscow to localize the mass production of Shahed-type drones.Shvets Alyona 2024-05-23 Investigation: EU, US companies still operate in Russia's main drone production hub https://kyivindependent.com/investigation-eu-us-companies-still-operate-in-russias-main-drone-production-hub/ 2026-05-01 The Kyiv Independent en This proliferation serves multiple agendas for Iran. The Ukrainian front functions as a "global laboratory". By testing drones against advanced Western air defenses, Iran extracts critical data to harden its own technology and adapt commercial electronics for navigation and electronic warfare. Iran trades drone proliferation for Russian military modernization in a strategy of tactical reciprocity. Supplying drone technology enabled Iran to secure advanced capabilities and manufacturing capacity in return, creating a self-reinforcing production network between Moscow and Tehran. A core geopolitical agenda driving this proliferation is asymmetric bankruptcy. Inexpensive weapons deliberately drain resources designed to counter more advanced threats. While a Shahed drone typically costs around $20,000 to $50,000,Kofman Michael 2023-01-26 The Cost of a Shahed https://www.phenomenalworld.org/analysis/cost-of-a-shahed/ 2026-05-01 Phenomenal World en a single Patriot interceptor missile costs roughly $3 million to $4 million.Doyle Gerry Motevalli Golnar 2026-03-02 Iran's Missile Math: $20,000 Drones Take on $4 Million Patriots https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-03-02/iran-strikes-missile-math-20-000-iranian-drones-take-on-4-million-patriots 2026-05-02 Bloomberg en This cost mismatch forces defenders into an unsustainable economic deficit, weaponizing the cost of modern air defense. While the Iranian state benefits geopolitically from this strategy, the domestic consequences for the Iranian people are severe. The diversion of state funds toward military expansion and the "Axis of Evasion" deprives public infrastructure and economic development of critical resources. Furthermore, the international sanctions triggered by this drone proliferation disproportionately impact ordinary citizens, driving hyperinflation, widespread unemployment, and shortages of essential goods.International Sanctions on Iran https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/international-sanctions-iran 2026-05-02 Council on Foreign Relations en Ultimately, the regime's pursuit of asymmetric external power is heavily subsidized by the socioeconomic attrition of its own people. U.S. Defense Companies U.S. defense companies play a central role in shaping modern drone warfare by linking military needs, technological innovation, and economic incentives. Rather than acting as neutral suppliers, these firms actively influence how warfare evolves by determining what technologies are available, scalable, and practical on the battlefield. In Ukraine, U.S. defense companies have supplied drone systems, surveillance tools, and counter-drone technologies that have expanded the role of drones in combat.U.S. Department of Defense, "Security Assistance to Ukraine," https://www.defense.gov They have helped shape battlefield capabilities and contributed to making drones a routine part of warfare. This reflects a broader shift from specialized, high-cost systems to widely deployable technologies. Drones are no longer rare assets; they are expected tools. This shift shows how defense companies help normalize drones as everyday military tools rather than rare specialized weapons. Defense companies operate within a profit-driven system, meaning increased conflict and demand can accelerate production and innovation. As drones become cheaper and more effective, companies have incentives to promote their continued use. This creates a feedback loop where technological capability and military dependence reinforce each other. At the same time, U.S. defense companies remain embedded in global supply chains. Even advanced military drones often rely on internationally sourced components, including electronics that may originate in competing countries.Center for a New American Security (CNAS), "Drones in Ukraine Report" This complicates traditional ideas of national security. Violent Non-State Actors Due to the deadliness and accessibility of drone technology, many Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) have begun increasing their drone arsenals to stage attacks on countries, organizations, and civilians. Violent Non-State Actors are defined as individuals or groups, independent of governments, which threaten or use violence to achieve their goalsNon-state actor (NSA) Politics and Government Research Starters EBSCO Research https://www.ebsco.com/ 2026-05-02 EBSCO en. The most common subgroup of VNSAs are terrorist groups, but individuals, including civilians, can also be considered VNSAs. Since VNSAs are unaffiliated with governments, there are few regulating bodies or policies that can curtail or ban VNSA’s access and use of drones. This makes combat increasingly difficult as drones are significantly cheaper than the systems used to shoot them down. Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and other paramilitary groups in Russia have used Ukraine as a training ground to test and deploy drones. The RIM is a far-right paramilitary group based in Russia. They are ultra-nationalist and pro-monarchist with the goal of restoring the Russian Empire; they supported Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and invasion of Ukraine in 2022The Russian Imperial Movement (RIM) and its Links to the Transnational White Supremacist Extremist Movement https://icct.nl/publication/russian-imperial-movement-rim-and-its-links-transnational-white-supremacist-extremist 2026-05-02 International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - ICCT en. After the war mobilization in 2022 due to Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, the RIM began their Imperial Legion unit, a unit that trains private Russian civilians to fight alongside the Russian military. In RIM’s Partizan training camp, they run a course that trains drone operators with the purpose of sending those graduates to the Ukraine frontHummel Kristina 2023-08-30 The Russian Imperial Movement in the Ukraine Wars: 2014-2023 https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-russian-imperial-movement-in-the-ukraine-wars-2014-2023/ 2026-05-02 Combating Terrorism Center at West Point en-US. Ukrainian Civilians While VNSAs are commonly associated with organizations like terrorist groups, they also encompass civilians. In the Russo-Ukraine War, Ukrainian civilians have leveraged easy access to drones and open source software to help their country in the war effortGamba Matilde 2025-06-24 Above the Battlefield: The Threat of UAVs in the Hands of VNSAs https://gnet-research.org/2025/06/24/above-the-battlefield-the-threat-of-uavs-in-the-hands-of-vnas/ 2026-05-02 GNET en-GB. Using resources like Telegram and dark web forums, ordinary civilians are able to find instructions on how to design effective drone weaponry. Groups have also been able to leverage non-open source software through exploits. The Russian and Ukrainian governments, along with civilians, have exploited vulnerabilities in software by reverse engineering code to use in their own drone software2026-01-26 How Reverse-Engineered Russian Drones Ended Up Flying for Ukraine https://united24media.com/latest-news/how-reverse-engineered-russian-drones-ended-up-flying-for-ukraine-15318 2026-05-02 UNITED24 Media en. Future considerations Drone warfare is a large topic with much nuance. This article mainly covers how countries, companies, and VNSAs have leveraged the proliferation of drones to further their own agendas. However, key participant groups such as civilians, military personnel, and the United Nations were not covered. Thus, some future topics to consider include: effects of drone usage on civilians, effect of drones on PTSD and casualties among military personnel, and drone policy on the international stage. The accessibility to drones and its use by non-governmental actors shares similarities to the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) in the Wars in the Middle East post-9/11. Another potential topic could be how drones and IEDs have affected military tactics and negotiations in the 21st century. References