1972 invasion of Uganda

Tanzania-backed attempt to overthrow Idi Amin 1972 invasion of Uganda LocationUganda&Tanzania.png Uganda (red) was invaded by rebels based in and supported by Tanzania (blue) September 1972 Southern Uganda Ugandan government victory Second Republic of UgandaLibyan Arab RepublicPalestine Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Uganda Ugandan rebels People's Army UPC supporters Tanzania Second Republic of Uganda Idi AminSecond Republic of Uganda Ali FadhulSecond Republic of Uganda Yusuf GowonSecond Republic of Uganda Isaac Maliyamungu Uganda Milton OboteUganda David Oyite-OjokUganda Tito OkelloUganda Captain AnachUganda Captain OyileUganda Lieutenant OkotUganda Yoweri MuseveniTanzania Julius Nyerere Uganda Army Simba Battalion Uganda Army Air Force People's Army Uganda People's Liberation Front Museveni's rebel group Second Republic of Uganda ThousandsLibyan Arab Republic 399Palestine Small 1,340–1,500 Light Hundreds killed https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/the-rise-of-kikosi-maalum-1892440 The rise of Kikosi Maalum 31 May 2020 Daily Monitor 7 December 2020 150 Ugandan civilians killed in combat; hundreds executed afterwards9–20 Tanzanian civilians killed1 American civilian killed The 1972 invasion of Uganda https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/obote-museveni-blame-each-other-for-failed-1972-invasion-of-uganda-1847674 Obote, Museveni blame each other for failed 1972 invasion of Uganda 14 September 2019 Daily Monitor 24 April 2021 was an armed attempt by Ugandan insurgents, supported by Tanzania, to overthrow the regime of Idi Amin. Under the orders of former Ugandan President Milton Obote, insurgents launched an invasion of southern Uganda with limited Tanzanian support in September 1972. The rebel force mostly consisted of the "People's Army" whose forces were mainly loyal to Obote, but also included guerillas led by Yoweri Museveni. The operation was hampered by problems from the start, as a planned rebel commando raid had to be aborted, Amin was warned of the impending invasion, and the rebels lacked numbers, training, and equipment. Regardless, the militants occupied a few towns in southern Uganda at the invasion's start. However, no major popular uprising erupted as Obote had hoped. Without mass civilian support and outnumbered as well as outgunned, the rebels were mostly defeated by Amin's loyalists within hours. Most insurgents were killed or captured, while the rest fled in disarray back to Tanzania. Reinforced by allied Libyan and PLO troops, the Ugandan security forces launched operations to hunt down and destroy rebel stragglers, while initiating political purges against suspected Obote supporters. Meanwhile, Amin ordered his air force to retaliate by bombing Tanzania, prompting the latter to mobilize its army along the border. Before the conflict could escalate into a full war between Uganda and Tanzania, the two countries agreed to a ceasefire under Somali mediation, and subsequently ratified a treaty in Mogadishu to defuse tensions. Despite this, the conflict greatly worsened the already poor relations between Uganda and Tanzania, and ultimately contributed to the Uganda–Tanzania War. Background 1971 Ugandan coup d'état Second Republic of Uganda left horizontal 300 center Idi Amin cropped.jpg Grace Ibingira, Milton Obote, and John Kakonge.jpg center Idi Amin (1977) Milton Obote (center, 1962) In 1971, a military coup overthrew the President of Uganda, Milton Obote. Colonel Idi Amin installed himself as new Ugandan President and ruled the country under a repressive dictatorship. Honey Martha Ugandan Capital Captured The Washington Post 12 April 1979 https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1979/04/12/ugandan-capital-captured/1eb604a7-5ff0-4c51-9fa0-527169e5bffa/?noredirect=on 7 November 2018 However, this takeover was initially welcomed by many Ugandans, as Obote had become deeply unpopular in sections of the country's population and Amin presented himself as reformer. He freed several opposition figures who had been imprisoned under Obote, including Shaban Opolot, Grace Ibingira, and Benedicto Kiwanuka. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-killings-that-turned-amin-into-a-tyrant-1820170 The killings that turned Amin into a tyrant 15 April 2019 Isaac Mufumba Daily Monitor 7 May 2021 The coup resulted in a deterioration of relations with neighbouring Tanzania, as Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere withheld diplomatic recognition of the new government and offered asylum to Obote and his supporters.Roberts 2017 155 After the coup, Amin launched purges of his enemies,Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 6–7 and empowered his own followers to consolidate his regime. The country's military, officially known as Uganda Army (UA), was most affected by this development. Much of its leadership was killed or expelled, while members of ethnic and religious groups supportive of Amin were recruited and promoted en masse.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 11 A large number of soldiers and opposition figures targeted by the purges consequently fled into exile. They set up training camps and organized militant groups in Sudan and Tanzania.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 6–7Avirgan Honey 1983 35 Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiry opposed Amin due to his support for Sudanese Anyanya rebels,Avirgan Honey 1983 35 while Tanzanian President Nyerere had close ties with Obote and had supported his socialist orientation.Roberts 2017 155 As a result, relations between Uganda and Tanzania became increasingly tense. Nyerere frequently denounced Amin's regime, and Amin made repeated threats to invade Tanzania.Roberts 2017 155 The situation was further complicated due to a border dispute, as Uganda claimed that the Kagera Salient—a 720 sqmi stretch of land between the official border and the Kagera River 18 miles to the south, should be placed under its jurisdiction, maintaining that the river made for a more logical border. The border had originally been negotiated by British and German colonial officials before World War I. Darnton John Mediation is Begun in Tanzanian War The New York Times 5 7 November 1978 https://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/07/archives/mediation-is-begun-in-tanzanian-war-african-nations-trying-to.html 12 February 2019 In addition to the Kagera Salient, Amin also harbored hopes of acquiring a corridor to the Indian Ocean. Accordingly, he contemplated plans of conquering Tanzania's north, including the harbor town of Tanga.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 15 Following an armed clash between soldiers along the countries' common border a few months after the coup, Amin issued rules of engagement which clarified that the Uganda Army was only allowed to attack Tanzania in retaliation or if he gave orders to do so. Regardless, his political stance remained highly aggressive.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 15 At the same time, the Ugandan exiles plotted to overthrow Amin with Tanzanian support. One of the first groups to act was Yoweri Museveni's yet-unnamed militant group. It infiltrated Uganda and attempted to establish a guerrilla base at Mount Elgon in 1971, but the militants were discovered and arrested by security forces.Ngoga 1998 93 Despite being opposed to Obote and his policies, Museveni and his small group of comrades subsequently decided to team up with the former president, viewing Amin as the greater threat.Avirgan Honey 1983 40Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 39–40 As time went on, Obote's rebel alliance suffered several setbacks. Obote had already planned simultaneous invasions from Sudan and Tanzania to take place in August 1971, but this operation was cancelled due to Nyerere's fear of British and Israeli support for Amin, doubts by the Tanzania People's Defence Force's (TPDF) high command about the invasions' chances of success, and inter-rebel feuds.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 In early 1972, Amin reportedly requested Israeli aid for an invasion of Tanzania. When the Israeli government refused to provide weaponry for this plan, the Ugandan President responded by severing diplomatic ties and allying with anti-Israeli forces such as Libya under Muammar Gaddafi and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 15 Amin also stopped assisting the Anyanya rebels and signed a deal with Sudan, after which the country expelled most Ugandan insurgents from its soil. Sudan-based Obote loyalists had to be evacuated through Kenya to Tanzania; on the way, many died. The survivors joined the few hundred already stationed at Kigwa in the Tabora Region.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 A few rebels remained in southern Sudan, and attempted an invasion of Uganda in April 1972. The operation was easily crushed by the Uganda Army.Otunnu 2016 262 In August 1972, Amin ordered the expulsion of Asians from Uganda,Ravenhill 1974 237 confiscating their wealth and claiming that he was redistributing it to other Ugandans.Seftel 2010 155 This move was very popular locally, and distracted the population from the ongoing economic crisis.Ravenhill 1974 237 There were growing fears among the rebels and the Tanzanian government that delaying a major rebel invasion continued to diminish its chances of success, while Nyerere was informed that Uganda had joined an international plot to overthrow him. As a result, the Tanzanian President finally signed off a rebel invasion of Uganda for 15 September 1972.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 Meanwhile, Obote had amassed a force of about 1,300 ex-soldiers who had escaped into exile.Rice 2009 177 His followers were known as the "Uganda People's Liberation Front" (UPLF). https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/news/national/the-failed-1971-guerilla-force-attack-ex-minister-wakholi-disappearance-1631492 The failed 1971 guerilla force attack, ex-minister Wakholi disappearance 20 November 2015 Daily Monitor 29 April 2021 Prelude thumb|A McDonnell Douglas DC-9 of the East African Airways in 1973 Obote's plan for the invasion was complete by 10 September: First, the rebels would "borrow" an East African Airways McDonnell Douglas DC-9 and use it to transport 80 commandos to Entebbe Airport.Rice 2009 178The South African magazine Drum reported that the DC-9 was supposed to carry 300 guerrillas,Seftel 2010 109 while the Daily Monitor put the number at 100. These rebels would capture the airport, march on Kampala, and capture its radio station to broadcast a prerecorded message by Obote. The former president hoped that this would inspire an uprising by civilians and soldiers.Seftel 2010 110 Meanwhile, two strike teams of insurgents would cross the border from Tanzania and attack the important towns of Mbarara and Masaka in southern Uganda. After securing these, the rebel ground forces would push on towards Kampala, Mubende, and Fort Portal. The western team targeted Mbarara would attack from the rebel camp at Kigwe, while the team attacking Masaka would start at the Handeni rebel camp.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 The Voice of Uganda, the Ugandan state newspaper, claimed Tanzanian intelligence director Lawrence Gama was involved in the invasion's planning. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/former-minister-wakholi-is-arrested-at-mutukula-border-3357240 Former minister Wakholi is arrested at Mutukula border 11 April 2021 Faustin Mugabe Daily Monitor 3 May 2021 At the same time, the TPDF supplied Museveni's force with guns and assisted them to conduct forays into Uganda to set up anti-Amin cells such as the "Temporary Committee" based in Kampala. Museveni told the Tanzanians that these missions were a great success and that several thousand people were willing to revolt in the Mbarara area.Avirgan Honey 1983 35Rice 2009 178 However, he was generally critical of "putschist solutions", believing that Amin could only be toppled through long-term guerrilla war.Rice 2009 177 On 14 September, Museveni was informed of the invasion plans by the Tanzanian defense minister who told him that trucks were already on the way to transport his rebels from their camp to the border.Rice 2009 177–178 The battle plans presumed that Museveni's undercover network would produce a large number of rebels to assist the invasion.Rice 2009 178 Museveni later claimed that he had not been the one to promise a large fifth column in Uganda. As proof, he pointed at the short notice he was given of the invasion, which made it impossible for him to prepare his underground network for an uprising. Museveni argued that Obote had deliberately overplayed the extent of his insider contacts to convince the Tanzanians of greenlighting the invasion. In general, there were reportedly strong tensions within the rebel alliance, as members of Obote's faction treated Museveni's group "as enemies". Following his capture during the invasion, rebel Alex Ojera also told his Ugandan interrogators that the insurgents had been affected by tribalism, as Bantu, Acholi, and Lango militants distrusted each other. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/ex-minister-ojera-taken-prisoner-after-obote-forces-are-ambushed-1630694 Ex-minister Ojera taken prisoner after Obote forces are ambushed 14 November 2015 Faustin Mugabe Daily Monitor 3 May 2021 Amin was informed that a rebel invasion was being organized, and prepared for this possibility by strengthening his southern defenses.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 The South African magazine Drum stated that the Kenyan intelligence agency was reportedly responsible for leaking the invasion plans,Seftel 2010 111 while researcher A. Kasozi argued that information had been leaked by Baganda civilians in southern Uganda who opposed Obote.Kasozi 1994 123 Journalist Faustin Mugabe held Ugandan spies in Tanzania responsible for uncovering the rebel plans. According to Ugandan army officer Bernard Rwehururu, many Ugandan military officers did not take the warnings about an invasion seriously, and did not properly prepare for this possibility.http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/15042002/Features/Magazine3.html Fighting for Amin The East African 8 April 2002 https://web.archive.org/web/20080308114206/http://www.nationaudio.com/News/EastAfrican/15042002/Features/Magazine3.html 8 March 2008 13 May 2019 Invasion Initial rebel operations thumb|left|Map of southeastern Uganda showing Masaka and Mbarara From the beginning, the invasion was a "fiasco"Avirgan Honey 1983 35 and "disaster." Ugandan historian Samwiri Karugire described it as "One of those rare events in military history. A perfect failure."Rice 2003 11 The DC-9 airplane never arrived at Entebbe. Obote had selected James Lalobo, a son of a friend, to fly the aircraft despite him lacking experience. Although the DC-9 was successfully stolen with support by the Tanzanian intelligence from the Dar es Salaam Airport, the pilot failed to retract its landing gear.Rice 2009 179 In his attempt to temporarily stop at Kilimanjaro International Airport to pick up the commandosRice 2009 178 on 15 September,Rice 2009 176, 179 he landed at an exceptionally high speed, destroying the DC-9's tires. The raid on Entebbe had to be canceled, while journalists got wind of the events at Kilimanjaro. A newspaper, the Uganda Argus, promptly ran an article titled "Pilot vanishes in DC-9 mystery," alerting Amin that a rebel operation was imminent. He put his southern commanders on alert, sending Simba Battalion commander Ali Fadhul to assess the situation at the border.Rice 2009 178 Despite having lost the surprise element, the ground invasions continued.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 Having dubbed his force the "People's Army"Seftel 2010 106 or "people's army forces", Mohr Charles Uganda Reports Invasion by Tanzania; It's a People's Revolt, the Latter Insists The New York Times 1 18 September 1972 https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/18/archives/uganda-reports-invasion-by-tanzania-its-a-peoples-revolt-the-latter.html 12 May 2021 Obote and the rebel factions under his leadership launched the invasion on 17 September.Seftel 2010 106 The entire rebel force was 1,340Ngoga 1998 93 to about 1,500 fighters strong.Keesing's 1972 The main rebel group crossed the border at 5:30 a.m. after killing several border guards,Seftel 2010 111 and captured Mutukula. It was supposed to target Masaka,Avirgan Honey 1983 36 about 1,000 fighters strong,Rice 2009 178 and led by Captain AnachSeftel 2010 111 or Lieutenant Colonel David Oyite-Ojok Mohr Charles Uganda Invaders reported halted by Amin's troops The New York Times 1 19 September 1972 https://www.nytimes.com/1972/09/19/archives/uganda-invaders-reported-halted-by-amins-troops-guerrillas-are-said.html 18 February 2020 and Tito Okello. The main group initially made good progress, overwhelmining a few small groups of soldiers and capturing some military equipment. After being informed of the rebels crossing the Ugandan border, Gaddafi pledged support to his ally Amin,Seftel 2010 106–107 and ordered an intervention force to be sent to Uganda.Keesing's 1972 thumb|right|Some civilians raised the black-red-blue flag of the Uganda People's Congress in support of the rebels.Rice 2009 180 The western rebel force, led by Captain Oyile,His name was also spelled "Oyire"Seftel 2010 111 and "Oyira"; he was reportedly Obote's cousin.Keesing's 1972 Lieutenant Okot, and Lieutenant Okumu, crossed the border at 7 a.m, behind schedule. Armed with a few sub-machine guns, recoilless rifles, and rockets,Seftel 2010 111 it consisted of about 300 to 350 guerrillas and included Museveni's small forceAvirgan Honey 1983 35Rice 2009 178 of 40 militants. The western group was troubled by internal problems from the start. Whereas the Obote loyalists were wearing uniforms and expecting an easy victory, Museveni's group wore civilian clothing to fight as guerrillas. Several members of the western group expressed doubts about their outdated weaponry and their small numbers compared to the Uganda Army. Some militants in the group were even unarmed. The group also had problems with their trucks, slowing their progress.Rice 2009 180 However, the group initially destroyed a Ugandan border post, killing four guards. After advancing 14 km flip into Uganda proper, the rebels encountered a Land Rover with eight soldiers who were killed in a firefightSeftel 2010 111 at Kaberebere. Despite this easy victory, some rebels were so inexperienced that they already broke during this clash and fled into the hills. The remainder continued their advance. They also ran into Fadhul, but they failed to recognize him in his civilian car. The commander sped past the insurgents and then informed Amin by telephone of the rebels' numbers and location.Rice 2009 180 According to the Ugandan government, the rebels occupied Kyotera, Kakuto and Kalisizo.Keesing's 1972 Tanzanian radio reports also claimed that Kisenyi and Umburra had been captured by rebels.Keesing's 1972 A few civilians reacted to the western insurgent group by raising the flags of the Uganda People's Congress, Obote's party.Rice 2009 180 However, contrary to Museveni's hopes, no grand rebellion erupted in the Mbarara area to support the invasion.Avirgan Honey 1983 35Rice 2009 180 Most civilians were still supportive of Amin at the time, especially due to his ongoing expulsion of the Ugandan Asians from the country.Ravenhill 1974 237 Meanwhile, the Ugandan government loyalists reacted by organizing their defenses. At 9 a.m. the Simba Battalion's second-in-command Yusuf Gowon raised the alarm at the Mbarara barracks, and ordered most of his troops to take up defensive positions. He also dispatched several jeeps to guard the road at the barracks.Rice 2009 180 The western strike team of insurgents arrived at Mbarara at 10:30 a.m., where they destroyed a few roadblocks and an abandoned jeep before moving to assault the town's barracks.Rice 2009 180 Without proper supplies, badly trained and lacking experienced leadership, the rebels failed to capture the Mbarara barracks.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 As soon as they approached the garrison, an army jeep opened fire with a recoilless rifle and destroyed a rebel truck. The entire insurgent advance promptly fell into disarray. Captain Oyile "disappeared", while several militants fled into the nearby woods. Museveni and thirty of his guerrillas advanced up to the barracks' gates, taking cover at an anthill and firing at the soldiers. Another group of rebels took position at a mosque and fired at the barracks with a mortar. Some rebels attempted to climb across a wire fence which surrounded the barracks, but were easily killed by Gowon's troops.Rice 2009 181 After an hour of fighting, the rebels retreated. As the remaining rebels were left mostly leaderless, Museveni took command and led the survivors back to the Tanzanian border. They were pursued by Gowon's troops.Rice 2009 181 Many more rebels were killed during the retreat than during the battle at Mbarara.Rice 2009 182 Several insurgents attempted to hide with local civilians, including Oyile, Okot, and Okumu, only to be handed over to the Uganda Army. The eastern rebel force was stopped at Kiziba by a large Uganda Army contingent.Avirgan Honey 1983 36According to Museveni's account, Tito Okello had called for reinforcements before arriving at Kalisizo. He did so using an army radio without changing frequency; Uganda Army members promptly answered, pretending to be insurgents and telling him to move to a certain area to receive ammunition. The Ugandan loyalists then disptached troops to the Lukoma airstrip in the south from where they moved to ambush the eastern rebel convoy. The government forces included tanks and armoured personnel carriers. As the rebels lacked weaponry to overcome the government forces,Avirgan Honey 1983 36 and also ran out of ammunition,Seftel 2010 111 they quickly broke off the attack.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 About 169 rebels were killed in this clash. Having suffered heavy losses, they retreated under the cover of darkness.Seftel 2010 111 Rebel retreat and border clashes By early 18 September, the rebels were in full retreat. Only 46 insurgents belonging to the Mbarara strike force reportedly reached the Tanzanian border on that day.Rice 2009 181 At least 100 insurgents of this group were killedAvirgan Honey 1983 36 and several others captured to be later executed.Ngoga 1998 93 The casualties included important members of Museveni's faction such as Mwesigwa Black and Omongin Raila.Ngoga 1998 93 Government loyalists fully retook Mbarara, Kalisizo and Kyotera,Keesing's 1972 while Mutukula remained outside Uganda Army control. According to Rwehururu, the insurgents were routed at Kalisizo by a combined force, consisting of Simba Battalion and Suicide Regiment troops led by Lt. Atanasius. One group of about 500 rebels retreated into the marshes between Masaka and the Tanzanian border, where they dug in.Keesing's 1972 Informants in Tanzania claimed that these insurgents were provided with fresh supplies, equipment, and some reinforcements from Tanzania. Amin blamed Nyerere for backing and arming his enemies,Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 6–7 and claimed that 1,000 Tanzanian soldiers had been part of the invasion force. He retaliated by ordering his air force to bomb Tanzanian border towns.Roberts 2017 155 The Uganda Army Air Force targeted Mwanza and BukobaSeftel 2010 109 from 18 to 20 September,Avirgan Honey 1983 36 claiming to have destroyed insurgent camps there.Seftel 2010 109 The TPDF moved its 4th battalion and a mortar company to safeguard the border.Keesing's 1972 Amin also accused Israel, Britain, and India of supporting the attack,Seftel 2010 108 and the rebels of being in the pocket of the unpopular Ugandan Asians.Ravenhill 1974 237 A Uganda Army spokesman stated that three white Israeli mercenaries had been working with the insurgents and killed during the invasion,Keesing's 1972 with foreign observers fearing that these "mercenaries" had actually been white civilians caught in the crossfire. On 19 September, President Amin declared "complete victory" over the insurgents, despite the latter still holding some areas.Keesing's 1972 He publicly claimed that his troops had secured a copy of the rebels' battle plans, and falsely stated that the insurgents had intended to massacre certain tribes and professions. Enraged, groups of civilians banded together and began to hunt for rebel stragglers, lynching those whom they captured.Rice 2009 182 Some civilians used the opportunity to settle grudges, trying to frame innocents as insurgent supporters.Rice 2009 182–183 The official mopping-up operations and purges of pro-rebel elements were entrusted to Fadhul, Gowon, and Isaac Maliyamungu.Lowman 2020 102 Fadhul was entrusted with the countryside, Gowon was responsible for Mbarara,Rice 2009 187 and Maliyamungu organized the purges in Masaka.Lowman 2020 104 The State Research Centre (SRC) played a major role in rounding up suspected anti-Amin elements.Rice 2009 187 At Mbarara, an ad hoc court was set up presided over by Gowon; several suspected rebels were sentenced to death, although others were found innocent and freed.Rice 2009 183–184 On 20 September, five Libyan Lockheed C-130 Hercules carrying 399 soldiers and military equipment crossed into Sudanese airspace in the attempt to reach Uganda.Keesing's 1972 They were forced by Sudanese jetsSeftel 2010 108–109Decker 2010 56 to land in Khartoum; the Sudanese authorities confiscated their weaponry and instructed them to return to Libya.Keesing's 1972Decker 2010 56 The C-130 pilots assured the Sudanese that they would follow these instructions, but then continued their flight to Uganda,Keesing's 1972 flying below the Sudanese radar.https://www.zeit.de/1972/39/amin-siegte-ueber-obote Amin siegte über Obote Zeit German 29 September 1972 29 April 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20161108040453/https://www.zeit.de/1972/39/amin-siegte-ueber-obote 8 November 2016 The Libyans landed in Entebbe on 21 September.Keesing's 1972 Despite them arriving too late to offer "meaningful assistance" in the fighting against the rebels,Decker 2010 56 their presence boosted Amin's local image.Seftel 2010 108–109 Libya also sent some Palestine Liberation Organization commandos, and a MiG jet to assist Amin.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 On 24 September, the Ugandan government claimed that guerrillas were still controlling the towns of Mutukula and Kikagati.Keesing's 1972 Amin claimed on 28 September that about 50 guerrillas remained on Ugandan soil, encircled by Uganda Army troops.Keesing's 1972 By the next day, foreign journalists stated that the fighting had mostly ceased. International reactions and mediation The invasion and the Tanzanian support for the insurgents were internationally condemned, especially by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Nigeria, Guinea, Libya, and Egypt openly condemned the Tanzanian training and arming of Ugandan rebels.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 In response, Tanzania People's Defence Force (TPDF) commander Major General Mrisho Sarakikya denied any Tanzanian involvement in the rebel operation. Nyerere also sent a telegram to OAU chairman Hassan II of Morocco protesting the Ugandan airstrikes targeting Tanzanian towns. To avoid open war, the OAU requested third-party countries to mediate between Uganda and Tanzania. The OAU initially approached Kenyan President Jomo Kenyatta, but he and his government refused to get involved in the dispute. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, Algerian President Houari Boumédiène and Guinean President Ahmed Sékou Touré offered to organize the mediation, while Egypt contacted Tanzanian Foreign Minister John Malecela to seek a peaceful solution. However, a five-point peace plan by Somali President Siad Barre was the most positively received proposal in Uganda as well as Tanzania, though Amin initially continued his aggressive rhetoric while Ugandan and Tanzanian representatives met in the Somali capital Mogadishu. https://www.monitor.co.ug/uganda/magazines/people-power/somalia-saves-uganda-and-tanzania-from-going-to-war-1680344 Somalia saves Uganda and Tanzania from going to war Daily Monitor 17 December 2016 12 May 2021 Aftermath Uganda–Tanzania War thumb|left|Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (pictured 1975) refrained from further escalating the conflict. Though his commanders urged him to respond in kind to the Ugandan border attacks, Nyerere agreed to the mediation overseen by Siad Barre, which resulted in the signing of the Mogadishu Agreement, which stipulated that Ugandan and Tanzanian forces retreat to positions at least 10 km flip away from the other's border and refrain from supporting opposition forces that targeted each other's governments.Roberts 2017 155 The Ugandan rebel camp at Handeni was closed, and the Obote loyalists were resettled to Tabora in central Tanzania to live as tobacco farmers.Avirgan Honey 1983 37 The agreement was signed on 5 October 1972. Amin and Nyerere would remain deeply hostile.Decker 2010 57 Overall, the rebels were completely defeated and suffered heavy losses;Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 15–17 hundreds were killed. The Daily Monitor put the insurgent losses at 454 dead. The Uganda Army admitted that nine soldiers had been killed. According to the Ugandan government, about 150 Ugandan civilians had died during the invasion.Keesing's 1972 Between nine and 20 Tanzanian civilians were killed during the Ugandan airstrikes.Avirgan Honey 1983 36 One American Peace Corps worker was killed by crossfire in southern Uganda.Melady 1976 19 After the invasion Amin posed on television with several captured rebels.Keesing's 1972 Several alleged guerrillas were later secretly or publicly executedSeftel 2010 118–119 including Captain Oyile, former Information Minister Alex Ojera, Picho Ali,The Ugandan government initially declared that Oyile, Ojera, and six other members of the invasion force had "escaped custody"Seftel 2010 121 instead of admitting that they had been killed. and former Deputy Minister of Cooperatives Joshua Wakholi. Amin also used the invasion as an opportunity to kill political opponents, regardless of whether they had supported the rebel attack or not. Hundreds of people belonging to the country's civilian elite were arrested and killed. These purges were led by the Military Police, SRC, and Public Safety Unit.Lowman 2020 102 Benedicto Kiwanuka (whom Amin had freed in 1971 and appointed Chief Justice of Uganda) was among those murdered in the rebel attack's aftermath.Lowman 2020 108 There were numerous executions of suspected Uganda People's Congress supporters in the Masaka and Mbarara areas,Kasozi 1994 123 and many imprisoned opposition figures were also killed.Seftel 2010 113Kasozi 1994 123 Many Ugandans were shocked at the mass killings following the invasion, as they had still considered Amin to be the "reformer and messiah" as whom he had previously presented himself. Amin also ordered an acceleration of the expulsion of Asians from Uganda in response to the invasion, and purged the policeRavenhill 1974 235 as well as the Uganda Army of suspected disloyal elements. Several ethnic Baganda officers were forcibly disappeared,Ravenhill 1974 235 while the President was publicly "lashing out" against Acholi and Langi soldiers, ordering them to "stop their dirty activities".Decker 2014 500–501 The 1972 invasion is regarded in Uganda as the turning point at which Amin's regime became much more violent than before, becoming more paranoid and more willing to outright murder civilians.Lowman 2020 100–101 Even though the purges were an attempt to stabilize the Ugandan government so that it became less vulnerable to external attacks, the killings damaged its reputation and popularity. As a result, Amin came to rely even more on terror to stay in power. Researcher Alicia Decker concluded that the terror ultimately "devoured his regime from within".Decker 2010 57 Amin's popularity also suffered when the expulsion of Ugandan Asians proved to cause severe long-term problems, greatly harming the country's economy and international reputation.Ravenhill 1974 237 About twenty thousand Ugandans fled the country, resettling in Tanzania.Avirgan Honey 1983 37 Insurgent activity against Amin continued,Avirgan Honey 1983 37 and Nyerere informed the Ugandan rebels that anti-Amin activities would be tolerated in Tanzania despite the Mogadishu Agreement. The Tanzanian President asked the insurgents to stay mostly clandestine and not inform him of their operations. Tanzania also continued to treat Obote like a head of state.Avirgan Honey 1983 37 However, the failed invasion caused great disagreements among the anti-Amin opposition, as rebel leaders blamed each other for the defeat. Obote never forgave Museveni for the fact that the popular uprising at Mbarara had not occurred as he had allegedly promised.Avirgan Honey 1983 35 In early 1973, Museveni officially announced the formation of the "Front for National Salvation" (FRONASA),Avirgan Honey 1983 41 while Obote reorganized and rebuilt his guerrilla force.Otunnu 2017 46Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 27 FRONASA, Obote's rebels, and other militant factions took part in the Uganda–Tanzania War of 1978–79 which resulted in Amin's overthrow.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 27–28 Obote subsequently returned to power in the disputed 1980 Ugandan general elections, causing several opposition groups to take up arms. In the course of the Ugandan Bush War, Museveni's National Resistance Movement emerged victorious and he became Ugandan President in 1986.Cooper Fontanellaz 2015 39–40, 51 Notes References Works cited Armed Invasion of Uganda by Followers of Ex-President Obote. Resultant Conflict between Uganda and Tanzania. Somali Mediation leads to Peaceful Settlement. Keesing's Record of World Events 18 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC 1972 https://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/1381-1972-11-KS-a-RRW.pdf Keesing's 1972 Avirgan Tony Tony Avirgan Honey Martha Martha Honey War in Uganda: The Legacy of Idi Amin Dar es Salaam Tanzania Publishing House 1983 978-9976-1-0056-3 Cooper Tom Fontanellaz Adrien Wars and Insurgencies of Uganda 1971–1994 2015 Helion & Company Limited Solihull 978-1-910294-55-0 Decker Alicia Idi Amin's Dirty War: Subversion, Sabotage, and the Battle to Keep Uganda Clean, 1971-1979 The International Journal of African Historical Studies 43 3 489–513 2010 23046822 Decker Alicia C. In Idi Amin's Shadow: Women, Gender, and Militarism in Uganda Ohio University Press 2014 Athens, Ohio https://books.google.com/books?id=9JKdBAAAQBAJ 978-0-8214-4502-0 Kasozi A. 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From the Pages of Drum Fountain Publishers 2010 1st pub. 1994 Kampala 978-9970-02-036-2 Otunnu Ogenga Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1890 to 1979 https://books.google.com/books?id=aZDLDQAAQBAJ 2016 Palgrave Macmillan Chicago 978-3-319-33155-3 Otunnu Ogenga Crisis of Legitimacy and Political Violence in Uganda, 1979 to 2016 https://books.google.com/books?id=4UQwDwAAQBAJ 2017 Palgrave Macmillan Chicago 978-3-319-33155-3 Category:Invasions Category:1972 conflicts Category:Massacres in 1972 Category:1972 in Uganda Category:September 1972 in Africa Category:Milton Obote Category:Wars involving Uganda Category:Wars involving Tanzania Category:Wars involving Libya Category:Military operations involving the Palestine Liberation Organization Category:20th-century mass murders in Uganda Category:20th-century rebellions Category:Tanzania–Uganda relations Category:Idi Amin