2000–2001 California electricity crisis

Electricity crisis in California in 2000–2001 December 2024 June 2022 Chronology https://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/opennat.asp?fileID=10492781 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Chronologyhttp://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/ref_case_californiacrisis.asp ERisk.com's The California Energy Crisis 2063-20100 https://web.archive.org/web/20060118233725/http://www.erisk.com/Learning/CaseStudies/ref_case_californiacrisis.asp January 18, 2006 https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/blackout/california/timeline.html FrontLine's California Crisis Timeline PBS August 17, 2008 1996 California begins to modify controls on its energy market and takes measures ostensibly to increase competition. September 23, 1996 Pete Wilson signs Electric Utility Industry Restructuring Act (Assembly Bill 1890) and it becomes law.https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/assemblybill.html California Electric Energy Crisis - Provisions of AB 1890 U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) May 1, 2019April 1998 Spot market for energy begins operation. May 2000 Significant rise in energy prices. June 14, 2000 Blackouts affect 97,000 customers in San Francisco Bay area during a heat wave. August 2000 San Diego Gas & Electric Company files a complaint alleging manipulation of the markets. January 17–18, 2001 Blackouts affect several hundred thousand customers. January 17, 2001 Governor Davis declares a state of emergency. March 19–20, 2001 Blackouts affect 1.5 million customers.https://www.nytimes.com/2001/03/21/us/california-orders-blackouts-for-a-second-straight-day.html California Orders Blackouts For a Second Straight Day The New York Times March 21, 2001 July 3, 2024https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-mar-21-mn-40618-story.html Second Day of Blackouts Disrupts 500000 Homes and Businesses Los Angeles Times March 21, 2001 July 3, 2024 April 2001 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. files for bankruptcy.https://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/07/us/california-s-largest-utility-files-for-bankruptcy.html California's Largest Utility Files for Bankruptcy The New York Times April 7, 2001 July 3, 2024https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2001-apr-07-mn-48927-story.html PG&E; Declares Bankruptcy; State's Crisis Plans Collapse Los Angeles Times April 7, 2001 July 3, 2024 May 7–8, 2001 Blackouts affect upwards of 167,000 customers.https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/2001/05/08/rolling-blackouts-ordered-across-state/ Rolling blackouts ordered across state San Diego Union-Tribune May 8, 2001 July 3, 2024 September 2001 Energy prices normalize. December 2001 Following the bankruptcy of Enron, it is alleged that energy prices were manipulated by Enron. February 2002 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission begins investigation of Enron's involvement. Winter 2002 The Enron Tapes scandal begins to surface. November 13, 2003 Governor Davis ends the state of emergency. The 2000–2001 California electricity crisis, also known as the Western U.S. energy crisis of 2000 and 2001, was a period during which the state of California experienced an electricity shortage caused by market manipulation and capped retail electricity prices. http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/OurEnergyFuture/TheCaliforniaElectricityCrisisLessonsfortheFuture.aspx The California Electricity Crisis: Lessons for the Future Sweeney James L. Summer 2002 National Academy of Engineering of the Nation Academies January 9, 2012 "... volatile commodity market, but it had fixed sales prices for the investor-owned utilities at the retail level, a potentially untenable combination" The state suffered multiple large-scale blackouts, one of its largest energy companies collapsed, and the economic fall-out greatly harmed the standing of Governor Gray Davis. Drought and delays in the approval of new power plants also decreased supply.109 This caused an 800% increase in wholesale electricity prices from April 2000 to December 2000.The California Electricity Crisis: Causes and Policy Options Weare Christopher 2003 Public Policy Institute of California San Francisco 1-58213-064-7 http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/R_103CWR.pdf 1 In addition, rolling blackouts adversely affected many businesses dependent on a reliable supply of electricity and inconvenienced many retail consumers. California had an installed generating capacity of 45 GW (gigawatts, or billions of watts). At the time of the blackouts, demand was 28 GW. A supply-demand gap was created by energy companies, mainly Enron, to create artificial shortages. Energy traders took power plants offline for maintenance during days of peak demand to increase prices.Tapes: Enron plotted to shut down power plant.Egan Timothy Timothy Egan Tapes Show Enron Arranged Plant Shutdown https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/national/04energy.html?ex=1107666000&en=01449ebf62df572e&ei=5070 September 9, 2020 The New York Times February 4, 2005 https://archive.today/20120905051311/http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/04/national/04energy.html?ex=1107666000&en=01449ebf62df572e&ei=5070 September 5, 2012InternetArchiveBot Traders were thus able to sell power at premium prices, sometimes at up to twenty times its normal value. Because the state government capped retail electricity charges, this market manipulation squeezed the industry's revenue margins, causing the bankruptcy of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) and the near bankruptcy of Southern California Edison in early 2001.2–3 According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the situation became possible because of legislation enacted in 1996 by the California Legislature (AB 1890) and Governor Pete Wilson that deregulated some aspects of the energy industry. Enron took advantage of this partial deregulation and engaged in economic withholding and inflated price bidding in California's spot markets. http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/summary-findings.pdf FERC Summary of findings March 17, 2010 May 27, 2010 https://web.archive.org/web/20100527135313/http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/summary-findings.pdf dead The damage caused by the crisis was estimated to be between $40 and $45 billion.3–4 Causes Market manipulation As the FERC report concluded, market manipulation was only possible because of the complex market design produced by partial deregulation. Manipulation strategies were known to energy traders by names such as "Fat Boy", "Death Star", "Forney Perpetual Loop", "Wheel Out", "Ricochet", "Ping Pong", "Black Widow", "Big Foot", "Red Congo", "Cong Catcher", and "Get Shorty".Congestion Manipulation "DeathStar", McCullough Research (June 5, 2002) In a letter sent by David Fabian to Senator Boxer in 2002, it was alleged that: "There is a single connection between northern and southern California's power grids. I heard that Enron traders purposely overbooked that line, then caused others to need it. Next, by California's free-market rules, Enron was allowed to price-gouge at will."Letter from David Fabian to Senator Boxer, February 13, 2002, p.1, quoted in Congestion Manipulation "DeathStar", McCullough Research (June 5, 2002) at p.4. Effects of partial deregulation At the federal level, the Energy Policy Act of 1992, for which Enron had lobbied, opened electrical transmission grids to competition by unbundling generation and transmission of electricity.A most favored corporation: Enron prevailed in federal, state lobbying efforts 49 times https://www.publicintegrity.org/2003/01/06/3160/most-favored-corporation-enron-prevailed-federal-state-lobbying-efforts-49-times Center for Public Integrity January 6, 2003 At the state level, part of California's deregulation process, which was promoted as a means of increasing competition, was also influenced by lobbying from Enron and began in 1996, when California became the first state to deregulate its electricity market.Fogarty Thomas A. Iwata Edward Energy deregulation: Is it friend or enemy? http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/covers/2002-05-16-enron-california-hearings.htm USAToday May 15, 2002Editorial: Don't let ghosts of Enron haunt us again https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/article103535032.html Sacramento Bee September 24, 2016 en thumb|right|200px|PG&E yard in San Francisco Energy deregulation put the three companies that distributed electricity into a difficult situation. The energy deregulation policy froze or capped the price of energy that the three energy distributors could charge for electricity.http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/gate/archive/2001/05/08/lookhow.DTL Energy Crisis Overview: How we got here August 17, 2008 The San Francisco Chronicle dead May 8, 2001 https://web.archive.org/web/20080206194211/http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=%2Fgate%2Farchive%2F2001%2F05%2F08%2Flookhow.DTL February 6, 2008 Furthermore, distributors were not initially permitted to buy long-term energy contracts and were instead forced to procure electricity in short-term spot markets, increasing their exposure to price volatility.Energy Deregulation: The Benefits of Competition Were Undermined by Structural Flaws in the Market, Unsuccessful Oversight, and Uncontrollable Competitive Forces https://information.auditor.ca.gov/pdfs/reports/2000-134.1.pdf California State Auditor 23 Deregulating energy producers did not lower energy costs. Deregulation did not encourage new producers to generate more electricity and drive down prices. Instead, as demand for electricity increased, energy producers charged higher prices for electricity. https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/THE-ENERGY-CRUNCH-A-YEAR-LATER-State-s-2834535.php The Energy Crunch / A Year Later / State's deregulation folly is no laughing matter / Consumers face inflated bills for years for failed electricity plan Carolyn Said December 24, 2001 August 17, 2008 The San Francisco Chronicle The producers used spikes in energy production to inflate energy prices. In January 2001, energy producers began shutting down plants in order to increase prices. Government price caps Retail electricity price caps limited the ability of utilities to pass rising wholesale costs on to consumers. In February 2001, California Governor Gray Davis stated, "Believe me, if I wanted to raise rates I could have solved this problem in 20 minutes."Energy crisis cited as turning point for Davis https://web.archive.org/web/20090221160025/http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/politics/recall/20030902-9999_1n2power.html February 21, 2009 , San Diego Union-Tribune, September 2, 2003 However, in San Diego, where San Diego Gas & Electric had paid off its debt, market rates began to be charged in July 1999. Prices doubled in two months because of a hot summer, and people protested by refusing to pay their bills and calling the power company.Lazarus David 2000-07-27 Deregulation Doubling Electric Bills / San Diego jolt a preview of what Northern California may face https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Deregulation-Doubling-Electric-Bills-San-Diego-3303208.php San Francisco Chronicle Utilities were required to satisfy their expected electricity demand in California’s day-ahead power market rather than its real-time market. As a consequence of price caps, however, utilities were incentivized to submit false schedules with artificially low demand into the day-ahead market, depressing day-ahead prices without increasing real-time prices beyond the cap.2003-07-03 American Electric Power Service Corporation et al.; Order To Show Cause Concerning Gaming and/or Anomalous Market Behavior https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2003/07/03/03-16821/american-electric-power-service-corporation-et-al-order-to-show-cause-concerning-gaming-andor 2026-09-10 Federal Register en In turn, the gap between day-ahead and real-time power created incentive for wholesalers to find ways to reclassify their day-ahead power as real-time. For example, in a market technique known as megawatt laundering, wholesalers bought electricity in California at below cap price, sold it out of state, and immediately re-imported it to sell at higher real-time prices. When electricity demand in California rose, utilities had no financial incentive to expand production because long-term prices were capped. In some instances, wholesalers scheduled power transmission to create congestion and drive up prices.Leopold Jason Enron linked to California blackouts https://www.marketwatch.com/story/enron-caused-california-blackouts-traders-say May 27, 2021 MarketWatch EN-US After extensive investigation, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) substantially agreed in 2003: "supply-demand imbalance, flawed market design and inconsistent rules made possible significant market manipulation as delineated in final investigation report. Without underlying market dysfunction, attempts to manipulate the market would not be successful." "many trading strategies employed by Enron and other companies violated the anti-gaming provisions". "Electricity prices in California's spot markets were affected by economic withholding and inflated price bidding, in violation of tariff anti-gaming provisions." New regulations In the mid-1990s, under Republican Governor Pete Wilson, California began restructuring its electricity industry. Democratic State Senator Steve Peace was the chairman of the Senate Committee on Energy at the time and is often credited as "the father of deregulation".Martin Mark Newsmaker Profile: Steve Peace / Davis' finance chief skilled at raising hell / Brash ex-senator a bold pick http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/NEWSMAKER-PROFILE-Steve-Peace-Davis-finance-2709769.php San Francisco Chronicle December 22, 2002 The author of the bill was Senator Jim Brulte, a Republican from Rancho Cucamonga.How California's Consumers Lost With Electricity Deregulation https://web.archive.org/web/20120628142938/http://www.commondreams.org/headlines/120900-01.htm June 28, 2012 Common Dreams Wilson publicly admitted that defects in the deregulation system would need to be fixed by "the next governor". thumb|200px|right|PG&E electric meter on Angel Island Supply and demand California's population increased by 13% during the 1990s.Perry Marc Mackun Paul Population Change and Distribution: Census 2000 Brief https://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/c2kbr01-2.pdf United States Census Bureau June 7, 2021 The state did not build any new major power plants during that time, and California's generation capacity decreased by 2 percent from 1990 through 1999, while retail sales increased by 11 percent.Subsequent Events-California's Energy Crisis https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html#N_7_ U.S. Energy Information Administration June 7, 2021 EIA California's utilities came to depend in part on imports of excess hydroelectric power from the Pacific Northwest states of Oregon and Washington.Subsequent Events-California's Energy Crisis https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html#N_7_ U.S. Energy Information Administration June 7, 2021 EIA During that time, California relied on out-of-state generators to supply 7 to 11 gigawatts of power.Subsequent Events-California's Energy Crisis https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html#N_7_ U.S. Energy Information Administration June 7, 2021 EIA In the summer of 2001, a drought in the Northwest states reduced the amount of hydroelectric power available to California.Subsequent Events-California's Energy Crisis https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/subsequentevents.html#N_7_ U.S. Energy Information Administration June 7, 2021 EIA Moreover, wholesale natural gas prices spiked nationwide, rising from around $2 per 1 e6BTU kWh on off in at the beginning of 1999 to more than $10 per million BTU in the winter of 2000-2001.Natural Gas: Analysis of Changes in Market Price https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-03-46.pdf U.S. General Accounting Office USGAO The main line that allowed electricity to travel from the north to the south, Path 15, had not been improved for manyDecember 2010 years and became a major bottleneck that limited the amount of power that could be sent south to 3,900 MW. The International Energy Agency estimatesThe Power to Choose – Enhancing Demand Response in Liberalised Electricity Markets Findings of IEA Demand Response Project, Presentation 2003 that a 5% reduction in demand would have resulted in a 50% price reduction during the peak hours of the 2000-2001 crisis. With better demand response, the market also becomes more resilient to the intentional withdrawal of offers from the supply side. Key events Rolling blackouts affecting 97,000 customers hit the San Francisco Bay Area on June 14, 2000, and San Diego Gas & Electric Company filed a complaint in August 2000 alleging market manipulation by some energy producers. On December 7, 2000, because of low supply and idled power plants, the California Independent System Operator (ISO), which manages the California power grid, declared the first statewide Stage 3 power alert, meaning power reserves were below 3 percent. Rolling blackouts were avoided when the state halted two large state and federal water pumps to conserve electricity.Quinton Amy California's Water Supply, A 700 Mile Journey http://www.capradio.org/articles/2013/10/07/californias-water-supply-a-700-mile-journey/ Capradio.org February 25, 2020 Most notably, the city of Los Angeles was unaffected by the crisis because government-owned public utilities in California (including the Los Angeles Department of Water & Power) were exempt from the deregulation legislation and sold their excess power to private utilities in the state, mostly to Southern California Edison, during the crisis. That enabled much of the greater Los Angeles area to suffer only rolling brownouts rather than long-term blackouts experienced in other parts of the state.Hahn Orders DWP to Probe Power Deals https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2002-jun-29-me-dwp29-story.html April 3, 2013 Los Angeles Times June 29, 2002 Seema Mehta Nancy Vogel Consequences of wholesale price rises on the retail market As a result of the actions of electricity wholesalers, Southern California Edison (SCE) and Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E) were buying electricity on the spot market at very high prices but were unable to raise retail rates. For a product that the IOUs used to produce for about three cents per kilowatt-hour of electricity, they were paying eleven to fifty cents, or occasionally even more, but they were capped at 6.7 cents per kilowatt-hour when charging their retail customers. As a result, PG&E filed for bankruptcy, and Southern California Edison devised a workout plan with the State of California to save the company from the same fate.Keeley Fred Fred Keeley The Energy Crisis: Keeping The Lights On http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/01/01-03keeley-speech.html Commonwealth Club of California August 18, 2020 https://archive.today/20021020055030/http://www.commonwealthclub.org/archive/01/01-03keeley-speech.html October 20, 2002 March 8, 2001 deadInternetArchiveBot According to a 2007 study of Department of Energy data by Power in the Public Interest, retail electricity prices rose much more from 1999 to 2007 in states that adopted deregulation than in those that did not. Johnston David Competitively Priced Electricity Costs More, Studies Show The New York Times November 6, 2007 https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/business/06electric.html August 17, 2008 Involvement of Enron Enron One of the energy wholesalers that became notorious for "gaming the market" and reaping large speculative profits was Enron Corporation. Enron CEO Kenneth Lay mocked the efforts of the California state government to thwart the practices of the energy wholesalers, insisting that "no matter what the 'crazy people in California' did, he had people working for him at Enron that could figure out a way to make money." The original statement was made during a phone conversation between S. David Freeman (chairman of the California Power Authority) and Lay in 2000, according to statements made by Freeman to the Senate Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism in Aprilhttp://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/041102freeman.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20060301073438/http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/041102freeman.pdf March 1, 2006 Testimony of S. David Freeman April 11, 2002 August 17, 2008 and May 2002.http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/051502freeman.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20060301072016/http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/051502freeman.pdf March 1, 2006 Testimony of S. David Freeman May 15, 2002 August 17, 2008 Freeman, who was appointed chair of the California Power Authority in the midst of the crisis, made the following statements about Enron's involvement in testimony submitted to the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation on May 15, 2002: "There is one fundamental lesson we must learn from this experience: electricity is really different from everything else. It cannot be stored, it cannot be seen, and we cannot do without it, which makes opportunities to take advantage of a deregulated market endless. It is a public good that must be protected from private abuse. If Murphy's Law were written for a market approach to electricity, then the law would state 'any system that can be gamed, will be gamed, and at the worst possible time.' And a market approach for electricity is inherently gameable. Never again can we allow private interests to create artificial or even real shortages and to be in control. "Enron stood for secrecy and a lack of responsibility. In electric power, we must have openness and companies that are responsible for keeping the lights on. We need to go back to companies that own power plants with clear responsibilities for selling real power under long-term contracts. There is no place for companies like Enron that own the equivalent of an electronic telephone book and game the system to extract an unnecessary middleman’s profits. Companies with power plants can compete for contracts to provide the bulk of our power at reasonable prices that reflect costs. People say that Governor Davis has been vindicated by the Enron confession." Handling of the crisis Governor Gray Davis Some critics, such as Arianna Huffington, alleged that Davis was lulled into inaction by campaign contributions from energy producers.Huffington Arianna Arianna Huffington Gov. Davis and the failure of power: California's energy crisis is another lesson in the need for campaign finance reform https://www.salon.com/2001/01/27/power_4/ Salon September 2, 2020 January 27, 2001 https://archive.today/20080726204147/http://www.salon.com/politics/feature/2001/01/27/power/index.html July 26, 2008 live In addition, the California State Legislature would sometimes push Davis to act decisively by taking over power plants that were known to have been manipulated and placing them back under the control of the utilities, ensuring a steadier supply and punishing the worst manipulators. Meanwhile, conservatives argued that Davis signed overpriced energy contracts, employed incompetent negotiators, and refused to allow residential electricity prices to rise statewide as they did in San Diego, which they argued could have given Davis more leverage against the energy traders and encouraged greater conservation. http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200308/ai_n9286114 https://web.archive.org/web/20070324221436/http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200308/ai_n9286114 usurped March 24, 2007 Ten good reasons to recall Gray Davis August 18, 2003 August 17, 2008 Human Events Additional criticism is presented in the book Conspiracy of Fools, which details a meeting involving the governor and his officials, Clinton Administration Treasury officials, and energy executives, including market manipulators such as Enron, during which Davis disagreed with the Treasury officials and energy executives. They advised suspending environmental studies to build power plants and implementing a small rate hike to prepare for long-term power contracts (which Davis eventually signed overpriced ones, as noted above), while Davis supported price caps, denounced the other solutions as too politically risky, and allegedly acted rudely. Eichenwald Kurt Kurt Eichenwald Conspiracy of Fools 2005 1st Broadway Books New York 0-7679-1178-4 408–12 15 registration https://archive.org/details/conspiracyoffool00eich The contracts Davis signed locked Californians into high electricity costs for the next decade.http://www.geoffmetcalf.com/davis_20010525.html Governor Davis and the Energy Crisis October 10, 2011 dead https://web.archive.org/web/20111016005719/http://geoffmetcalf.com/davis_20010525.html October 16, 2011 As of October 2011, electric rates in California had yet to return to pre-contract levels. Arnold Schwarzenegger On May 17, 2001, future Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger and former Los Angeles mayor Richard Riordan, a Republican, met with Enron CEO Kenneth Lay at the Peninsula Beverly Hills Hotel in Beverly Hills. The meeting was convened for Enron to present its "Comprehensive Solution for California," which called for an end to federal and state investigations into Enron's role in the California energy crisis. https://web.archive.org/web/20060814133208/http://www.projectcensored.org/publications/2005/13.html August 14, 2006http://www.democracynow.org/2003/10/6/schwarzenegger_accused_of_involvement_in_9b Schwarzenegger Accused of Involvement in $9B California Swindle with Enron's Ken Lay Democracynow.org August 14, 2010 On October 7, 2003, Schwarzenegger was elected governor of California to replace Davis. Over a year later, he attended the commissioning ceremony http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/cct/2005/jan14/27no12.htm https://web.archive.org/web/20060924224547/http://www.wapa.gov/newsroom/cct/2005/jan14/27no12.htm September 24, 2006 Western Area Power Administration Closed Circuit newsletter January 14, 2005 Hinkley August 17, 2008 Carolyn for a new Western Area Power Administration (WAPA) 500 kV line that remedied the power bottleneck on Path 15. Congressional response to the crisis In the spring of 2001, House Government Affairs Energy Policy and Regulatory Affairs Subcommittee chairman Doug Ose held a series of field hearings in California and Nevada, receiving testimony from Public Utilities Commission chair Loretta Lynch, FERC General Counsel Kevin Madden, California ISO President and CEO Terry Winter, and Central Valley farmers. During the hearings, the state and federal representatives blamed each other, but there was consensus that warning signs of the crisis had been repeatedly missed.Thompson Don House launches probe https://www.recordnet.com/story/news/2001/04/11/house-launches-probe/50786172007/ June 2, 2022 The Stockton Record en-US Federal Energy Regulatory Commission The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) was closely involved in the handling of the crisis beginning in the summer of 2000. There were at least four separate FERC investigations. http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec.asp Summary of FERC documentation relating to the Western Energy Crisis 2000–2001 August 17, 2008 The Gaming Case, which investigated general allegations of manipulation of the Western energy markets. The Enron Western Markets Investigation, FERC Docket Number PA02-2, which specifically investigating the involvement of Enron and other companies in manipulating the energy markets. The Refund Case, which involved the wide-ranging recovery of illegal profits made by some companies during the crisis. The Economic Withholding and Anomalous Bidding Case.Investigation of Anomalous Bidding Behavior and Practices in the Western Markets, 103 FERC ¶ 61,347 at 62,360 (2003). In December 2005, the Commission filed a report with Congress on its response to the California electricity crisis, https://www.ferc.gov/sites/default/files/2020-05/comm-response.pdf The Commission's Response to the California Electricity Crisis and Timeline for Distribution of Refunds which stated that "to date, the Commission staff has facilitated settlements resulting in over $6.3 billion". On August 17, 2013, the British Columbia company Powerex agreed to a $750 million refund to settle charges of manipulating electricity prices during 2000. http://in.reuters.com/article/utilities-california-crisis-idINL2N0GH0WI20130816 https://web.archive.org/web/20160105122152/http://in.reuters.com/article/utilities-california-crisis-idINL2N0GH0WI20130816 dead January 5, 2016 Canadian province settles California energy crisis case August 17, 2013 Reuters August 16, 2013 See also California 2000s List of power outages Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, a United States Supreme Court case caused by this disaster. References 2 External links Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Final Report on Price Manipulation in Western Markets (March 23, 2003) Findings at a glance https://web.archive.org/web/20060221111358/http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/wec/enron/summary-findings.pdf February 21, 2006 Chronology in detail Further documents, including detailed report Reports on Enron and the California Energy Crisis https://web.archive.org/web/20060220191900/http://mresearch.com/reports.html February 20, 2006 by McCullough Research – page includes many downloadable reports, some of which were presented as evidence during investigations into the causes of the crisis. Susan L. Pope, "California Electricity Price Spikes: An Update on the Facts" (December 9, 2002) (Opposes the McCullough research and supports the view that the crisis was an outcome of genuine problems with supply and demand) Enron Traders Caught On Tape – Gloating about manipulating California's energy market. (CBS Evening News) Enron Tapes Hint Chiefs Knew About Power Ploys – (Los Angeles Times) Papers Show That Enron Manipulated Calif. Crisis – (The Washington Post) "Defying Corporations, Defining Democracy": As Internal Memos Reveal That Enron Drove Up Power Prices in California – A talk to Author Richard Grossman (Democracy Now!) Schwarzenegger Accused of Involvement in $9B California Swindle with Enron’s Ken Lay – (Democracy Now!) http://econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/lkletzer/borenstein_jepw02.pdf The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster https://web.archive.org/web/20060905020641/http://econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/lkletzer/borenstein_jepw02.pdf September 5, 2006 http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/dwr50thanniversary/cers.cfm California Department of Water Resources 50th Anniversary Article on the 2001 Energy Crisis https://web.archive.org/web/20070403224128/http://www.publicaffairs.water.ca.gov/dwr50thanniversary/cers.cfm April 3, 2007 Category:2000 disasters in the United States Category:2000 in California Category:2000s energy crisis Category:2001 disasters in the United States Category:2001 in California Electricity crisis Category:Electric power in the United States Category:Electricity economics Category:Energy crises in the United States Category:Energy in California Category:Enron Category:George W. Bush administration controversies Category:Market failure Category:Power outages in the United States Category:Scandals in California Category:Sempra Energy