17 October affair

1952 political crisis in Indonesia February 2023 17 October affair the liberal democracy period in Indonesia 17 October affair in the Merdeka Palace.jpg Situation at the Merdeka Palace during the affair 17 October 1952 Jakarta, Indonesia Opposition to the Wilopo Cabinet's centralization and demobilization scheme within the Indonesian army Dissolution of the Provisional House of Representatives Holding of elections The 17 October affair (id Peristiwa 17 Oktober, yes 17 October event) was an event during which Indonesian soldiers pressured the president to disband the Provisional People's Representative Council, at the behest of the administration's chief of staff, along with the commander of the armed forces. The demand was made of President Sukarno while the Merdeka Palace was surrounded. Due to tensions regarding potential army reorganization to conserve budgets, the Indonesian Army's high command disputed with the parliament regarding excessive civilian meddling in military affairs. After the dismissal of a pro-government officer in July 1952, the parliament began demanding a significant restructuring of armed forces leadership. After three months, tensions culminated in thousands of demonstrators mobilized by the army in Jakarta. Sukarno managed to temper the demonstrators and assure the army officers but refused to concede to any demands. Soon after the incident, a significant proportion of the army's high command was replaced, including Nasution and Simatupang. Background During 1952, the Indonesian government faced a fiscal crisis due to a drop in government revenues and current account deficit as the economic boom due to the Korean War levelled out. Government officials under the Wilopo Cabinet began cutting down on expenses, including civilian and military service members, which would include 60,000 soldiers being retired. Demobilization after the Indonesian National Revolution had occurred in the past, but not many had been forcefully retired. Beyond the demobilization, the Indonesian Army had also undergone a "reorganization" program involving many demotion or transfer of local military commanders, which was unpopular among them.Feith 2006 246–248 This generally split the army into two factions: those who preferred reorganization and worked with the civilian administration's budget reduction programs and the traditional military officers at risk of reorganization, including many officers trained by Japanese occupation forces before independence,Feith 2006 249 under the PETA organization.Feith 2009 123 This reorganization process had been coordinated by the Army's leadership, including Armed Forces Chief Tahi Bonar Simatupang and Army Chief of Staff Abdul Haris Nasution.Feith 2009 128 For 1952, three-quarters of the army's budget was spent on salaries, limiting the amount of purchasable equipment for renewal, and even so the salary allocations were minimal.Feith 2009 129 In mid-1952, the army reorganizers decided to begin a demobilization process late that year, which would demobilize 80,000 soldiers, out of 200,000 at that time. While pensions would be provided, the plan was unpopular among many of the rank and file to be discharged and among the traditional officers.Feith 2006 249 These traditional officers had strong connections with President Sukarno's Indonesian National Party (PNI) and other opposition parties. Sukarno himself had been opposed to many of the changes in the army and had occasionally intervened in the personnel policy.Feith 2006 250 Between June and July 1952, one Colonel Bambang Supeno, a distant relative of Sukarno's, began to gather support to petition for the removal of Nasution from army leadership.Feith 2009 131TNI 1981 426 After a tense meeting of regional commanders and a letter from Supeno criticizing his superiors to the civilian government, he was removed from his post on 17 July.Feith 2009 131 Supeno was one of the most senior army officers who had formulated an official military code of principles and was a supporter of the "traditional" faction, espousing that the army should focus on local defense and the utilization of its abundant workforce.McVey 1971 145 Following Supeno's dismissal, the parliament began issuing demands to restructure the Indonesian Army's leadership and the Ministry of Defense, particularly removing Simatupang and Nasution. The military leadership saw this as excessive civilian interference in defense affairs and began holding meetings to discuss a countermove.McVey 1971 146 The Wilopo Cabinet itself suffered from infighting regarding the demands, with the Indonesian Socialist Party and the Indonesian Christian Party threatening to withdraw from the government coalition should Defense Minister Hamengkubuwono IX be removed.Feith 2009 138 On 23 September, a motion of no-confidence on the defence ministry's policies by parliamentary defence section secretary Zainul Baharuddin, cosigned by the Murba Party and the Labour Party members, was submitted. On 10 October, a modified motion was submitted to draw the Indonesian National Party's support.Feith 2009 137 Around that time, the highest-ranking regional army commanders had gathered in Jakarta for a meeting, including Maludin Simbolon, A. E. Kawilarang, and Gatot Subroto.TNI 1981 426Feith 2009 141 The situation in early October was tense, with military guards posted to the parliament building.Feith 2009 141 Baharuddin's motion failed on 15 October, and a more moderate motion proposed two days earlier by I. J. Kasimo, of the Catholic Party, was instead approved by the government. More importantly, a stronger motion by the PNI's Manai Sophiaan, which allowed civilian politicians to alter the armed forces' leadership, also passed on 16 October.Feith 2009 139–142 Events On the morning of 17 October 1952, thousands of demonstrators brought into Jakarta by army trucksMcVey 1971 147 arrived in front of the parliament building. The demonstrators demanded the dissolution of parliament, carrying placards with related messages. There were around 5,000 people by 8 AM, and they broke into the parliament building, where they smashed chairs and damaged the cafeteria.Feith 2006 258 The group was apparently organized by Colonel Moestopo, head of the army's dental service.Feith 2006 261 The crowd moved across the city, growing as some bystanders joined in. The group collectively presented a petition to Vice President Mohammad Hatta, and on several occasions Dutch flags were taken off flagpoles and torn up. By the time they arrived in front of the Merdeka Palace, there were some 30,000 people in the crowd.Feith 2006 258TNI 1981 427 Beyond the large crowd, the army also pointed several tanks and artillery pieces at the presidential palace.McVey 1971 147Feith 2006 258TNI 1981 427 The demonstrators remained in the front of the palace's fences.Feith 2006 258 While this was ongoing, Nasution did not physically participate, as he did not want to appear involved with the movement; he instead invited UN Representative John Reid for lunch.Reid Anthony Djakarta in 1952–53: A Moment of Nation-building Optimism Indonesia 2019 108 73 10.5728/indonesia.108.0065 https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5728/indonesia.108.0065 0019-7289 Shortly after the crowd's arrival, President Sukarno walked out and addressed the crowd from the steps of the presidential palace, promising elections in the short term. However, Sukarno denied the demonstrators' request to dissolve parliament, stating that such actions would be dictatorial. This speech largely managed to calm down the demonstrators, and after the conclusion of his speech, he received cheers, and the crowd largely dispersed.Feith 2006 258 Sometime past 10 AM, seventeen high-ranking officers, including five of the seven army territorial commanders, met the president. The closed-door meeting lasted for an hour and a half and also involved Hatta, Wilopo, Cabinet Secretary A.K. Pringgodigdo id, and parliament speaker A. M. Tambunan.Feith 2006 259 The army officers demanded the president dissolve parliament.Feith 2006 260 According to historian Ruth McVey, the officers would have likely accepted a compromise, whereas the parliament would remain but would no longer interfere with army leadership.McVey 1971 148 Sukarno, however, refused to either dissolve parliament, to make public statements supporting the army, or to propose a compromise otherwise, and he sent away the officers after previously promising that he would satisfy all parties.Feith 2006 260McVey 1971 148 Once the officers had left the palace, still on 17 October, Sukarno spoke in a broadcast to appeal for calm.McVey 1971 148 Telephone and telegraph connections in Jakarta ceased that day starting at 11 AM, and a curfew was implemented, with meetings over five people being restricted. Six parliament members (including former prime minister Soekiman Wirjosandjojo) were arrested, and several newspapers were banned. However, after three days, the bans, arrests, and other measures had been lifted, and army activity in Jakarta significantly returned to normal.Feith 2006 261 Impact The army failed to achieve its objective of mobilizing demonstrators to coerce Sukarno, and its high command faced internal and external replacements. Three of the seven territorial commanders were removed by their subordinates in October 1952.McVey 1971 149–150 In the four cities serving as the headquarters of the unchanged territorial commands – Medan, Bandung, Semarang, and Banjarmasin – anti-parliament demonstrations occurred after 17 October.Feith 2006 266 Once the parliament had reconvened in late November, both Simatupang and Nasution were removed from their posts, with Simatupang's office being abolished and Nasution being replaced by Bambang Soegeng.McVey 1971 149–150Feith 2006 269 The affair and the ensuing coups in the territorial commands deprived the army's high command of significant powers while strengthening local officers and the overall armed forces command. Continued disputes between the military and the parliament also forced local territorial commands to seek sources of funding beyond the central government through deals with local businesses, and this grew to a point where this income exceeded central budgets. It also strengthened the traditionalist officers at the expense of the more modern, professional ones.McVey 1971 152–154 Under Soegeng, the army attempted to resolve this issue of factionalism but failed, and once Soegeng resigned in 1955, Nasution returned to his post as Army Chief of Staff.McVey 1971 156–157 References Bibliography Feith Herbert The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia 2006 Equinox Publishing 978-979-3780-45-0 https://books.google.com/books?id=VAH0W9uxoqoC en Feith Herbert The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: A Turning Point in Post-Revolutionary Indonesia 2009 Equinox Publishing 978-602-8397-15-5 https://books.google.com/books?id=5bBHQwa0z8AC en Sejarah TNI-AD, 1945-1973: Riwayat hidup singkat pimpinan tentara nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat 1981 Indonesian Armed Forces Historical Service https://books.google.com/books?id=l7maivDM07kC id TNI 1981 McVey Ruth The Post-Revolutionary Transformation of the Indonesian Army Indonesia 1971 11 11 131–176 10.2307/3350748 0019-7289 3350748 1813/53507 free Further reading Nasution Abdul Haris Abdul Haris Nasution Peristiwa 17 Oktober 1952: ketika "moncong" meriam mengarah ke istana 2013 Narasi 978-979-16831-1-1 https://books.google.com/books?id=t5D0mgEACAAJ id Category:Indonesian Army Category:October 1952 in Asia Category:1952 in Indonesia Category:20th century in Jakarta Category:Sukarno Category:Military history of Jakarta Category:Political history of Indonesia Category:Military scandals Category:Scandals in Indonesia Category:1952 in military history Category:1952 in politics