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1988 Mexican general election

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None February 2022 Mexico 6 July 1988 yes Presidential election presidential 1982 Mexican general election 1982 1994 Mexican general election 1994 52.01% ( 22.83pp) 130x130px Carlos Salinas de Gortari en 1989.jpeg Carlos Salinas de Gortari Institutional Revolutionary Party 9,687,926 50.71% Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (cropped 3x4).jpg Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas National Democratic Front (Mexico) 5,929,585 31.03% Manuel Clouthier.jpg Manuel Clouthier National Action Party (Mexico) 3,208,584 16.79% Elecciones presidenciales de México de 1988 por entidad federativa.svg Results by state President Miguel de la Madrid Institutional Revolutionary Party Carlos Salinas de Gortari Institutional Revolutionary Party yes Senate All 64 seats in the Senate of the Republic 33 1982 1991 Jorge de la Vega Domínguez Institutional Revolutionary Party 63 60 50.83 Heberto Castillo Mexican Socialist Party 0 4 4.23 yes Chamber of Deputies 1985 1991 All 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies 251 Jorge de la Vega Domínguez Institutional Revolutionary Party 292 260 50.97 Luis H. Álvarez National Action Party (Mexico) 38 101 18.00 Rafael Aguilar Talamantes Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction 11 49 9.20 Jorge Cruickshank García Popular Socialist Party (Mexico) 38 23 4.33 Carlos Cantú Rosas Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution 11 30 6.18 Heberto Castillo Mexican Socialist Party 18 24 4.45 General elections were held in Mexico on 6 July 1988.Dieter Nohlen (2005) Elections in the Americas: A data handbook, Volume I, p453 978-0-19-928357-6 They were the first competitive presidential elections in Mexico since the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) took power in 1929. The elections were widely considered to have been fraudulent, with the PRI resorting to electoral tampering to remain in power. PRI candidate Carlos Salinas de Gortari was proclaimed the winner of the presidential election, with the Secretariat of Interior reporting he received 51% of the vote. It was the lowest for a winning candidate since direct presidential elections were inaugurated in 1917; in all previous presidential elections, the PRI faced no serious opposition and won with well over 70% of the vote.Nohlen, pp471-474 In the Chamber of Deputies election, the PRI won 260 of the 500 seats,Nohlen, p469 as well as winning 60 of the 64 seats in the Senate election.Nohlen, p470 Although early results from the parallel vote tabulation indicated that Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas was leading, when the official results were published, Salinas de Gortari was claimed to have won by a large margin. All of the opposition candidates decried the rigged elections, and there were numerous rallies across the country, including those by opposition lawmakers in Congress. However, Salinas de Gortari was allowed to take office as President on December 1 after the PRI-dominated Congress ruled his election legitimate.Cantú Francisco 2019 The Fingerprints of Fraud: Evidence from Mexico's 1988 Presidential Election American Political Science Review en 113 3 710–726 10.1017/S0003055419000285 0003-0554 free Background The Federal Law of Political Organizations and Electoral Processes (LFOPPE), which resulted from the political reform of 1977, was in effect for the previous legislative elections in 1985, which saw the full renewal of the Chamber of Deputies. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) won 292 seats, the National Action Party (PAN) 38, while five parties won 11–12 seats and a further two parties won six seats each. The PRI had a supermajority of around 72% of the Deputies in the Chamber of the LIII Legislature. Miguel de la Madrid presidency (1982–1988) In the 1982 general elections the PRI, along with the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), had received 71% of the vote.https://diariooficial.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?cod_diario=205460&pagina=6&seccion=0 DOF - Visor de imágenes Once in office, President Miguel de la Madrid implemented a "severe austerity program" that included cuts to public services and social spending.El siglo del sufragio De la no reelección a la alternancia https://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos2/CDD/Reforma_Electoral2014/descargas/estudios_investigaciones/ElSigloDelSufragio.pdf live 13 February 2024 13 March 2022 https://web.archive.org/web/20220313024343/https://portalanterior.ine.mx/archivos2/CDD/Reforma_Electoral2014/descargas/estudios_investigaciones/ElSigloDelSufragio.pdf The decline in oil prices in 1985, compounded by the September 19 earthquake of the same year;The Oxford handbook of Mexican politics 2012 Oxford Univ. Press 978-0-19-537738-5 Camp Roderic Ai Oxford destroyed the economic stabilization that had resulted from the government's response to the debt crisis at the beginning of the decade.The earthquake's political ramifications included the need for the country to collaborate together for rescue and reconstruction efforts in the face of government inaction, resulting in "civil associationism." In 1987, inflation reached a high of 159%. The situation caused the price of bread to increase by 1800%, beans by 800%, and tortillas by 400%. In this period, the external public debt went from 6 billion dollars to 84 billion.García Calderón Carola Medios de comunicación y campañas electorales: 1988-2000 Figueiras Tapia Leonardo 2006 Plaza y Valdés ed 978-970-722-578-7 México The government's "adoption of neoliberal policy and the consolidation [in power] [...] of a group of technocrats" was a result of the debt growth, the deepening economic crisis, and the agreements it made with the IMF to continue receiving loans. This behavior also resulted in the social unrest that "politicians who feel displaced and who continue to support the thesis of revolutionary nationalism" brought about."Rueda Peiro Isabel México: crisis, reestructuración económica, social y política: 1982 - 1996 1998 Siglo Veintiuno Editores 978-968-36-6597-3 1. México 177 Spanish At the political level, the electoral and constitutional reforms were a government response to pressure from the opposition, "at the same time [they obeyed] the control purposes of the ruling party."https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/325/32518423009.pdf Las reformas electorales a nivel federal en México 13 February 2024 13 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240213195956/https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/325/32518423009.pdf live The CFE's composition changed, putting the PRI front and center and eliminating the need for support from opposition parties; furthermore, it was confirmed that this encouraged the so-called "parastatal parties," also known as voters. or "satellite parties", those that normally supported the PRI and that at that time were the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), the Popular Socialist Party (PPS) and the Socialist Workers Party (PST), - to challenge his former ally.Molinar Juan Weldon Jeffrey July 2014 Elecciones de 1988 en México: crisis del autoritarismo Revista Mexicana de Opinión Pública es 17 164–191 10.1016/S1870-7300(14)70904-4 free The opposition started to gain traction during this time, both on the left and the right, to the point where the PAN started to pose a "threat" to the PRI in some state elections, as happened in the Elecciones estatales de Chihuahua de 1986 1986 Chihuahua state election es Added to the above was the split within the dominant party. For the PRI elite, the situation meant that they needed to "move to the right and block the main leftists." In this context, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, and Rodolfo González GuevaraPivron Anne 1999-01-01 Anatomía de un partido de oposición mexicano: la estructura del juego político en el Partido de la Revolución Democrática, 1989-1997 https://estudiossociologicos.colmex.mx/index.php/es/article/view/672 Estudios Sociológicos de el Colegio de México es 17 49 239–272 10.24201/es.1999v17n49.672 2448-6442 free formed the Corriente Democrática (México) Democratic Current es within the PRI in 1986. Its establishment was caused by the "abandonment of State intervention in the economy, budget cuts, privatization of companies in the parastatal sector and the contraction of social spending." This shift in governmental action implied, for Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo, a betrayal of the party's ideological foundation, "the ideology of the Mexican Revolution."Luis Medina Peña https://repositorio-digital.cide.edu/bitstream/handle/11651/1054/36827.pdf repositorio-digital.cide.edu Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas https://web.archive.org/web/20171222105540/https://repositorio-digital.cide.edu/bitstream/handle/11651/1054/36827.pdf 22 December 2017 es-MX live 1986 constitutional reforms An agreement signed by President Miguel de la Madrid was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF) on 19 June 1986. It directed the Ministry of the Interior to call on national political parties, associations, organizations, institutions and citizens to take part in "public consultation hearings on the Electoral Political renewal [...]" in order to seek feedback that would enable the president to "find ways of democratic improvement." The "renewal" described changes to the electoral laws. The consultations took place in July and August. De la Madrid subsequently proposed an initiative on 3 November to amend sections 54 and 77 of the constitution, as well as articles 52, 53, 56, and 60.Alvarez Manuel Barquín La reforma electoral de 1986-1987 en México Retrospectiva y analisis https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/2/650/6.pdf Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas de la UNAM https://web.archive.org/web/20171222051126/https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/2/650/6.pdf 22 December 2017 es-MX 1987 live The reforms, which involved adjustments to the Chamber of Deputies electoral system, were approved by the Chamber at the end of November,González Casanova Pablo México, el 6 de julio de 1988: segundo informe sobre la democracia 1990 Siglo vientiuno ed 978-968-23-1651-7 Biblioteca México México, D.F and published in the DOF on 15 December.https://archivos.juridicas.unam.mx/www/bjv/libros/2/650/6.pdf La Reforma Electoral 1986-1987 en México Retrospectiva y Análisis Electoral Reform 1986-1987 in Mexico: Retrospective and Analysis Barquín Manuel 1987 Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos es 1988 VI es 968-36-0716-0 Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas es The changes included increasing the number of deputies from 400 to 500 by raising the number of seats elected by proportional representation from 100 to 200, limiting the maximum number of seats that the party with the most votes could win (350) and allowing all parties to participate in elections regardless of their percentage of the total votes cast. To guarantee that a party maintained an absolute majority in the Chamber, a mechanism was also established: "The party with the greatest evidence of majority will be assigned proportional representation deputies, until the absolute majority is reached [...]"El constitucionalismo en las postrimerías del siglo XX [veinte]. 6: La Constitución mexicana: 70 años después 1988 Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México 978-968-36-0716-4 Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas Serie B, Estudios comparativos. d, Derecho latinoamericano Méxicohttps://www.dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?cod_diario=206493&pagina=2&seccion=0 DOF - Visor de imágenes if no party receives 51% of the effective national vote and none of them reach half plus one of the chamber's members. In contrast, a three-year decree established the Senate's partial renewal. Following the reforms, article 60 stipulated that the federal government would be in charge of "preparation, development, and monitoring of the electoral processes" and that each "Chamber will qualify the elections of its members and resolve any doubts that may arise about them". Federal Electoral Code of 1987 De la Madrid sent the Chamber of Deputies his proposed Federal Electoral Code in November 1986. On 17 December the following year the parliamentary groups of five parties that had protested the initiative and the removal of their projects had their petition rejected. This marked the beginning of the debates in this regard. It was then published in the DOF on 12 February 1987.DOF Image Viewer https://dof.gob.mx/nota_to_imagen_fs.php?codnota=4638888&fecha=12/02/1987&cod_diario=199597 August 20, 2024 dof.gob.mx With the implementation of the annual electoral roll review, the new electoral code eliminated conditional registration of political formations, facilitated coalition formation, and established the principle of public financing for political parties based on vote and seat totals. It changed the composition of the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) and added the Federal Electoral Contentious Tribunal, which is in charge of handling claims, complaints, and annulment appeals: However, the Congress of the Union established political party representation, with one commissioner for each formation receiving 1.5% of the vote and one for each additional 3%, up to a maximum of 16 commissioners per party. It would still be led by the Secretary of the Interior, who also served as its president. Parallel vote tabulation This was the first time that a parallel vote tabulation was implemented in Mexico, and the results were informed by telephone from the electoral districts to the secretariat of the Interior. The institution in charge of counting the votes was the Comisión Federal Electoral (CFE), presided by the Secretary of the Interior, Manuel Bartlett. On July 2, four days before the elections, Francisco Xavier Ovando, Cárdenas' top adviser, and his assistant Román Gil were assassinated in Mexico City. According to Cárdenas, Ovando designed a network to collect information from the 300 electoral districts on election day in order to prevent the PRI from engaging in electoral fraud. Two days later, FDN representatives protested the assassination outside the Secretariat of the Interior. Manuel Bartlett promised that the government would investigate the crime immediately, but it took many years before four Michoacán Police agents were charged with the assassination, with José Franco Villa (the state's attorney general at the time) among the intellectual authors.The Governor of Michoacán at the time of the assassinations, Luis Martínez Villicaña, had been one of Cárdenas fiercest rivals, and had heavily repressed FDN officials and sympathizers in the State.Castro Doralicia Son asesinados Xavier Ovando y su ayudante Román Gil, del equipo de campaña del candidato presidencial Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. http://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/7/02071988-FXO.html 5 July 2021 Memoria Política de MéxicoCaño Antonio 4 July 1988 Asesinado un colaborador de Cárdenas https://elpais.com/diario/1988/07/05/internacional/584056817_850215.html 5 July 2021 El País Organization Electoral authorities With the reforms of 1986 and 1987, the composition of the Federal Electoral Commission (CFE) was transformed. The consolidation of power within the PRI under its president, the Secretary of the Interior, and the PRI's increased strength within the body "appear as government attempts to strengthen control over electoral competition." They make clear, though, that these intentions were not successful due to the political environment. The PRI used its majority of votes in the CFE—19, to be exact—to settle disputes against the wishes of the other parties on multiple occasions.Rodríguez Araujo Octavio La reforma política y los partidos en México 1989 Siglo Veintiuno Ed 978-968-23-1567-1 10. ed., act Sociología y política México The votes came from 16 commissioners, two congressional representatives, and the commission president. The opposition parties' request to extend the registration period, which was set by the Code to end on December 31, 1987, is an example of the aforementioned. The PRI voted against it, claiming it would be illegal and shorten other deadlines. Approximately 38 million people were added to the voter registry in preparation for these elections. The National Population Council (CONAPO) estimated that by 1987, the number of Mexicans with voting rights would be 43.5 million. For the opposition, a few media outlets, and subject-matter experts believed that the registry was untrustworthy. Twenty to thirty percent were thought to be irregular. In this regard, the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI), which calculated that 40 million people had the right to vote, joined CONAPO. The Republic's presidency, for its part, estimated that there would be "close to 38 million Mexicans." The official data indicated 38,074,926 individuals on the registry. Similarly, the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) withdrew its candidacy in favor of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and the PRI was able to enforce its choice. The PRI denied the request to reprint the electoral ballots, whose printing was handled by the Nation's Graphic Workshops, in order to keep the discussion focused on technical matters. as with the number of registered voters, the number of boxes installed varies according to the sources at the time - between 54,652 and 56,642. As opposed to the previous statement, assuring, the CFE did, on occasion, attempt to reach an understanding and compromise on "thorny issues." They cite the formation of a subcommittee tasked with investigating allegations of destroying electoral propaganda and using public funds to benefit the PRI, as well as a complaint filed against Televisa for airing a show that misrepresented the views of PRI opponents. The design of the electoral ballot for senators was also a source of contention, with opponents requesting differentiated voting for one party for the six-year period and another for the three-year period - given that the Senate was partially renewed, a candidate from each state would hold his position for six years and another for only three. According to the ruling of the Electoral Contentious Court, "the two formulas appeared on the same ballot and with a single circle per party." During the election year, the Court heard 23 appeals in total, approving the CFE's decision not to reprint the ballots following Pemesista's withdrawal. Nonetheless, the organization played a very small role in the election preparation process. Presidential candidates Institutional Revolutionary Party The PRI announced Carlos Salinas de Gortari, who was the Secretary of Programming and Budget at the time, as its nominee for president on 4 October 1987.1987-10-05 El PRI 'destapa' a Carlos Salinas para la presidencia de México https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/05/portada/560386801_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214161211/https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/05/portada/560386801_850215.html live At 10:30 a.m., the party president, Jorge de la Vega Domínguez, made the following announcement at the national headquarters in front of the sector leaders: "The three sectors of our party and its territorial leadership, have spoken unanimously in favor of comrade Carlos Salinas de Gortari's pre-candidacy."Ventana de articulo http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/10/05&PageLabelPrint=13&EntityId=Ar01301&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 2024-02-14 h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx 17 June 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180617015217/http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/10/05&PageLabelPrint=13&EntityId=Ar01301&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 live the selection process for candidates was, nevertheless, "a fictitious one [...] with a parade of the supposed pre-candidates, which was nothing more than a mere simulation." In keeping with PRI custom, the chosen one was picked by the Mexican president, and the "uncovering ritual" was repeated amid a setting of "presumed party unity." This "simulation" was the ruling party's reaction to the "democratizing current" that eventually led to the National Democratic Front (FDN) being formed and the departure of a number of militants. In this regard, the confrontation created by the Democratic Current (CD) made the candidate selection process "more open than before," even though it was not more democratic. Later, they called into question the president Madrid's economic strategy and called for a more democratic internal election system.Reveles Vázquez Francisco Partido Revolucionario Institucional: crisis y refundación 2003 UNAM Ed. Gernika 978-970-637-137-9 Colección Ciencias políticas México Cárdenas requested that the PRI issue a call for the PRI candidate's selection on 1 June 1987. As the "democratizers" gained momentum, the party became aware of it. At the end of the month, when Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo intensified their calls for the PRI leaders, they were told not to use party resources, logos, or speak in their honor. In the end, Cárdenas was pre-nominated by the CD on 3 July,http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rep/article/view/60030/52962 10.22201/fcpys.24484903e.1988.2.60030 La Corriente Democrática: De la legitimidad y de alianzas (Junio de 1985 a julio de 1987) 1988 Xelhuantzi López María Estudios Políticos 2 free with the primary goal of "putting pressure on the party and government to open the presidential succession process."López María Xelhuantzi 1988-07-01 De legitimidad y de alianzas: de la Corriente Democrática al Frente Democrático Nacional, (julio de 1987 a julio de 1988) https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rep/article/view/59993 Estudios Políticos 3 es 10.22201/fcpys.24484903e.1988.3.59993 2448-4903 free 14 February 2024 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214161211/https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rep/article/view/59993 live Together with other politicians, Cárdenas accepted the nomination at a rally held at his house in front of two thousand people, along with the virtual pre-campaign coordinator Muñoz Ledo and Ignacio Castillo Mena.Ventana de articulo http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/07/04&PageLabelPrint=12&EntityId=Ar01201&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 2024-02-14 h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx In parallel, the PRI continued its uncovering process. At first, the Madrid cabinet's secretaries of state were all regarded as "not constitutionally impeded." Salinas de Gortari and the Treasury Secretary, Jesús Silva-Herzog Flores, stood out among them. But following a disagreement with Salinas regarding public spending, his exclusion from "presidential favor," and his resignation on 17 June 1987, the first lost his chance. Near de la Madrid, Alfredo del Mazo González, the Secretary of Energy, emerged as a "strong" contender. Consequently, del Mazo, Salinas, Interior Secretary Manuel Bartlett Díaz and Miguel González Avelar the Secretary of Education were among the most "popular" secretaries and best positioned candidates.Lomnitz Larissa Adler de https://books.google.com/books?id=bBEQoI5n9dQC Simbolismo y ritual en la política mexicana Elena Rodrigo Salazar Adler Ilya 2004-01-01 Siglo XXI 978-968-23-2542-7 es On August 13, the party's president announced the names of "six distinguished PRI members" who could run for president, including Sergio García Ramírez, the head of the Attorney General's Office, Bartlett Díaz, del Mazo González, González Avelar, and Salinas de Gortari. The names were listed in alphabetical order to "avoid suspicions." Other names mentioned in the media, such as Secretary of Health Guillermo Soberón Acevedo and General Director of the Mexican Social Security Institute Ricardo García Sainz, were also omitted.Ventana de articulo http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/08/14&PageLabelPrint=2&EntityId=Ar00201&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 2024-02-14 h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx According to the official version, the six names arose from visits throughout the country that de la Vega Domínguez made to meet with party and opinion leaders. Everybody was asked to take part in appearances before the party leaders and guests, which were broadcast on television between 17 and 27 August during "prime television news hours" in "rigorous alphabetical order." Touted as a "lesson in democracy" and "the end of tapadism," these presentations were broadcast in their entirety and garnered news coverage on Channel 7, Channel 5 and Channel 2, after 24 hours. the interventions had in common praise for the president and the "little precision" of the proposals. In order to dispel the "negative aspects of their image," the applicants presented themselves as politicians when they were "accused of being technocrats," and those who were less knowledgeable about economics "prayed" to show off their capabilities.Comas José 1987-09-26 El 'destape' del 'tapado' méxicano https://elpais.com/diario/1987/09/26/internacional/559605621_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214165149/https://elpais.com/diario/1987/09/26/internacional/559605621_850215.html live To find out what they thought, the PRI "began a process of consultation with the bases and conversations with leaders". PRI members, on the other hand, declined to endorse any one candidate. The PRI released a call on 3 October and stated that pre-candidates would be able to register from 5 to 7 October. Bartlett, Salinas, and del Mazo were "considered with the most possibilities" during the "uncertainty" that surrounded the PRI candidacy announcement in the preceding days.Comas José 1987-10-03 Tres nombres para un 'destape' https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/03/internacional/560214012_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214165150/https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/03/internacional/560214012_850215.html live The confusion continued until October 4 when, in the morning, Núcleo Radio Mil—which was later joined by Acir, Radio Formula and Radio Programas de México—erroneously reported—due to a rumor that del Mazo spread That García Ramírez was the selected one. When Salinas de Gortari was finally declared the winner, the news spread quickly—"minutes, in hours, the entire country was aware of the name"—thanks to a "wide spread of information" that included state and private television. On the same day that Salinas was the only pre-candidate, the PRI pre-campaign got underway, and culminated in him being sworn in as a candidate. on the following 8 November; It was held at the national headquarters of the PRI and within the framework of the second day of the VII Ordinary National Convention and also marked the beginning of the presidential campaign of the official party. National Democratic Front National Democratic Front (Mexico) left|thumb|253x253px|Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano led the Democratic Current of the PRI and was nominated for the presidency by the PARM. The CD announced its plan for a "PRI basic electoral platform" on 9 September 1987, and on 17–21 September it conducted the "100 Hour March for Democracy." The plan was to demand that the pre-candidate registration process be opened at the PRI headquarters, but on the 21st, the leaders declined, citing the possibility that their actions would be viewed as "provocations." As a result, they assigned a group of people to meet with the PRI leaders and present their demands. Following a twenty-minute meeting between a commission headed by Ifigenia Martínez, Oscar Pintado, and Castillo Mena, representing the CD, and Humberto Lugo Gil and Jesús Salazar Toledano, representing the party, the PRI refused to register Cárdenas "simply because there is no call for the registration of pre-candidates,".Ventana de articulo http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/09/22&PageLabelPrint=1&EntityId=Ar00110&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 2024-02-14 h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx 18 June 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180618230131/http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/09/22&PageLabelPrint=1&EntityId=Ar00110&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 live On the 29th, the CD issued a manifesto defending democratic legitimacy as "a last effort in this regard." Owing to resource constraints, the manifesto was only published until October 3. The document cited Muñoz Ledo and Cárdenas' previous media statements, as well as the Corriente's disagreement, stating that "they have already revealed the search for scenarios outside the PRI." Following Salinas' announcement to run for office, Cárdenas spoke of "undemocratic procedures carried out by the leadership behind the [sic] militants' backs."Comas José 1987-10-06 La elección del candidato del PRI indigna a la Corriente Democrática https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/06/internacional/560473212_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 It was in this environment that "the possibility of negotiating a single left-wing candidacy was envisioned" before Cárdenas left the PRI. In any case, "that's what two opposition parties said"—the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS), led by Heberto Castillo, and the Popular Socialist Party (PPS), which is currently without a candidate.La democracia en México y América Latina: claves de lectura 2012 Ficticia 978-607-02-3217-6 López Leyva Miguel Armando México, D.F Castaños Fernando Labastida Martín del Campo Julio To come to a consensus, PPS leaders met with Cárdenas and Muñoz Ledo on 9 October. The PMS, for its part, tried to take in the CD. The Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), a third party, created a "serious link" in contrast to the "loose" approaches of the first two parties, and on 12 October a commission of assembly members proposed his candidacy. Cárdenas joined the PARM and participated in protests as its presidential candidateReuters 1987-10-15 Cárdenas, disidente del PRI, optará a la presidencia https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/15/internacional/561250812_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 two days later. Castillo stated that Castdenas's candidacy was a serious political error and that his actions showed that he was more focused on the campaign than the issues facing the country. He even entertained the possibility that he could It is an action taken by the PRI directly. Likewise, the cupular decision of the nomination caused an "internal division" in the political formation.Patraca Víctor Manuel Muñoz https://books.google.com/books?id=yAKpvQn8Jl8C&pg=PA76 Partido Revolucionario Institucional, 1946-2000: ascenso y caída del partido hegemónico 2006-01-01 Siglo XXI 978-968-23-2616-5 es Because of the previously mentioned, Cárdenas was additionally expelled out of the PRI. Article 211 of the party's statutes, which states that "anyone who joins another party [...] or is nominated as a candidate by another party to oppose the PRI [...] [resigns] his capacity as a member of the PRI," is the reason for the exclusion, according to a statement issued by the party on 16 October.EFE 1987-10-18 Cuauhtemoc Cárdenas, expulsado del PRI mexicano https://elpais.com/diario/1987/10/18/internacional/561510022_850215.html 2024-02-14 El País es 1134-6582 It left open the possibilities for other formations to join the candidacy; his recent trajectory, and that he did not impose conditions or try to "appropriate the movement and the legitimacy of the Current." Following the PARM, the Workers' Socialist Party (PST) officially changed its name to the Party of the Cardenista Front for National Reconstruction (PFCRN) on 22 November, combining it with Cárdenas's candidacy. Similar to the PARM, the CD in this instance "protected the Mexican Revolution's ideological and project hegemony." After a span of seven days, Cárdenas initiated his electoral campaign in Morelia, which was witnessed by 8,000 people as per the authorities and 35,000 people by the organizers.Ventana de articulo http://h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx/Default/Scripting/ArticleWin.asp?From=Archive&Source=Page&Skin=ElSiglo&BaseHref=EDT/1987/11/30&PageLabelPrint=2&EntityId=Ar00206&ViewMode=GIF&FontSize=l1 2024-02-14 h.elsiglodetorreon.com.mx During his speech, he declared that the PPS and other political factions would be joining him shortly. This materialized on 13 December, when at its XIII Congress the PPS nominated it and with this concluded "the stage of gestation of fundamental alliances of the Democratic Current with registered political organizations." At that time, the Cardenista candidacy already received the support of unregistered organizations, such as the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Union and the Revolutionary Socialist Party. With Muñoz Ledo's departure from the PRI on 15 December, a wider alliance was formed. He later became one of the "main drivers" of the coalition, along with Cárdenas, and it began to take shape on 12 January 1988. On that day in the city of Xalapa, the Progressive Forces of Mexico, the National Council of Workers and Peasants, the Popular Action Movement, the Assembly of Neighborhoods of Mexico City, the Emiliano Zapata Revolutionary Union, and the Mexican Green Party all formally supported the formation of the National Democratic Front (FDN) by signing a common "nationalist left" platform.Memoria Política de México https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/1/12011988.html 2024-02-14 www.memoriapoliticademexico.org Until the July 1988 elections, he acted as a "political actor with full personality and precise functions," and the FDN was not a "terminal objective" but rather a "political-historical-electoral instrument at the national and regional level to define basic alliances and convergences." National Action Party The National Action Party (PAN) had an "unprecedented electoral boom in the northern region" of the nation in the years leading up to the election. A "pragmatic leading coalition fueled by the entry [...] of several businessmen" dissatisfied with the government provided the basis for its electoral profile.Vázquez Francisco Reveles 1996 La selección de candidatos presidenciales en el PAN: entre la ausencia y la confrontación https://www.jstor.org/stable/3541024 Revista Mexicana de Sociología 58 1 57–75 10.2307/3541024 3541024 0188-2503 14 February 2024 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214182525/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3541024 live subscription free One of them, Manuel J. Clouthier - also known as Maquío - publicly announced his affiliation to the political party on 16 November 1984 at a rally held by Carlos Castillo Peraza - PAN candidate for the municipal presidency of Mérida.2013-01-19 Excélsior https://www.excelsior.com.mx/ 2024-02-14 Excélsior es-MX 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214181711/https://www.excelsior.com.mx/ live Since then, he has participated in party events and ran for governor of Sinaloa against PRI candidate Francisco Labastida Ochoa in 1986. He and the other PAN gubernatorial candidates initiated a "more dynamic and aggressive style of conducting electoral campaigns" that included defending the vote in the event of fraud. PAN members used novel forms of "complaint and civil resistance" in response to a contentious defeat, which they saw as an act of electoral fraud.Memoria Política de México https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/CMJ34.html 2024-02-14 www.memoriapoliticademexico.org 16 April 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240416142453/https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Biografias/CMJ34.html live In Holy Week 1987, a group of PAN members and his friends convinced him to run in the internal race to be the PAN presidential candidate.Excélsior Gerardo Galarza / Fotos: Archivo 2014-10-01 Tuvo Maquío meteórica y brillante carrera política https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/10/01/984595 2024-02-14 Excélsior es-MX 29 August 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180829175458/https://www.excelsior.com.mx/nacional/2014/10/01/984595 live thumb|241x241px|Manuel Clouthier Clouthier received endorsements from the state committees of Nayarit, Sinaloa, and Veracruz when he registered as a presidential candidate on September 3, the following year. Salvador Rosas Magallón, Jorge Eugenio Ortiz Gallegos, and Jesús González Schmal followed after him. The second, however, retired for health reasons. September and November were pre-campaign months. González Schmal supported a "radical pragmatic" PANism that was driven by the business community and aimed to "break with the State and the party," whereas Clouthier supported this "aggressive, populist, and contradictory" PANism. He represented the "doctrinary" and most conservative group.González Casanova Pablo Primer informe sobre la democracia: México 1988 Cadena Roa Jorge 1988 Siglo Veintiuno ed. Centro de Investigaciones Interdisciplinarias en Humanidades 978-968-23-1467-4 Biblioteca México México Outside the party, the group led by Clouthier was known as "the barbarians of the north" - a phrase attributed to the PRI leader Fidel Velázquez -; Inside they were pejoratively called the "neopanists."La era del neopanismo https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/122948.html 2024-02-14 El Universal es 14 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240214182525/https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/122948.html live On November 22, Clouthier won the internal elections with 870 votes (70.3%), González Schmal received 335 votes (27%), and Rosas Magallón received 34 votes (2.7%). The convention lasted seven hours and took place in Mexico City's Juan de la Barrera gymnasium. González Schmal, who lost, expressed his support for Clouthier, who was also backed by party president Luis H. Alvarez. The candidate urged the populace "to resist and disobey those who, through the abuse of power, intend to continue oppressing them" and urged his opponents to sign a pledge against "fraudulent triumphs" and launch a "high-level political campaign." Mexican Socialist Party On January 10, 1987, leftist parties such as the Unified Socialist Party of Mexico (PSUM), Mexican Workers Party (PMT), Revolutionary Socialist of the Mexican People, and the Popular Revolutionary Movement merged to form a new party with the goal of changing the "political regime" and providing "broad channels for workers and peasants" to participate in "national affairs." The "Merger Agreement" that led to the creation of the Mexican Socialist Party (PMS) was signed on 29 March with this goal in mind. In order to choose its presidential candidate, the party held internal elections following its integration.La travesía de la izquierda hacia la democracia http://archivo.estepais.com/inicio/historicos/141/6_Ensayo3_La%20travesia_gomez.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20180802071300/http://archivo.estepais.com/inicio/historicos/141/6_Ensayo3_La%20travesia_gomez.pdf 2 August 2018 2024-02-15 es Direct and open primary elections were to be the "new" system. left|thumb|275x275px|Heberto Castillo was the presidential candidate of the PMS Under this system, any citizen of Mexico could cast a ballot, not just affiliated members. Heberto Castillo was put up as a pre-candidate in mid-June during a gathering attended by about 2,000 PMT-affiliated Veracruz peasants. Additionally, 154 base committees from that formation gave their support to him. Castillo thus joined federal deputy Eraclio Zepeda, PSUM head in Chihuahua Antonio Becerra Gaytán, and former leftist candidate for Hidalgo governor José Hernández Delgadillo.2018-08-02 EN UN ACTO MASIVO DE CAMPESINOS DE VERACRUZ SE PROPUSO A HEBERTO CASTILLO - Proceso Proceso https://www.proceso.com.mx/146355 2024-02-15 https://web.archive.org/web/20180802041048/https://www.proceso.com.mx/146355 2 August 2018 After the registration period expired at the end of the month, four verified candidates for the 6 September primary election were facing one another. Three days later, the PMS National College of Voters reported that Castillo was emerging as the winner. Moments later, Becerra acknowledged his defeat and the next day Zepeda did the same.2018-08-02 LA CAMPAÑA FUE UNA LUCHA, NO UN BAILE Y HUBO ROCES, DICE BECERRA; FUE LIMPIA, AFIRMA ERACLIO - Proceso Proceso https://www.proceso.com.mx/146875/la-campana-fue-una-lucha-no-un-baile-y-hubo-roces-dice-becerra-fue-limpia-afirma-eraclio 2024-02-15 https://web.archive.org/web/20180802041126/https://www.proceso.com.mx/146875/la-campana-fue-una-lucha-no-un-baile-y-hubo-roces-dice-becerra-fue-limpia-afirma-eraclio 2 August 2018 Castillo was announced as the party's presidential candidate on 13–14 September. In an article for the journal Proceso, the standard bearer himself stated: "I was elected PMS candidate for the Presidency with [119,600] votes out of [216,000] valid votes, 55% of the total."2018-08-02 El pueblo a Palacio Nacional - Proceso Proceso https://www.proceso.com.mx/146938/el-pueblo-a-palacio-nacional 2024-02-15 https://web.archive.org/web/20180802041030/https://www.proceso.com.mx/146938/el-pueblo-a-palacio-nacional 2 August 2018 During his campaign, he put forth a "minimum plan of political and social transformations" and a "radical" program of political action with the intention of creating an "alternative power for the people." When he announced on 23 June that he would consider running for Cárdenas if he "broke with the PRI," Castillo was among the first to denounce him. However, on 23 June he made this statement. In order to negotiate a single candidacy, the PMS nevertheless met with the CD and PPS on 15 October. During this meeting, Castillo claimed that the PARM was a "crude instrument of PRI dissidence" and acknowledged Cárdenas's "right" to join that party, but added that "now Cárdenas's option is not Heberto Castillo's." Castillo realized that his candidacy was at the service of his party," nevertheless. In this way, despite his candidate's claims that "the talks were opened," the PMS obstructed any kind of consensus. For Arnoldo Martínez Verdugo, Pemesista leader, the left had to unite to defeat the PRI and continue with the austerity measures, so efforts to achieve a "unified position" would be maintained.January 1987 The Future: Who Will Manage It? https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10714839.1987.11723343 NACLA Report on the Americas en 21 5 21–39 10.1080/10714839.1987.11723343 0149-1598 subscription Castillo eventually withdrew his candidacy in support of a unified Socialist coalition behind Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano of the National Democratic Front a month before the elections of 1988.Mexican socialist offers to join coalition https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/04/Mexican-socialist-offers-to-join-coalition/3581581400000/ 2024-02-15 UPI en Campaign thumb|PMS Election Campaign 250px|thumb|Stickers from the Salinas de Gortari, Cárdenas and Clouthier campaigns 250px|thumb|Campaign buttons from the Salinas de Gortari, Cárdenas, Clouthier and Ibarra campaigns The Madrid government anticipated that the opposition would grow in these elections, but it did not account for the spread of the vote that the "multiparty system" would bring about. The author claims that the "high degree of politicization of society" allowed a glimpse of the "crisis" to be seen during the election campaign.Evolución histórica de las instituciones de la justicia electoral en México 2002 Tribunal Electoral del Poder Judicial de la Federación 978-970-671-137-3 Mexiko México, D.F250px|thumb|right|A Salinas de Gortari campaign hat. Opinion polls During this election, Mexico started using electoral polls more frequently. Numerous opinion polls were presented as a result of the conditions surrounding these elections, which produced a "high level of competition" and "uncertainty". He does, however, note that the majority were restricted to the Federal District and the Valley of Mexico metropolitan area. Its execution was the responsibility of educational institutions, with assistance from media sources like El Universal and La Jornada, as well as American groups like Gallup, Bendixen, and Law.Ramos Murilo Kuschick 2002 México: elecciones y el uso de las encuestas preelectorales Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales es 45 184 10.22201/fcpys.2448492xe.2002.184.48332 2448-492X free There were more than twenty exercises that involved "very diverse" media, researchers and methodologies. it was also within these circumstances that "the first generation of Mexican institutions specialized in public opinion research emerged."Peña Ricardo de la 2006 Las encuestas electorales en 1988 https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmop/article/view/41823 Revista Mexicana de Opinión Pública es 1 2448-4911 Since the polls were not taken seriously before because, "in the social imagination," the PRI was virtually "invincible," this time they were a "novelty" because of their "proliferation and diffusion."There are nine nationwide surveys "of which we have a record," compared to twenty-one that are restricted to the Federal District. Similarly, it takes into account seven national polls and thirteen from the District, averaging them to award Salinas a victory of 52.0 percent and 36.95%, respectively. In the first instance, Clouthier came in second with 22.09%, and in the second, Cárdenas came in first with 31.85%. The PRI candidate received a minimum of 38% and a maximum of 61.4% of the total coverage nationwide. Regarding the nation's capital, Salinas led eight measurements, Cárdenas led four, and there was a technical tie in one.López Leyva Miguel Armando La encrucijada: entre la protesta social y la participación electoral (1988) 2007 Plaza y Valdés [u.a.] Universidad Autónoma del Estado de Hidalgo 978-970-9967-14-2 1st México, D. F The questionnaires, sample sizes, survey types, and "quality of the results" varied, which prevented the surveys from offering "certainty or reliability regarding" the electoral process. In this regard, the June 14 El Universal poll asked, "Do you believe that the electoral results will be reliable?" and 60.73% of respondents answered negatively. 60.44% of respondents said in July that the official candidate would win "despite everything," adding 76.45% to this percentage.2018-08-01 EL COTIDIANO Revista de la Realidad Mexicana Actual http://www.elcotidianoenlinea.com.mx/articulo.asp?id_articulo=447 2024-02-15 https://web.archive.org/web/20180801004738/http://www.elcotidianoenlinea.com.mx/articulo.asp?id_articulo=447 1 August 2018 The polls indicated that electoral fraud was planned, according to candidate Cárdenas, who shared this skepticism: "[The polls are] part of the game of the official party, but above all of the government, to alter the result of the election." Even though Salinas's numbers were favorable,  the PRI reached "unprecedented" percentages and that Cárdenas "represented a rising opposition." SurveyMurilo Kuschick Ramos 2002 México: elecciones y el uso de las encuestas preelectorales Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales 45 184 103–127 http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/48332 15 February 2024 17 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215181938/https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmcpys/article/view/48332 live DateSampleRosario Maríñez 1988 Comentarios y Consideraciones Metodológicas a las Encuestas Electorales El Cotidiano 25 http://www.elcotidianoenlinea.com.mx/articulo.asp?id_articulo=447 https://web.archive.org/web/20180801004738/http://www.elcotidianoenlinea.com.mx/articulo.asp?id_articulo=447 1 August 2018RangeSalinasPRIClouthierPANCárdenasFDNCastilloPMSothersLa Jornada8 and 9 February 1988440 surveyedDistrito Federal37.8%15.2%15.7%11.2%Sin autor11 February 1988234 interviewsCoahuila46.7%54.3%19.4%23.1%17.2%14.4%1.2%0.6%PEACApril 19881000 interviewsZMVM45.4%44.4%9.9%17.3%26.3%17.1%2.3%3.2%0.6%UNAM/FCPyS13 May 19889000 PeopleNational61.4%15.7%15.2%El NorteRicardo de la Peña 2006 Las encuestas electorales en 1988 Revista Mexicana de Opinión Pública 1 127–129 http://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmop/article/view/41823/38188 15 February 2024 17 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215181945/https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rmop/article/view/41823/38188 live June 1988No DataNo Data46%36%17%1%UAEM2 June 198810 000 CitizensState of México40.0%17.0%24.5%4.2%2.1%UAM9 June 1988594 CitizensDistrito Federal14.8%15.8%43.4%Proyecto Datavox-Punto13 June 19881200 interviewsDistrito Federal41.8%23.1%32.8%27.9%4.8%1.0%El Universal14 June 1988No dataNational57.1%17.0%20.8%El Colegio de México19 June 1988No dataNational61.4%21.0%17.5%El Universal20 June 1988No DataNational56.2%18.1%21.6%Gallup21 June 19882960 PeopleNational56.0%23.0%19.0%El Universal20 June 1988No dataNational54.1%22.0%19.1%UAZ30 June 19882251 PeopleZacatecas41.4%11.9%23.8%5.5%1.8%UNAM/FCPySNo data469 QuestionnairesDistrito Federal18.9%10.2%52.5%El Universal4 July 1988No DataNational57.2%21.0%18.0%Proyecto Datavox-Punto4 July 1988600 interviewsDistrito Federal36.9%23.4%37.3%26.1%8.0%1.1%PEAC5 July 19884414 InterviewsNational43.6%17.4%29.1%COMECSO5 July 1988No DataDistrito Federal32.0%13.3%32.4%Bendixen and Law5 July 19881500 peopleNational38.0%36.0%26.0%26.0%29.0%22.0%5.0%IIS/UNAMNo Data400 peopleDistrito Federal14.7%16.7%42.7%4.7% Conduct The Democratic Front and its leaders urged president De la Madrid to prevent an illegal act by bringing up the Salinas campaign's daily expenditures of one billion pesos and its strategy of pressuring and threatening the media to support the presidential campaign of the declared contender.Canal 6 de Julio Documental Crónica de un fraude. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnVFop2tniM 2024-02-15 www.youtube.com 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215184845/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NnVFop2tniM dead The primary Mexican television news program, 24 Hours of Televisa, was then run by Jacobo Zabludovsky. Manuel Clouthier also criticized the unfairness of the process and the lack of objectivity in the coverage, leading to the creation of one of his campaign's catchphrases, "Don't watch 24 hours because it hides the truth."2015-07-06 Jacobo/Arturo Herrera Cornejo https://www.quadratin.com.mx/opinion/JacoboArturo-Herrera-Cornejo/ 2024-02-15 es-MX 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215184846/https://www.quadratin.com.mx/opinion/JacoboArturo-Herrera-Cornejo/ live Democratic Front campaign collaborators Román Gil Heráldez and Francisco Javier Ovando Hernández were assassinated in Mexico City on July 2, four days prior to the elections. The Front's candidacy suffered irreversible harm when Ovando Hernández was named national coordinator of the plan to obtain electoral data from the polling places and districts. Election day On 6 July, the day of the elections, a "large number of irregularities" were recorded.Montoya Irma Campuzano 2002-06-01 Las elecciones de 1988 https://moderna.historicas.unam.mx/index.php/ehm/article/view/3052 Estudios de Historia Moderna y Contemporánea de México es 23 023 10.22201/iih.24485004e.2002.023.3052 2448-5004 free 15 February 2024 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215192253/https://moderna.historicas.unam.mx/index.php/ehm/article/view/3052 live The elections started at eight in the morning, according to media reports, and the CFE set up its permanent session to oversee the proceedings at that point. Nearly all polling places had followed the proper procedures. Yet, beginning at 10:00 a.m., rumors spread regarding "difficulties in some boxes."Cantú Gloria M. Delgado de https://books.google.com/books?id=WbYYZiMANjEC&pg=PA473 Historia de Mexico, Legado Historico Y Pasado Reciente 2004 Pearson Educación 978-970-26-0523-2 es At noon, "an unusual influx of voters" was reportedly seen, and in the middle of the afternoon, PAN representatives in Sinaloa, Durango, Guanajuato, and Querétaro "began to complain about irregularities," ensuring that although "instrumented" electoral surveillance was increased over the previous election cycle, its goals were not met. For a variety of reasons, the reported irregularities lacked the requisite "forcefulness"—many protest letters were not received by the Electoral Litigation Court, and certain district committees encountered difficulties in receiving and handling the complaint materials. The opposition commissioners complained at 2:00 p.m. over the magazines Impacto and Jueves de Excélsior being distributed. The former stated that the PRI had won with twenty million votes, while the latter was dated the following day and already confirmed Salinas' victory. However, Jorge Amador of the PFCRN asked that all commissioners be granted direct access to the computers that would contain the election results.Chavez Elías 9 July 1988 Se cayó el sistema" afloran las dudas https://www.proceso.com.mx/150955/se-cayo-el-sistema-afloran-las-dudas Proceso 15 February 2024 4 August 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180804075746/https://www.proceso.com.mx/150955/se-cayo-el-sistema-afloran-las-dudas dead Prohibition was also imposed, and starting at 03:00, the Army patrolled the polls in a "constant and discreet" manner. Furthermore, 38,000 Navy personnel were quartered. 56 thousand police officers participated in the "largest police deployment" that took place in the Federal District. In addition to 124 Public Ministry agencies that the Attorney General's Office ordered to remain open for business twenty-four hours a day, there were approximately 2,500 notaries who also had to continue their operations.Molinar Juan Weldon Jeffrey 1990 Elecciones de 1988 en México: crisis del autoritarismo https://www.jstor.org/stable/3540608 Revista Mexicana de Sociología 52 4 229–262 10.2307/3540608 3540608 0188-2503 15 February 2024 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215192251/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3540608 live free Cabildo Miguel Ramírez Ignacio 9 July 1988 Fueron las elecciones más vigiladas de la historia: Ejército, Marina, policías y hasta notarios https://www.proceso.com.mx/150952/fueron-las-elecciones-mas-vigiladas-de-la-historia-ejercito-marina-policias-y-hasta-notarios Proceso 15 February 2024 4 August 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180804075743/https://www.proceso.com.mx/150952/fueron-las-elecciones-mas-vigiladas-de-la-historia-ejercito-marina-policias-y-hasta-notarios dead Among the anomalies that were brought up were the incomplete electoral rolls, the late release of the polling place's location, and the erasure of permanent ink. Clouthier and Cárdenas, backed by Ibarra de Piedra, started to "talk about joint actions."Loaeza Soledad 1999 La crisis electoral del 6 de julio de 1988 https://www.jstor.org/stable/3541142 Revista Mexicana de Sociología 61 3 163–182 10.2307/3541142 3541142 0188-2503 15 February 2024 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215192251/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3541142 live subscription free When the Commission meeting reconvened at 6:00 p.m. following a break, the criticism of actions like ballot box theft (sacks of ballots were tossed in the trash), the expulsion of poll workers at gunpoint,32–43 Across the Gulf Stephania Taladrid The Atlantic April 28, 202535 the "pregnancy" of ballot boxes, and voting by unregistered voters continued.Chávez Elías 9 July 1988 Se cayó el sistema" afloran las dudas. https://www.proceso.com.mx/150955/se-cayo-el-sistema-afloran-las-dudas Proceso 15 February 2024 4 August 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180804075746/https://www.proceso.com.mx/150955/se-cayo-el-sistema-afloran-las-dudas dead The official party "resorted to its full repertoire of electoral tricks." Even in the days before the elections, the discovery of ballots marked in favor of the PRI was reported in states such as Chiapas, Jalisco, Michoacán and Veracruz.Reding Andrew 1988 Mexico at a Crossroads: The 1988 Election and Beyond https://www.jstor.org/stable/40468589 World Policy Journal 5 4 615–649 40468589 0740-2775 Only a few days after the election, the Federal Electoral Commission received reports of damaged official voting packets and paperwork appearing in various parts of the nation. There were also reports of forged ballots inside the polls and PRI corporate union leaders withholding voting credentials. Results The first official results arrived very slowly and inconsistently, but they showed that Cárdenas was in the lead.Carmona Doralicia Se "cae" el sistema que recibía los resultados de la votación de 54,641 casillas desde los distritos electorales. https://www.memoriapoliticademexico.org/Efemerides/7/06071988.html Memoria Política de México 19 April 2021 The first official preliminary results were expected to arrive at 19:00 on election day, but once that time arrived, the CFE informed that the counting system had "broken down", and that the CFE president had scheduled a meeting with the Technical Secretariat to "correct the issue". In the meantime, the opposition candidates began to denounce that they had not been granted full access to the counting centers, and marched together to the headquarters of the Secretariat of the Interior to denounce irregularities in the elections.Castro Sánchez Aida El día en que "se cayó el sistema" y ganó Salinas https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/el-dia-en-que-se-cayo-el-sistema-y-gano-salinas El Universal 19 April 2021 19 April 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210419215638/https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/colaboracion/mochilazo-en-el-tiempo/nacion/sociedad/el-dia-en-que-se-cayo-el-sistema-y-gano-salinas live Later that day, the aforementioned Bartlett said that the telephone network was saturated due to, among other things, adverse weather conditions, characterizing it as a "breakdown of the system."quoted in Enrique Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power. New York: HarperCollins 1997, p. 770. Then-president Miguel de la Madrid later admitted that this "breakdown" was a fabrication.Ex-President in Mexico Casts New Light on Rigged 1988 Election https://web.archive.org/web/20181230081349/https://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/09/world/ex-president-in-mexico-casts-new-light-on-rigged-1988-election.html 30 December 2018 New York Times, 9 March 2004 One observer said, "For the ordinary citizen, it was not the network but the Mexican political system that had crashed."Krauze, Mexico: Biography of Power, p. 770. Although the CFE itself stated that it was not able to proclaim a winner yet due to the aforementioned "Network breakdown" (and in fact, would not release results until a week later), on 7 July at 03:10 the then-Secretary General of the PRI, Jorge de la Vega Domínguez, proclaimed that Salinas de Gortari had won by a great margin, stating that "Mexico has won and has given Carlos Salinas de Gortari a strong, legal and unobjectionable victory". Later that day, Salinas de Gortari himself also proclaimed that he had won. This sparked immediate protests from the opposition, who denounced that a massive electoral fraud was taking place. President Carlos Salinas de Gortari Institutional Revolutionary Party 9687926 Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas National Democratic Front 5929585 Manuel Clouthier National Action Party 3208584 Gumersindo Magaña Negrete Mexican Democratic Party 190891 Rosario Ibarra Workers' Revolutionary Party 74857 Non-registered candidates 14333 695042 38074926 Becerra Chávez Senate File:Mexican Senate 1988.svg Institutional Revolutionary Party 9263810 60 –3 National Action Party 3293460 0 0 NationalDemocraticFront 4 Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction 1727376 0 New Popular Socialist Party 1702203 0 –1 Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution 1154811 0 0 Mexican Socialist Party 770659 4 +4 Mexican Democratic Party 223631 0 0 Workers' Revolutionary Party 76135 0 0 Non-registered and common candidates 14095 0 0 #DDDDDD 689542 38074926 0 Becerra Chávez, Nohlen, Villalpando Rojas Chamber of Deputies 300px300pxResults by party (left) and coalition (right) Institutional Revolutionary Party 9276934 260 –32 National Action Party 3276824 101 +63 NationalDemocraticFront 4 Party of the Cardenist Front of National Reconstruction 1704532 36 New Popular Socialist Party 1673863 49 +38 Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution 1124575 30 +19 Mexican Socialist Party 810372 24 +6 Mexican Democratic Party 244458 0 –12 Workers' Revolutionary Party 88637 0 –6 620220 38074926 +100 Nohlen, Villalpando Rojas Analysis Years later, the aforementioned Miguel de la Madrid admitted in an autobiography that the infamous "network breakdown" never happened, and that there was not yet any official vote count when the PRI declared Salinas as the winner. In 1991, the ruling PRI and the opposition PAN approved a motion to burn all the ballots, therefore removing all evidence of the fraud. In 2011, PRI politician and contender for the PRI presidential candidacy in 1988 Ramón Aguirre Velázquez, stated that while he believed that Salinas de Gortari had indeed won, the real percentage of votes for him had been around 49%, which greatly alarmed the PRI since they had never obtained less than half of the votes in previous presidential elections they participated in since their foundation, and that the "network breakdown" was precisely an excuse Bartlett came up with to rig the election and to give Salinas enough votes to reach at least 50%.Chavolla Alcalá María Gisela Salinas me pidió declinar, yo obedecí: Ramón Aguirre https://zonafranca.mx/sin-categoria/salinas-me-pidio-declinar-yo-obedeci-ramon-aguirre-velazquez/ Zona Franca 15 July 2011 19 April 2021 19 April 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210419214136/https://zonafranca.mx/sin-categoria/salinas-me-pidio-declinar-yo-obedeci-ramon-aguirre-velazquez/ dead In July 2017, Manuel Bartlett, former Secretary of the Interior, declared to the media that electoral fraud had been committed through the manipulation of figures, in addition to the fact that this had been carried out in complicity with the National Action Party to prevent Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas from becoming president.2017-07-07 Se acusan Bartlett y Calderón del "fraude" del 1988 https://vanguardia.com.mx/noticias/nacional/se-acusan-bartlett-y-calderon-del-fraude-del-1988-JSVG3317970 2024-02-15 vanguardia.com.mx es-MX 15 February 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240215161545/https://vanguardia.com.mx/noticias/nacional/se-acusan-bartlett-y-calderon-del-fraude-del-1988-JSVG3317970 live A 2019 study in the American Political Science Review found "evidence of blatant alterations" in approximately one third of the tallies in the election. Aftermath Numerous protests were held throughout the country in the following days. Some of the many irregularities denounced by the opposition included duplicated Voter ID's, anticipated delivery of ballots with votes already marked for the PRI, and even votes from dead people. On 13 July, exactly one week after the election, the CFE finally released its official results, according to which Carlos Salinas de Gortari had won the election with 50.36% of the votes. Bartlett asked all the political parties to "accept the popular will". However, the nationwide protests continued. On 1 September, while president De la Madrid was giving his final Address to the Congress, he was interrupted by opposition legislators from the FDN, who protested against the fraud; meanwhile, the PAN legislators stood silent, holding ballots as proof of the fraud. Other legislators threw punches. This was a stark contrast with all previous Addresses to the Congress under the PRI regime, which until then had been little more than ceremonies dedicated to celebrate the President, who would receive unanimous praise from the chamber. Journalist Fidel Samaniego noted that on 1 September 1988 the old ritual of the Address to the Congress had died.Samaniego Fidel La interpelación de 1988 enterró el ritual envejecido https://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/nacion/153320.html 19 April 2021 The opposition legislators noted that the Constitution established the right of interpellation in Congress. On 9 September the Chamber of Deputies met to validate the elections. It was already expected that the Deputies would validate the election since the PRI held 263 out of its 500 seats, and thus the PRI legislators could validate the election by themselves even if the opposition unanimously voted against. After a 20-hour session in which the opposition legislators presented evidence of the fraud while the PRI members emphatically denied the accusations, the election results were validated: all 263 PRI legislators voted in favor, 85 opposition members voted against, and the rest abstained. The FDN legislators walked out during the voting. Thus, Salinas de Gortari was now officially President-elect.Salinas de Gortari, declarado presidente electo de México con los votos del PRI https://elpais.com/diario/1988/09/11/internacional/589932008_850215.html El País 11 September 1988 El País 19 April 2021 Of the five federal entities (the states of Baja California, Michoacán, Morelos, the State of Mexico and the Federal District) in which, according to the official results, Cárdenas had won, three of their State Governors (the Governor of Baja California Xicoténcatl Leyva Mortera, the Governor of Michoacán Luis Martínez Villicaña and the Governor of the State of Mexico Mario Ramón Beteta) were forced to resign in the following months by the PRI, which held them responsible for the party's defeat in those states. See also LIV Legislature of the Mexican Congress References General Category:Legislative elections in Mexico Category:Presidential elections in Mexico General Category:Democratization Category:Electoral fraud