1987 Aegean Crisis

Geopolitical dispute between Greece and Turkey August 2026 August 2026 1987 Aegean Crisis Aegean Sea 19 February – 28 March 1987 Greece Turkey Locator.png Map of Europe highlighting Greece and Turkey See figure caption 1.1 Aegean Dispute Turkey Greece Turgut Özal Andreas Papandreou Initiated bilateral discussions Parties involved in crisis The Aegean Crisisel Κρίση στο Αιγαίο Krísi sto Aigaío and tr Ege kıta sahanlığı krizi. of March 1987 was a political and military standoff between Turkey and Greece over offshore oil exploration near the Greek island of Thasos in the Aegean Sea. The crisis was driven by conflicting claims over the Aegean Sea's continental shelf. The crisis was triggered when Canadian firm Denison Mines, a member of an international oil consortium, announced plans to drill east of Thasos. The location was beyond Greece's territorial sea, but within waters claimed by Athens and disputed by Ankara. To prevent the operation, the Greek government sought to acquire a controlling share in the oil consortium. However, the Turkish government misread this intervention as an indication that the Greek government was preparing to initiate its own offshore drilling project in the disputed waters. Following a request for clarification, a miscommunication occurred between the Greek deputy foreign minister and the Turkish ambassador. In response, Turkey dispatched a survey vessel to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships. Both nations placed their military forces on high alert. The tension was amplified by the absence of a direct channel of communication between the two governments. The crisis reached its peak when the Turkish government decided to dispatch another survey vessel, escorted by two more warships, while the Turkish prime minister was on a flight and unaware of the decision. The situation raised concerns within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as both countries were members of the alliance. Diplomats intervened and resolved the misunderstanding. Turkey withdrew its naval vessels under the condition that Greece would not seek oil drilling in the north Aegean Sea beyond its territorial waters. A diplomatic rapprochement followed, with a meeting between the prime ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal in Davos the following year. The meeting launched the Davos process, aimed at easing tensions in GreekTurkish relations. However, political opposition in both countries diminished the progress achieved in Davos. Background right Aegean 6 nm.svg 320 Map of the Aegean Sea outlining the territorial waters at 6 nmi Aegean 12 nm.svg Map of the Aegean Sea outlining the territorial waters at 12 nmi Territorial waters based on (left) 6 nmi and (right) 12 nmi. The former corresponds to the territorial waters during the 1987 crisis, while the latter corresponds to the extent of territorial waters and national airspace defined as a legal right by UNCLOS, to which Greece is a signatory, and Turkey is not. thumb|Aegean islands by demilitarization status|alt=Map of the Aegean Sea showing the demilitarization status based on the relevant treaties The 1987 Aegean Crisis stemmed from a series of incidents and tensions that developed during the 1970s over sovereign rights to the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea. These tensions became apparent during negotiations for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) that started in 1973. One of the emerging outcomes was UNCLOS to grant participating states the right to extend their territorial waters to twelve miles (previously six miles)In this article, "miles" refers to nautical miles. from their coastlines, including around their islands. If this were to occur, Turkish ports in the Aegean and Black Sea would access the high seas only through waters under Greek sovereignty and jurisdiction.Aydın 1997 116–117 Turkish officials described this potential outcome as turning the Aegean Sea into a "Greek lake".Avar Lin 2019 62 Aydın 1997 116–117 Turkey declared, beginning in 1974 and on several occasions thereafter, that any such extension of Greece's territorial waters would constitute a casus belli (cause for war).Aydın 1997 116–117 Tsakonas 2015 35 Ayman 2001 59 CRS Report 3 Greece refrained from extending its territorial waters in the Aegean Sea, although they retained the right to do so at a later date.Keridis 2009 44 The Cyprus crisis of 1974 was a turning point in Greek–Turkish relations. At the time, Cyprus was a republic—following a British colonial rule—under the Treaty of Guarantee (1960), which was an agreement between the British, Greek, and Turkish governments. The majority of the Greek Cypriot population sought enosis (union) with Greece. However, previous Greek governments had been skeptical because of the assertiveness of Turkey and the Turkish minority present in the area. At the time, Cypriot President Makarios III had abandoned enosis after the republic's creation. This position brought him into conflict with the Greek junta that came to power in Greece in 1967. The junta, dominated by military officers who favored enosis, viewed Makarios as an obstacle. In July 1974, the junta supported a coup by the Cyprus National Guard in an unsuccessful attempt to remove Makarios. The attempt amplified the political crisis, further exacerbating friction between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.Kyle 1997 8–17 Turkey invaded Cyprus, citing the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community and its role as a guarantor power under the 1960 treaty. Turkish forces subsequently occupied approximately one third of the island on the northern end, resulting in the displacement of the Greek Cypriot population and the island's division.Heraclides 2010 71–72 Ayman 2001 55 Tsakonas 2015 32–34, 50 Kyle 1997 17–21 The Turkish invasion crystallized Greek perceptions of Turkish military intentions and became a source of tension between Athens and Ankara, contributing to the deterioration of bilateral relations.Heraclides 2010 86–88 Tsakonas 2015 32–34 The Turkish invasion of Cyprus led to the fall of the junta and the return of the Greek political government. The new Greek government strengthened military presence on several eastern Aegean islands. As such, Turkey accused Greece of violating the islands' demilitarized status under previous agreements, and established the Aegean Army in Izmir in 1975, with amphibious capabilities that further heightened Greek concerns about Turkish intentions.Aydın 2004 30 CRS Report 3 Successive Greek governments maintained that Samothrace and Lemnos had been relieved of their demilitarized status by the Montreux Convention of 1936, while the militarization of other eastern Aegean islands was justified as a response to the presence of the Aegean Army.Veremis 1996 23 Tensions between the two countries escalated during the 1976 Aegean Crisis. Driven by acute supply pressures from the 1973 oil crisis, the Turkish government sought to expand its hydrocarbon exploration in the Aegean Sea. Meanwhile, Greek officials made exaggerated claims in 1973 about significant oil reserve discoveries near Thasos and Lemnos, leading Turkish policymakers to suspect Greece was attempting to monopolize the region's oil resources.Heraclides 2010 78 In August 1976, Ankara dispatched a seismic survey vessel, escorted by a warship, west of the Greek island of Lesbos.Heraclides 2010 88 The vessel conducted seismological surveys in Turkish territorial waters and in disputed areas of the continental shelf under the high seas. Tensions escalated when the head of the Turkish Nationalist Movement Party claimed that the eastern Aegean islands should have been Turkish. This prompted Greek statements that a forceful response would be forthcoming and that the Greek army was on full alert, bringing the two countries to the brink of war.Heraclides 2010 88 Subsequently, the Greek government appealed to the UN Security Council (UNSC) and International Court of Justice (ICJ), seeking to defuse the crisis through diplomatic efforts.Heraclides 2010 89 While the UNSC recommended restraint, the ICJ declared that it lacked jurisdiction to rule on the Aegean continental shelf dispute. Later that year, the two sides signed the Bern Agreement, which froze unilateral exploration activities. However, mutual suspicion persisted.Heraclides 2010 88–89 UPI Mar. 1987 Tsakonas 2015 32–34, 36–40 Additionally, after 1978, the two sides had no direct communication between their leaders, only being restored after the 1987 crisis.Congressional Record 4710 Events Prelude In 1981, Andreas Papandreou became prime minister of Greece. His government considered the November 1976 Bern Agreement's drilling ban east of Thasos void, since Aegean talks had stalled. However, his government was also entangled in legal disputes in an attempt to control oil companies wanting to expand exploration beyond Greek territorial waters.Heraclides 2010 120 The predominant Greek view at the time was that most of the Aegean continental shelf was Greek and so oil companies had to seek permission from the Greek state. Given these circumstances, exploration and extraction of oil beyond Greek territorial waters was improbable.Heraclides 2010 121 In the 1983 parliamentary election, Turgut Özal and his party won 45.14% of the vote, enabling him to form a single-party government and become prime minister of Turkey. This outcome was unexpected because the Turkish military, which had its own candidate, did not support Özal. Additionally, a single party government was uncommon.Heraclides 2010 117–118 For Özal, improving relations with Greece became a top priority of Turkish foreign policy, as he viewed it as a prerequisite for closer ties with the European Community. Toward this goal, he introduced several measures to improve relations with Greece between 1984 and 1986. These included abolishing entry visas for Greek citizens and improving conditions for the Greek minority in Istanbul. He also took initiatives to strengthen trade between the two countries.Heraclides 2010 118 Despite these overtures, little progress was achieved between the two leaders. Papandreou continued the policy of isolating Turkey in international forums, including its attempt at an association agreement with the EC.Heraclides 2010 119 The lack of progress led the Turkish military-diplomatic establishment to call for an end to the policy of tolerance toward Greece.Heraclides 2010 119–120 Miscommunication Tensions started to rise on 19 February 1987, when the Greek government announced plans to purchase majority shares in foreign companies drilling near Thasos, citing the strategic value of this area.Heraclides 2010 121 Katsoulas 2021 187 This was followed by an announcement by Denison Mines, a Canadian company, of plans to drill eight to ten miles east of Thasos. Although the proposed drilling site was beyond Greece's six-mile territorial sea, it fell within the twelve-mile limit claimed by Greece, angering the Greek government.Heraclides 2010 121 Katsoulas 2021 187 The Greek government faced a dilemma: allow exploration and risk a crisis with Turkey, or expropriate the company and take control itself. Although Greek officials believed it had a strong legal case, it feared a compromise ruling by the courts. Intelligence gathered by Greece in late 1986 also suggested that Turkey was planning to provoke a crisis to force Greece into bilateral negotiations. Papandreou decided to buy shares of the company to control its activities.Katsoulas 2021 187 However, the Turkish government viewed the company's public statement and the Greek government's purchase of shares as confirmation of Greece's intention to assert its continental shelf claims by drilling in disputed waters. The Greek actions alarmed the Turkish government, which was at the time seeking membership in the European Economic Community (EEC).Heraclides 2010 121 Turkish ambassador Nazmi Akıman tr sought assurances from Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Yannis Kapsis that the Greek government had no intention of drilling beyond its territorial waters. Kapsis, however, asserted Greece's sovereign right to drill anywhere on its continental shelf, even though this was not the Greek government's immediate plan.Heraclides 2010 121 Katsoulas 2021 187 Akıman interpreted this as an intent to drill beyond six miles, and Ankara warned that any activity in disputed areas would prompt a Turkish response. The Greek government refused to back down, announcing Aegean military exercises on 19 March.Heraclides 2010 121 On the same day, the Turkish survey vessel Piri Reis was sent to the area with an escort of two Turkish warships. Both governments placed their military forces on high alert.Heraclides 2010 120 Stergiou 2021 146 Crisis peak Tensions peaked following strong statements from both prime ministers. Papandreou ordered the armed forces to sink any Turkish ship if it was found in Greek territorial waters.Stergiou 2021 146 In a similar tone, Özal said that Turkey would respond if Greece interfered with its vessels. He also added that he was waiting for any Greek initiative.The New York Times Mar. (b) 1987 Özal was abroad for heart surgery in Texas, United States, and there was no direct communication channel in place. As a result, hard-liners in Ankara drove Turkey's reaction, undermining Özal's efforts to ease the strained relations.Heraclides 2010 121 On 26 March, the Turkish Council of Ministers scheduled the survey vessel RV MTA Sismik 1fn3 to go to disputed waters around the Greek islands of Lemnos, Samothrace, and Lesbos. RV MTA Sismik 1 would be escorted by twofn4 Turkish warships. Özal was unaware of this decision, as he was on a flight from the United States to London.Katsoulas 2021 188 In the meantime, the Greek government ordered the mobilization of its naval vessels and personnel, and, by 27 March, a significant deployment of ships had been made in strategically important areas.Katsoulas 2021 188 As the situation escalated, the US (particularly Robert V. Keeley, US ambassador in Athens) and Britain's Lord Carrington, the Secretary General of NATO, urged Greece and Turkey to avoid the use of force, and offered to act as mediators.Heraclides 2010 121–122 Katsoulas 2021 190 The New York Times Mar. (b) 1987 Both of them met with Özal upon his return to Ankara via London.Heraclides 2010 121–122 On 27 March, Özal attempted to de-escalate the tension; he spoke to BBC Radio, "There is no reason for tension. Turkey will not proceed to explore in the disputed areas, if Greece would not initiate exploration... The moment they go out we will also go out... The exploration vessel and our warships will remain within our territorial waters."Katsoulas 2021 191 Papandreou wanted to hold NATO, and especially the United States, responsible for failing to restrain one of their members.Tsakonas 2015 46 He ordered the suspension of the operation of the NATO communication base in Nea Makri (a town east of Athens). He also sent the Greek foreign minister, Karolos Papoulias, to Bulgaria, a Warsaw Pact member, for consultations with President Todor Zhivkov.Tsakonas 2015 46 The New York Times Mar. (a) 1987 Resolution In the meantime, Yiannis Boutos, a former minister and friend of Papandreou, learned of the escalating situation during a meeting with Turkish ambassador Akıman.Heraclides 2010 122 Boutos rushed to Papandreou's home to brief him, who was unaware of the Kapsis–Akıman exchange. Acting on the Prime Minister's behalf, Boutos assured Akıman that Greece's share purchase aimed to stop, not extend, drilling east of Thasos.Heraclides 2010 122 Reassured, Akıman confirmed this with Kapsis and informed his government. The crisis ended on 28 March 1987, when Özal declared that Turkey would withdraw its vessels as long as Greece refrained from drilling beyond its territorial waters.Heraclides 2010 122 Katsoulas 2021 191 Aftermath thumb|right|Prime Ministers Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal shake hands at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in 1988 at Davos, Switzerland.|alt=See figure caption A day after the crisis ended, Papandreou communicated with Özal through diplomatic channels over secret talking points, diffusing the tense atmosphere.Heraclides 2010 122 In January 1988, Papandreou and Özal met at the annual World Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, to improve relations between their two countries. Papandreou described the meeting as "a great event for the two nations," and Özal described it as a breakthrough.Katsoulas 2021 194 The two leaders said that they had reached a no-war understanding. They also agreed to establish a hotline between the two governments.Clogg 2013 189 Katsoulas 2021 194 Two joint committees were also established to promote closer political and economic relations: the Political Committee focused on political cooperation, while the Economic Committee focused on economic cooperation. The agreed framework of collaboration was named the Davos process.Clogg 2013 189 Papandreou sought this agreement to improve his image as a man of peace,Veremis 1993 185 while Özal wanted to improve Turkey's image abroad, as his country was under evaluation for full membership of the European Community.Katsoulas 2021 194 On 27 May 1988, the Political Committee met at the Athenian suburb of Vouliagmeni. There, the Greek foreign minister Karolos Papoulias and his Turkish counterpart Mesut Yılmaz signed a memorandum of understanding on confidence-building measures, aimed at reducing tensions and preventing future GreekTurkish confrontations. Özal, accompanied by Turkish entrepreneurs, visited Athens on 13–15 June 1988.Heraclides 2010 125 Despite the previous meetings, little progress was made until a subsequent meeting in Ankara on 6–9 September of the same year, where a document was signed establishing an understanding on preventing accidents in international waters.Heraclides 2010 125 Other meetings between the two sides focused on economic cooperation, specifically trade and tourism, as well as cultural exchanges.Heraclides 2010 124 Nevertheless, little progress was achieved on the continental shelf dispute. The two sides disagreed on the scope of their disputes: Greece focused on continental-shelf delimitation, whereas Turkey sought to include territorial waters, airspace, and the militarization of the eastern Aegean islands. Turkey favored bilateral negotiations, while Greece advocated international arbitration.Katsoulas 2021 195 Political opposition in both countries resulted in the abandonment of the Davos agreement. Özal faced resistance from the Turkish military-diplomatic establishment and from Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş.Heraclides 2010 126 On 6 June 1988, Papandreou was criticized by the opposition for focusing on bilateral disputes and shelving the Cyprus dispute and apologized from the podium of the Hellenic Parliament. Papandreou attempted to formally include Cyprus as a key issue during Özal's visit to Athens a week later, but Özal refused. In autumn, Papandreou yielded to the opposition and denounced the Davos process.Katsoulas 2021 195 Heraclides 2010 126 By the end of 1988, Greece reported 338 Turkish violations of the Greek airspace, 22 overflights of Greek sovereign space, and 42 mock dogfights.Katsoulas 2021 195 Historians John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis el Θάνος Βερεμής consider that the momentum gained in Davos, meant to improve the bilateral relations, gradually ended in 1989.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 168 Moreover, on 20 December 1989, the European Commission rejected the Turkish application for full membership in the EEC, which reduced incentives for a diplomatic solution.Veremis 1996 25 Tensions resurfaced over a series of incidents starting in 1994 and culminated in the Imia Crisis in January 1996.Veremis 1996 26–27 Nevertheless, the 1988 PapouliasYılmaz Memorandum established after the 1987 crisis provided principles upon which subsequent confidence-building efforts between Greece and Turkey continued to build. Examples include the 1997 Madrid Declaration after the Imia Crisis and the Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighborliness in 2023.CRS Report 4–5 Kathimerini Feb. 2019 Kathimerini Dec. 2023 Notes fn3 The appearance of Sismik 1 produced a déjà vu sensation to the Greeks since it also participated in the 1976 Aegean Crisis.Heraclides 2010 120 fn4 Although the initial announcement said seven Turkish warships, two warships eventually escorted Sismik 1.Katsoulas 2021 188, 191 References Sources Books Aydın Mustafa Aydın Mustafa Mustafa Aydın Ifantis Kostas 2004 Turkish-Greek Relations: the Security Dilemma in the Aegean Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations: Constraints and Opportunities Routledge 21–51 London and New York 0-203-50191-8 S1GQAgAAQBAJ Veremis Thanos Clogg Richard Richard Clogg Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade 1993 Palgrave Macmillan London and New York en 978-1-349-23056-3 https://archive.org/details/greece198189popu00rich Defence and Security Policies under PASOK 181–189 Clogg Richard A Concise History of Greece 2013 Cambridge University Press Cambridge en 978-1-107-65644-4 https://archive.org/details/concisehistoryof00clog_0 Heraclides Alexis Alexis Heraclides The Greek-Turkish Conflict in the Aegean 2010 Palgrave Macmillan London en 978-0-230-28339-8 LPGADAAAQBAJ Katsoulas Spyros The United States and Greek-Turkish Relations, The Guardian's Dilemma 2021 Taylor & Francis London and New York en 978-1-000-51433-9 5IxNEAAAQBAJ Keridis Dimitris 2009 Historical dictionary of modern Greece The Scarecrow Press Lanham, Maryland 978-0-8108-6312-5 c_qpXc2GTzIC Koliopoulos John S. John S. Koliopoulos Veremis Thanos M. :el: Θάνος Βερέμης Modern Greece A History Since 1821 2009 Wiley-Blackwell Oxford en 978-1-4443-1483-0 qumwwKbI0TQC Stergiou Andreas Greece's Ostpolitik Dealing with the 'Devil' 2021 Springer International Publishing Cham en 978-3-030-61129-3 WrUYEAAAQBAJ Tsakonas Panagiotes The Incomplete Breakthrough in Greek-Turkish Relations: Grasping Greece's Socialization Strategy 2015 Palgrave Macmillan UK London en 978-0-230-27807-3 Qx59DAAAQBAJ Journals and reports Aydın Mustafa 1997 Cacophony in the Aegean Contemporary Turkish-Greek Relations The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations 27 109–140 10.1501/Intrel_0000000256 Ayman S. Gülden 2001 The Kardak (Imia) Crisis and Turkish-Greek Relations Etudes Helleniques/Hellenic Studies 9 2 49–72 0824-8621 https://ejournals.lib.uoc.gr/hellst/article/view/1281/1171 Avar Yusuf Lin Yu Chou Aegean Disputes Between Turkey and Greece: Turkish and Greek Claims and Motivations in the Framework of Legal and Political Perspectives International Journal of Politics and Security 2019 1 1 57–70 https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/706054 Kyle Keith Keith Kyle 1997 Cyprus: In Search of Peace No. 3 Minority Rights Group https://minorityrights.org/app/uploads/2023/12/download-861-download-the-full-report.pdf Veremis Thanos 1996 Greek-Turkish Relations: Crisis in the Aegean Études helléniques/Hellenic Studies 4 2 19–32 0824-8621 https://ejournals.lib.uoc.gr/hellst/article/view/1422/1312 Greece and Turkey: Aegean Issues — Background and Recent Developments CRS Report for Congress 21 August 1997 CRS Report 97-799 https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/19970821_97-799_fafae64b4eb0fd47a3dca6e697546ff66311c8a3.pdf CRS Report Greek Independence Day 22 March 1988 4625–4712 Congressional Record – Senate https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt4/pdf/GPO-CRECB-1988-pt4-1-1.pdf Congressional Record Newspapers Greece and Turkey Alert Forces as Tension Builds on Oil Search Cowell Alan Alan Cowell 28 March 1987 The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/28/world/greece-and-turkey-alert-forces-as-tension-builds-on-oil-search.html?pagewanted=all The New York Times Mar. (a) 1987 Greeks and Turks Ease Aegean Crisis Cowell Alan 29 March 1987 The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/1987/03/29/world/greeks-and-turks-ease-aegean-crisis.html The New York Times Mar. (b) 1987 Greece Opposes Reported Turkish Oil Search in Aegean 26 March 1987 UPI UPI archives http://www.upi.com/Archives/1987/03/26/Greece-opposes-reported-Turkish-oil-search-in-Aegean/6705543733200/ UPI Mar. 1987 Greece, Turkey to draft framework to reduce tension Eleni Varvitsioti 14 February 2019 Kathimerini Kathimerini Feb. 2019 https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/237670/greece-turkey-to-draft-framework-to-reduce-tension/ https://web.archive.org/web/20210414035511/https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/237670/greece-turkey-to-draft-framework-to-reduce-tension/ 14 April 2021 Mitsotakis, Erdogan sign 'Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good-Neighborliness' 7 December 2023 Kathimerini Kathimerini Dec. 2023 https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/1226607/athens-declaration-expected-to-be-signed-between-greece-turkey/ Further reading Wilson Andrew 1979 The International Institute for Strategic Studies London Aegean Dispute Adelphi Paper No. 155 0-86079-030-4 https://archive.org/details/aegeandispute0000wils/page/n1/mode/2up Turkey and Greece: Time to Settle the Aegean Dispute 2011 N°64 International Crisis Group https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/pbei/icg/0022622/f_0022622_18613.pdf none Yavas Gokcen 2013 Europeanization of the Aegean dispute: An analysis of Turkish political elite discourse Turkish Studies 14 3 520–539 10.1080/14683849.2013.833020 none Category:Greece–Turkey relations Category:1987 in Turkey Category:1987 in Greece Category:1987 conflicts Category:International maritime incidents Category:Andreas Papandreou Category:History of North Aegean