1991 Soviet coup attempt

Failed attempt to unseat Mikhail Gorbachev the 1993 Russian constitutional crisis June 2026 November 2020 the end of the Cold War, the Revolutions of 1989,and later, the dissolution of the Soviet Union 2/2/2 330 infobox 1991-August-Moscow-2.jpg Boris_Yeltsin_22_August_1991-1.jpg T-80 1991 coup attempt04 (cropped).jpg Thursday_morning_on_Smolenskaya_(8000376283).jpg August_1991_coup_-_awaiting_the_counterattack_outside_the_White_House_Moscow_-_panoramio.jpg Clockwise from top left: Memorial to three citizens killed defying the GKChP coup Boris Yeltsin, the Russian president, waving the newly adopted national flag Barricade on Smolenskaya Street that reads "Ban, dissolve, prosecute the CPSU!" Pro-Yeltsin forces' barricades near Moscow's White House GKChP tanks on the Bolshoy Moskvoretsky Bridge near Red Square 320px 18–22August 1991 (5 days) Moscow, Russian SFSR, Soviet Union Presidential victory; coup fails Self-dissolution of the GKChP Failure of the proposed New Union Treaty Dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and seizure of its banks and buildings by the Russian SFSR Restoration of Estonian and Latvian independence Ukraine's declaration of independence Belarus' declaration of independence Chechen Revolution and Declaration of Sovereignty of the Chechen Republic Power shift continued towards republic elites, Soviet president left with effectively no authority Dissolution of the Soviet Union on 26December 1991 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics State Committee on the State of Emergency Red Army flag.svg Taman Division Red Army flag.svg Kantemir Division КПСС.svg Communist Party of the Soviet Union Emblema KGB.svg 14 KGB Emblema KGB.svg 14 Alpha Group Emblema KGB.svg 14 Vympel Group Supporting republics:Ольга Васильева, «Республики во время путча» в сб.статей: «Путч. Хроника тревожных дней». // Издательство «Прогресс», 1991. (in Russian). Accessed 14 June 2009. Archived 17 June 2009.Dunlop John B. The rise of Russia and the fall of the Soviet empire 1995 Princeton University Press 978-1-4008-2100-6 1st pbk. printing, with new postscript Princeton, N.J. 761105926Abkhaz ASSR AbkhaziaAzerbaijan SSR 1991 AzerbaijanByelorussian SSR Byelorussia Checheno-Ingush ASSR 1990 Checheno-IngushetiaFlag of the Gagauz people.svg GagauziaSouth Ossetia South OssetiaTajik SSR TajikistanTatar ASSR TatarstanMoldavian SSR TransnistriaTurkmen SSR TurkmenistanUzbek SSR Uzbekistan Interfront: Estonian SSR Intermovement Latvian SSR Interfront Lithuanian SSR Yedinstvo Moldavian SSR Unitate-Edinstvo Ukrainian SSRФлаг Интердвижения Донбасса.svg International Movement of DonbassRussian SFSR Communist Party of the RSFSREstonian SSR Communist Party of Estonia (CPSU)Latvian SSR Communist Party of LatviaLithuanian SSR Communist Party of LithuaniaFlag of the LDPSU.svg Liberal Democratic PartyA party led by the politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky – Accessed 13 September 2009. Archived 16 September 2009Flag of the National Patriotic Front.svg PamyatNotes from a former KGB lieutenant colonel: Who was behind the shooting of the defenders of the TV tower in Vilnius in January 1991? - 2020 Archived 20 June 2020Flag of Russian National Unity.svg Russian National UnityThe prosecutor's office has revived the specter of Russian Nazism - 2005 Archived 3 February 2023RussiaFlag of Russia (1858–1896).svg Russian nationalistsUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics Pro-coup and anti-Yeltsin demonstrators and organizations Diplomatic support:http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5261000/5261982.stm Би-би-си – Россия – Хроника путча. Часть II news.bbc.co.uk 18 August 2006 14 August 2013 28 August 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20070828040103/http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/russia/newsid_5261000/5261982.stm liveР. Г. Апресян. Народное сопротивление августовскому путчу (recuperato il 27 novembre 2010 tramite Internet Archive) China North Korea 1948 Vietnam Cuba Laos Yugoslavia Republic of Afghanistan (1987–1992) Flag of Iraq (1991–2004).svg Iraq Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 1977 Palestine PLOhttp://ethics.iph.ras.ru/works/N/9.html Апресян Р.Г. Народное сопротивление августовскому путчу https://web.archive.org/web/20070911002221/http://ethics.iph.ras.ru/works/N/9.html 2021-12-04 11 September 2007 Sudan USSR, Flag commander 1964.svg Presidency of the Soviet Union Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Emblem of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1978–1991), Emblem of the Russian Federation (1991–1992).svg Supreme Soviet Emblem of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1978–1991), Emblem of the Russian Federation (1991–1992).svg Congress of People's Deputies Emblem of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (1978–1991), Emblem of the Russian Federation (1991–1992).svg Council of Ministers Communist star with golden border and red rims.svg Soviet Military Supporting republics:Armenian SSR 1990 Armenia Estonian SSR 1990 EstoniaGeorgian SSR 1990 GeorgiaKarakalpak ASSR KarakalpakstanKazakh SSR KazakhstanKirghiz SSR KirghiziaLatvian SSR 1990 LatviaLithuanian SSR 1988 LithuaniaMoldavian SSR 1990 MoldovaNakhichevan ASSR 1991 NakhchivanUkrainian SSR Ukraine Russian SFSR 1991 Russian liberalsRussian SFSR 1991 Anti-coup and pro-Yeltsin demonstrators and organizations (DemRossiya)Armenian Revolutionary Federation Flag.svg Armenian Revolutionary FederationAzerbaijan 1991 Popular Front of AzerbaijanBelarus 1991 Belarusian Popular FrontFlag of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People.svg All-National Congress of the Chechen PeopleHayward Alker Rupesinghe Kumar Gurr Ted Robert Journeys Through Conflict 1999 Rowman & Littlefield 9780742510289 119Tatar Nationalist Flag.svg All-Tatar Public CenterUkraine 1991 People's Movement of UkraineFlag of UNA-UNSO.svg UNA–UNSOLithuania 1988 SąjūdisLatvia Popular Front of LatviaEstonian SSR 1990 Popular Front of Estonia Diplomatic support: United States United Kingdom NATO European Union EEC France 1974 Germany Israel Italy Holy See Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia Romania Hungary Poland Bulgaria Croatia Slovenia Mongolian People's Republic Flag of Afghanistan (1992–2001).svg Afghanistan Turkey Japan 1870 South Korea 1984 Pakistan Saudi Arabia Canada Australia New Zealand USSR Gennady YanayevUSSR Sergey AkhromeyevUSSR Dmitry YazovUSSR Vladimir KryuchkovUSSR Valentin PavlovUSSR Boris PugoUSSR Oleg BaklanovUSSR Vasily StarodubtsevUSSR Alexander TizyakovUSSR Nikolay Kruchina Abkhaz ASSR Vladislav ArdzinbaAbkhaz ASSR Vladimir MikanbaAzerbaijan SSR 1991 Ayaz MutallibovAzerbaijan SSR 1991 Hasan HasanovByelorussian SSR Anatoly MalofeyevByelorussian SSR Nikolai DementeyChecheno-Ingush ASSR 1990 Doku ZavgayevChecheno-Ingush ASSR 1990 Sergey BekovFlag of the Gagauz people.svg Gagauz Republic Stepan TopalFlag of South Ossetia.svg South Ossetian Soviet Democratic Republic Znaur GassiyevTajik SSR Qahhor MahkamovTatar ASSR Mintimer ShaimievTatar ASSR Mukhammat SabirovFlag of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1952–1990).svg Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic Igor SmirnovTurkmen SSR Saparmurat NiyazovUzbek SSR Islam Karimov Russian SFSR Valentin KuptsovEstonian SSR Lembit AnnusLatvian SSR Alfrēds RubiksLithuanian SSR Mykolas BurokevičiusFlag of the LDPSU.svg Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky USSR, Flag commander 1964.svg Mikhail Gorbachevunder house arrestRussian SFSR Boris YeltsinRussian SFSR Alexander RutskoyRussian SFSR Ruslan KhasbulatovRussian SFSR Ivan SilayevRussian SFSR Gennady BurbulisRussian SFSR Andrei KozyrevRussian SFSR Viktor BarannikovRussian SFSR Konstantin KobetsRussian SFSR Gavriil PopovRussian SFSR Pavel GrachevRussian SFSR Anatoly Sobchak Armenian SSR 1990 Levon Ter-PetrosyanEstonian SSR 1990 Edgar SavisaarGeorgian SSR 1990 Zviad GamsakhurdiaKarakalpak ASSR Dauletbay Shamshetov ru Шамшетов, Даулетбай Нуратдинович ibKarakalpak ASSR Amin TojiyevKazakh SSR Nursultan NazarbayevKirghiz SSR Askar AkayevLatvian SSR 1990 Ivars GodmanisLithuanian SSR 1988 Vytautas LandsbergisLithuanian SSR 1988 Gediminas VagnoriusMoldavian SSR 1990 Mircea SnegurMoldavian SSR 1990 Valeriu MuravschiNakhichevan ASSR 1991 Heydar AliyevAzerbaijan: A Country Study: Aliyev and the Presidential Election of October 1993, The Library of CongressUkrainian SSR Leonid KravchukUkrainian SSR Vitold Fokin Azerbaijan 1991 Abulfaz ElchibeyBelarus 1991 Zianon PazniakFlag of the All-National Congress of the Chechen People.svg Dzhokhar DudayevTatar Nationalist Flag.svg Fauziya BayramovaUkraine 1991 Viacheslav ChornovilFlag of UNA-UNSO.svg Yuriy ShukhevychLatvia Dainis Īvāns 3 died by suicide: Boris Pugo, the Minister of Interior Sergey Akhromeyev, a military advisor to Gorbachev Nikolay Kruchina, the Administrator of Affairs of the Central Committee of the CPSUhttps://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/08/26/Third-Soviet-official-commits-suicide/5619683179200/ Third Soviet official commits suicide 26 August 1991 United Press International 7 March 2019 8 March 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081651/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/08/26/Third-Soviet-official-commits-suicide/5619683179200/ livehttps://www.deseretnews.com/article/179916/THE-CENTRAL-COMMITTEE-CHIEF-OF-ADMINISTRATION-KILLS-HIMSELF.html The Central Committee Chief of Administration Kills Himself Deseret News 7 March 2019 8 March 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190308081514/https://www.deseretnews.com/article/179916/THE-CENTRAL-COMMITTEE-CHIEF-OF-ADMINISTRATION-KILLS-HIMSELF.html dead * 3 civilians killed on 21August 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt In August 1991, hardliners of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) attempted to forcibly seize control of the country from Mikhail Gorbachev, who was Soviet president and General Secretary of the CPSU at the time. The coup leaders consisted of top military and civilian officials, including Vice President Gennady Yanayev, who together formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (ru ГКЧП GKChP). Opposed to Gorbachev's reform program, they were angry at the loss of control over Eastern European states and fearful of the New Union Treaty, which was on the verge of being signed by the Soviet Union (USSR). The treaty was to decentralize much of the central Soviet government's power and distribute it among its fifteen republics. Boris Yeltsin's demand for more autonomy to the republics opened a window for the plotters to organize the coup. The attempt took place between 19 and 21 August 1991; as a result, the events were referred to as the August Coup.ru Августовский путч Avgustovskiy Putch August Putsch The GKChP hardliners dispatched KGB agents who detained Gorbachev at his dacha but failed to detain the recently elected president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, who had been both an ally and critic of Gorbachev. The GKChP was poorly organized and met with effective resistance by both Yeltsin and a civilian campaign of anti-authoritarian protesters, mainly in Moscow.Mark Kramer, "The Dialectics of Empire: Soviet Leaders and the Challenge of Civil Resistance in East-Central Europe, 1968–91", in Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton Ash (eds.), Civil Resistance and Power Politics: The Experience of Non-violent Action from Gandhi to the Present, Oxford University Press, 2009 pp. 108–109 https://web.archive.org/web/20170320185749/https://books.google.com/books?id=BxOQKrCe7UUC&dq=Civil+resistance+and+power+politics&source=gbs_navlinks_s 20 March 2017 . The coup collapsed in two days, and Gorbachev returned to office while the plotters all lost their posts. Yeltsin subsequently became the dominant leader and Gorbachev lost much of his influence. The failed coup led to both the immediate collapse of the CPSU and the dissolution of the USSR four months later. Following the capitulation of the GKChP, popularly referred to as the "Gang of Eight", both the Supreme Court of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR) and President Gorbachev described its actions as a coup attempt. Background Since assuming power as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1985, Gorbachev had embarked on an ambitious reform program embodied in the twin concepts of perestroika (economic and political restructuring) and glasnost (openness).http://mars.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/gorrev.html Gorbachev and Perestroika. Professor Gerhard Rempel, Department of History, Western New England College, 1996-02-02, accessed 2008-07-12 Mars.wnec.edu 31 March 2010 dead https://web.archive.org/web/20080828102933/http://mars.wnec.edu/~grempel/courses/wc2/lectures/gorrev.html 28 August 2008 These moves prompted resistance and suspicion on the part of hard-line members of the nomenklatura. The reforms also caused nationalist agitation on the part of the Soviet Union's non-Russian minorities to grow, and there were fears that some or all of the union republics might secede. In 1991, the Soviet Union was in a severe economic and political crisis. Scarcity of food, medicine, and other consumables was widespread,Sarker Sunil Kumar The rise and fall of communism 1994 Atlantic publishers and distributors New Delhi 978-8171565153 94 https://books.google.com/books?id=rGf2b1nsn9cC&q=economic+conditions+in+the+the+Soviet+Union+1991+food 4 January 2017 9 July 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210709213800/https://books.google.com/books?id=rGf2b1nsn9cC&q=economic+conditions+in+the+the+Soviet+Union+1991+food live people had to stand in long lines to buy even essential goods,https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00591R000100140005-4.pdf USSR: The food supply situation CIA.gov 26 July 2019 23 March 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180323092510/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP86T00591R000100140005-4.pdf dead fuel stocks were as much as 50% lower than the estimated amount needed for the approaching winter, and inflation exceeded 300% per year, with factories lacking the cash needed to pay salaries.Gupta R.C. Collapse of the Soviet Union 1997 Krishna Prakashan Media India 978-8185842813 62 https://books.google.com/books?id=_UwroC6xtPQC&q=Collapse+of+the+Soviet+Union+Gupta 4 January 2017 9 July 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210709213759/https://books.google.com/books?id=_UwroC6xtPQC&q=Collapse+of+the+Soviet+Union+Gupta live In 1990, Estonia,Ziemele (2005). p. 30. Latvia,Ziemele (2005). p. 35. LithuaniaZiemele (2005). pp. 38–40. and ArmeniaМаркедонов Сергей Самоопределение по ленинским принципам https://web.archive.org/web/20201116153617/https://www.apn.ru/publications/article10413.htm 16 November 2020 had already declared the restoration of their independence from the Soviet Union. In January 1991, a violent attempt to return Lithuania to the Soviet Union by force took place. About a week later, a similar attempt was engineered by local pro-Soviet forces to overthrow Latvian authorities. These attempts failed, and Lithuania and Latvia retained their statehood. Russia declared its sovereignty on 12June 1990 and thereafter limited the application of Soviet laws, in particular those governing finance and the economy, on Russian territory. The Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted laws that contradicted Soviet laws (the so-called War of Laws). In the unionwide referendum on 17 March 1991, boycotted by the Baltic states, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, a supermajority of residents in the other republics expressed the desire to retain the renewed Soviet Union, with 77.85% voting in favor. Following negotiations, eight of the remaining nine republics (Ukraine abstaining) approved the New Union Treaty with some conditions. The treaty was to make the Soviet Union a federation of independent republics called the Union of Soviet Sovereign Republics, with a common president, foreign policy, and military. Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan were to sign the Treaty in Moscow on 20August 1991.https://yeltsin.ru/day-by-day/1991/08/03/33235/ Многоступенчатый запуск нового Союза намечен на 20 августа 24 March 2021 2 June 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210602215054/https://yeltsin.ru/day-by-day/1991/08/03/33235/ live Союз можно было сохранить. Белая книга: Документы и факты о политике М. С. Горбачёва по реформированию и сохранению многонационального государства https://web.archive.org/web/20210310042330/https://www.gorby.ru/userfiles/union_could_be_saved.pdf 10 March 2021 . – 2-е изд., перераб. и доп. – М.: АСТ, 2007. – С. 316 – 567 с. British historian Dan Stone wrote the following about the plotters' motivation: The coup was the last gasp of those who were astonished at and felt betrayed by the precipitous collapse of the Soviet Union's empire in Eastern Europe and the swift destruction of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon that followed. Many feared the consequences of Gorbachev's German policies above all, not just for leaving officers unemployed but for sacrificing gains achieved in the Great Patriotic War to German revanchism and irredentism – after all, this had been the Kremlin's greatest fear since the end of the war.Dan Stone, Goodbye to all that? The story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2014) p. 23. Preparation Planning The KGB began considering a coup in September 1990. Soviet politician Alexander Yakovlev began warning Gorbachev about the possibility of one after the 28th Party Congress in June 1990. On 11December 1990, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov made a "call for order" over the Moscow Programme television station.Yevgenia Albats and Catherine A. Fitzpatrick. The State Within a State: The KGB and Its Hold on Russia – Past, Present, and Future. 1994. 0-374-52738-5, pp. 276–293. That day, he asked two KGB officersKGB Maj. Gen. Vyacheslav Zhizhin and KGB Col. Alexei Yegorov, The State Within a State, pp. 276–277. to prepare measures to be taken in the event a state of emergency was declared in the USSR. Later, Kryuchkov brought Soviet Defense Minister Dmitry Yazov, Central Control Commission Chairman Boris Pugo, Premier Valentin Pavlov, Vice President Gennady Yanayev, Soviet Defense Council deputy chief Oleg Baklanov, Gorbachev secretariat head Valery Boldin, and CPSU Central Committee Secretary Oleg Shenin into the conspiracy.https://flb.ru/material.phtml?id=3632 Заключение по материалам расследования роли и участии должностных лиц КГБ СССР в событиях 19–21 августа 1991 года flb.ru 10 April 2020 26 March 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210326152828/https://flb.ru/material.phtml?id=3632 liveru "Novaya Gazeta" No. 51 of 23 July 2001 https://web.archive.org/web/20120215063833/http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/51n/n51n-s15.shtml 15 February 2012 (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators) When Kryuchkov complained about the Soviet Union's growing instability to the Congress of People's Deputies, Gorbachev attempted to appease him by issuing a presidential decree enhancing the powers of the KGB and appointing Pugo to the Cabinet as Minister of Internal Affairs. Foreign Secretary Eduard Shevardnadze resigned in protest and rejected an offered appointment as vice president, warning that "a dictatorship is coming." Gorbachev was forced to appoint Yanayev in his place.Kyriakodis Harry G. 1991 The 1991 Soviet and 1917 Bolshewk Coups Compared: Causes, Consequences and Legality https://www.schoeningh.de/view/journals/ruhi/18/1-4/article-p317_13.xml Russian History 18 1–4 323–328 10.1163/187633191X00137 0094-288X None 30 June 2022 3 August 2022 https://web.archive.org/web/20220803084001/https://www.schoeningh.de/view/journals/ruhi/18/1-4/article-p317_13.xml live subscription Beginning with the January Events in Lithuania, members of Gorbachev's Cabinet hoped that he could be persuaded to declare a state of emergency and "restore order," and formed the State Committee on the State of Emergency (GKChP).Hoffman David E. The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and its Deadly Legacy 2009 Doubleday 978-0-385-52437-7 1 New York 320432478 On 17June 1991, Soviet premier Pavlov requested extraordinary powers from the Supreme Soviet. Several days later, Moscow Mayor Gavriil Popov informed U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union Jack F. Matlock Jr. that a coup against Gorbachev was being planned. When Matlock tried to warn him, Gorbachev falsely assumed that his own Cabinet was not involved and underestimated the risk of a coup. Gorbachev reversed Pavlov's request for more powers and jokingly told his Cabinet "The coup is over," remaining oblivious to their plans.Kyriakodis 1991 328 On 23July 1991, several party functionaries and literati published a piece in the hardline Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper, entitled "A Word to the People", that called for decisive action to prevent calamity.A Word to the People, full text https://web.archive.org/web/20210804210553/https://kprf.ru/media/filestorage/library/c65ca2_pravdamos_27_261_6.pdf 4 August 2021 scan from the Pravda newspaper at the KPRF website (in Russian) Six days later, on 29July, Gorbachev, Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the possibility of replacing hardliners such as Pavlov, Yazov, Kryuchkov and Pugo with more liberal figures,ru Timeline of the events https://web.archive.org/web/20071127115224/http://archive.rusbg.com/viewtopic.php?p=183469&sid=ab7f23384901f822938fcbc1b4e31240 27 November 2007 by Artem Krechnikov, Moscow BBC correspondent with Nazarbayev as Prime Minister (in Pavlov's place). Kryuchkov, who had placed Gorbachev under close surveillance as Subject 110 several months earlier, eventually got wind of the conversation from an electronic bug planted by Gorbachev's bodyguard, Vladimir Medvedev.Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin (2000). The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe and the West. Gardners Books. 0-14-028487-7, pp. 513–514.The KGB surveillance logbook included every move of Gorbachev and his wife Raisa Gorbacheva, Subject 111, such as "18:30. 111 is in the bathtub."The State Within a State, pp. 276–277 Yeltsin also prepared for a coup by establishing a secret defense committee, ordering military and KGB commands to side with RSFSR authorities and establishing a "reserve government" about 70 kilometers from Sverdlovsk under Deputy Prime Minister Oleg Lobov. Commencement On 4August, Gorbachev went on holiday to his dacha in Foros, Crimea. He planned to return to Moscow in time for the New Union Treaty signing on 20August. On 15August, the text of the draft treaty was published, which would have stripped the coup planners of much of their authority.http://soveticus5.narod.ru/gazety/sr910815.htm#u001 Договор о Союзе суверенных государств 15 August 2021 4 December 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211204043932/http://soveticus5.narod.ru/gazety/sr910815.htm#u001 live Kyriakodis 1991 280 On 17August, the members of the GKChP met at a KGB guesthouse in Moscow and studied the treaty document. Decisions were made to introduce a state of emergency from 19August, to form a State Emergency Committee, and require Gorbachev to sign the relevant decrees or to resign and transfer powers to Vice President Yanayev. They believed the pact would pave the way for the Soviet Union's breakup, and decided it was time to act. The next day, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin, and Soviet Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin Varennikov flew to Crimea for a meeting with Gorbachev. Yazov ordered General Pavel Grachev, commander of the Soviet Airborne Forces, to begin coordinating with KGB Deputy Chairmen Viktor Grushko and Genii Ageev to implement martial law. At 4:32pm on 18August, the GKChP cut communications to Gorbachev's dacha, including telephone landlines and the nuclear command and control system. Eight minutes later Lieutenant General Yuri Plekhanov, Head of the Ninth Chief Directorate of the KGB, allowed the group into Gorbachev's dacha. Gorbachev realized what was happening after discovering the telephone outages. Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov demanded that Gorbachev either declare a state of emergency or resign and name Yanayev as acting president to allow the members of the GKChP "to restore order" to the country.ru Novaya Gazeta No. 59 of 20 August 2001 https://web.archive.org/web/20070929122150/http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/59n/n59n-s16.shtml 29 September 2007 (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators)Kommersant https://web.archive.org/web/20080107015414/http://www.nr2.ru/projects/79717.html 7 January 2008 , 18 August 2006 ru Gorbachev has always claimed that he refused point-blank to accept the ultimatum.http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_1494000/1494325.stm Горбачев: "Я за союз, но не союзное государство" Gorbachev: "I am for the union, but not the union state" ru 16 August 2001 BBC News 26 June 2007 10 March 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20070310140152/http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/russian/news/newsid_1494000/1494325.stm live Varennikov has insisted that Gorbachev said: "Damn you. Do what you want. But report my opinion!"http://www.mysteriouscountry.ru/wiki/index.php/%D0%92%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD_%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87/%D0%9D%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B5/%D0%9A%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0_6/%D0%A7%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C_9/%D0%93%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0_2 Варенников Валентин Иванович/Неповторимое/Книга 6/Часть 9/Глава 2 – Таинственная Страна mysteriouscountry.ru 6 July 2011 10 October 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20171010070806/http://www.mysteriouscountry.ru/wiki/index.php/%D0%92%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B2_%D0%92%D0%B0%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B8%D0%BD_%D0%98%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D1%87/%D0%9D%D0%B5%D0%BF%D0%BE%D0%B2%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B5/%D0%9A%D0%BD%D0%B8%D0%B3%D0%B0_6/%D0%A7%D0%B0%D1%81%D1%82%D1%8C_9/%D0%93%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%B2%D0%B0_2 dead However, those present at the dacha at the time testified that Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov had been clearly disappointed and nervous after the meeting with Gorbachev. Gorbachev is said to have insulted Varennikov by pretending to forget his name, and to have told his former trusted advisor Boldin "Shut up, you prick! How dare you give me lectures about the situation in the country!" With Gorbachev's refusal, the conspirators ordered that he remain confined to the dacha. Additional KGB security guards were placed at the dacha gates with orders to stop anybody from leaving. At 7:30pm, Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov flew to Moscow, accompanied by Plekhanov. His deputy, Vyacheslav Generalov, remained "on the farm" in Foros. At 8:00pm, Yanayev, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo and Soviet Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov gathered in the Kremlin cabinet of the Prime Minister, discussing and editing the documents of the State Emergency Committee. At 10:15pm, they were joined by Baklanov, Shenin, Boldin, Varennikov and Plekhanov. It was decided to publicly declare Gorbachev ill. Yanayev hesitated, but the others convinced him that leadership and responsibility would be collective. At 11:25pm, Yanayev signed a decree entrusting himself with presidential powers. GKChP members ordered that 250,000 pairs of handcuffs from a factory in Pskov be sent to Moscow,Revolutionary Passage by Marc Garcelon p. 159 https://web.archive.org/web/20160516183548/https://books.google.com/books?id=2dqGABT3Yw0C&pg=PA157 16 May 2016 also ordering 300,000 arrest forms. Kryuchkov doubled the pay of all KGB personnel, called them back from holiday, and placed them on alert. Lefortovo Prison was emptied to receive prisoners. Chronology Timeline of the 1991 Soviet coup d'état attempt The members of the GKChP met in the Kremlin after Baklanov, Boldin, Shenin and Varennikov returned from Crimea. Yanayev (who had only just been persuaded to join the plot), Pavlov and Baklanov signed the so-called "Declaration of the Soviet Leadership", which declared a state of emergency in the entirety of the USSR and announced that the State Committee on the State of Emergency (Государственный Комитет по Чрезвычайному Положению, ГКЧП, or Gosudarstvenniy Komitet po Chrezvichaynomu Polozheniyu, GKChP) had been created "to manage the country and effectively maintain the regime of the state of emergency". The GKChP included the following members: Gennady Yanayev, Vice President Valentin Pavlov, Prime Minister Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB Dmitry Yazov, Minister of Defence Boris Pugo, Minister of Interior Oleg Baklanov, First Deputy Chairman of the Defense Council under the President of the USSR Vasily Starodubtsev, Chairman of the Peasant Union Alexander Tizyakov, President of the Association of the State Enterprises and Objects of Industry, Transport, and Communicationshttp://souz.info/library/other/gkchp/gkchppost.htm Souz.Info Постановления ГКЧП souz.info 26 June 2007 26 December 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20071226092755/http://souz.info/library/other/gkchp/gkchppost.htm live Yanayev signed the decree naming himself acting Soviet President, using the pretense of Gorbachev's inability to perform presidential duties due to "illness".http://souz.info/library/other/gkchp/gkchpukaz.htm УКАЗ вице-президента СССР 13 August 2021 26 August 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190826224704/http://www.souz.info/library/other/gkchp/gkchpukaz.htm live However, Russian investigators later identified Kryuchkov as the key planner of the coup. Yanayev later claimed that he had been forced to participate in the coup under the threat of arrest.Kyriakodis 1991 338 The eight aforementioned GKChP members became known as the "Gang of Eight". The GKChP banned all Moscow newspapers except for nine party-controlled newspapers.The newspapers that were allowed were Trud, Rabochaya Tribuna, Izvestia, Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sovetskaya Rossiya, Moskovskaya Pravda, Leninskoye Znamya, and Sel'skaya zhizn′. It also issued a populist declaration which stated that "the honour and dignity of the Soviet man must be restored." Monday 19 August Early hours At 1:00am, Yanayev signed documents on the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP), consisting of himself, Pavlov, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Pugo, Baklanov, Tizyakov and Starodubtsev. Included in the documents was the "Appeal to the Soviet people".Янаев Г. И. Последний бой за СССР https://web.archive.org/web/20180917121951/http://www.x-libri.ru/elib/janav000/00000045.htm 17 September 2018 . – М.: Эксмо, 2010. – 443 с. The GKChP members present signed GKChP Resolution No. 1, which introduced the following: a state of emergency "in certain areas of the USSR" lasting six months from 4:00am Moscow time on 19August; the prohibition of rallies, demonstrations and strikes; suspension of the activities of political parties, public organizations and mass movements that impede the normalization of the situation; and the allocation of up to 1500 m2 acre 1 of land to all interested city residents for personal use. At 4:00am, the Sevastopol regiment of KGB border troops surrounded Gorbachev's presidential dacha in Foros. By order of Soviet Air Defense Chief of Staff Colonel-General Igor Maltsev, two tractors blocked the runway on which the President's aircraft were located: a Tu-134 jet and Mi-8 helicopter.http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991/putch11.htm Путч: день первый. 19 августа 1991 года 13 August 2021 4 March 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20160304204619/http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991/putch11.htm live Morning Starting at 6:00am, all of the GKChP documents were broadcast over state radio and television. The KGB immediately issued an arrest list that included newly elected Russian SFSR president Boris Yeltsin, his allies, and the leaders of the umbrella activist group Democratic Russia. The Russian SFSR-controlled Radio Rossii and Televidenie Rossii, plus Ekho Moskvy, the only independent political radio station, were taken off the air. However, the latter station later resumed its broadcasts and became a source of reliable information during the coup. The BBC World Service and Voice of America were also able to provide continuous coverage. Gorbachev and his family heard the news from a BBC bulletin on a small Sony transistor radio that had not been seized. For the next several days, he refused to take food from outside the dacha to avoid being poisoned, and took long outdoor strolls to refute reports of his ill health.ru another "Kommersant" article https://web.archive.org/web/20080107014601/http://www.nr2.ru/ekb/publications/79720.html 7 January 2008 , 18 August 2006 Under Yanayev's orders,March 2022 units of the Tamanskaya mechanized infantry and Kantemirovskaya armored division rolled into Moscow, along with airborne troops. Around 4,000 soldiers, 350 tanks, 300 armoured personnel carriers and 420 trucks were sent to Moscow. Four Russian SFSR people's deputies were detained by the KGB at a Soviet Army base near the capital. However, almost no other arrests were made by the KGB during the coup. Ulysse Gosset and Vladimir Federovski later alleged that the KGB was planning to carry out a much larger wave of arrests two weeks after the coup, after which it would have abolished almost all legislative and local administrative structures under a highly centralized Council of Ministers. Yanayev instructed Foreign Minister Alexander Bessmertnykh to make a statement requesting formal diplomatic recognition from foreign governments and the United Nations. The GKChP conspirators considered detaining Yeltsin upon his return from a visit to Kazakhstan on 17August but failed when Yeltsin redirected his flight from Chkalovsky Air Base northeast of Moscow to Vnukovo Airport southwest of the city. Afterwards, they considered capturing him at his dacha near Moscow. The KGB Alpha Group surrounded his dacha with Spetsnaz, but for undisclosed reasons did not apprehend him. The commanding officer, Viktor Karpukhin, later alleged that he had received an order from Kryuchkov to arrest Yeltsin but disobeyed it, although his account has been questioned. The failure to arrest Yeltsin proved fatal to the plotters' plans.http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/55n/n55n-s14.shtml "Novaya Gazeta" No. 55 of 6 August 2001 (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators) 26 June 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20051224101119/http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/55n/n55n-s14.shtml 24 December 2005 deadhttp://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/57n/n57n-s12.shtml "Novaya Gazeta" No. 57 of 13 August 2001 (extracts from the indictment of the conspirators) 26 June 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20070929123630/http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/57n/n57n-s12.shtml 29 September 2007 dead After the announcement of the coup at 6:30am, Yeltsin began inviting prominent Russian officials to his dacha, including Leningrad Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, Moscow Deputy Mayor Yury Luzhkov, Colonel-General Konstantin Kobets, RSFSR Prime Minister Ivan Silayev, RSFSR Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, and RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov. thumb|U.S. map of Moscow with 1980s street names Yeltsin initially wanted to remain at the dacha and organize a rival government, but Kobets advised his group to travel to the White House, Russia's parliament building, to maintain communications with coup opponents. They arrived and occupied the building at 9:00am. Together with Silayev and Khasbulatov, Yeltsin issued a declaration "To the Citizens of Russia" that condemned the GKChP's actions as a reactionary anti-constitutional coup. The military was urged not to take part in the coup, and local authorities were asked to follow laws from the RSFSR president rather than the GKChP. Although he initially avoided the measure to avoid sparking a civil war, Yeltsin also subsequently took command of all Soviet military and security forces in the RSFSR. The joint declaration called for a general strike, with the demand to let Gorbachev address the people.http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991 Путч. Хроника тревожных дней. old.russ.ru 26 June 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20110522071605/http://old.russ.ru/antolog/1991/ 22 May 2011 dead This declaration was distributed around Moscow in the form of flyers, and disseminated nationwide through medium-wave radio and Usenet newsgroups via the RELCOM computer network.Andrei Soldatov Irina Borogan 2016-08-19 How the 1991 Soviet Internet Helped Stop a Coup and Spread a Message of Freedom https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/the-1991-soviet-internet-helped-stop-a-coup-and-spread-a-message-of-freedom.html 2021-05-27 Slate Magazine en 27 May 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210527054706/https://slate.com/technology/2016/08/the-1991-soviet-internet-helped-stop-a-coup-and-spread-a-message-of-freedom.html live Izvestia newspaper workers threatened to go on strike unless Yeltsin's proclamation was printed in the paper.Varney Wendy Martin Brian Lessons from the 1991 Soviet Coup 2000 https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607685 Peace Research 32 1 52–68 23607685 0008-4697 24 May 2020 24 July 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20200724143745/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23607685 live The GKChP relied on regional and local soviets, mostly still dominated by the Communist Party, to support the coup by forming emergency committees to repress dissidence. The CPSU Secretariat under Boldin sent coded telegrams to local party committees to assist the coup. Yeltsin's authorities later discovered that nearly 70 percent of the committees either backed it or attempted to remain neutral. Within the RSFSR, the oblasts of Samara, Lipetsk, Tambov, Saratov, Orenburg, Irkutsk, and Tomsk and the krai of Altai and Krasnodar all supported the coup and pressured raikom to do so as well, while only three oblasts aside from Moscow and Leningrad opposed it. However, some of the soviets faced internal resistance against emergency rule. The Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics of Tatarstan, Checheno-Ingushetia, and Abkhazia all sided with the GKChP. Soviet Armed Forces officers seized control of city halls and government buildings around the country claiming to be in control, as well as television stations in the Baltic states.Kyriakodis 1991 334 The Soviet public was divided on the coup. A poll in the RSFSR by Mnenie on the morning of 19August showed that 23.6 percent of Russians believed the GKChP could improve living standards, while 41.9 percent had no opinion. However, separate polls by Interfax showed that many Russians, including 71 percent of Leningrad residents, feared the return of mass repression. The GKChP enjoyed strong support in the Russian-majority regions of Estonia and Transnistria, while Yeltsin enjoyed strong support in Sverdlovsk and Nizhny Novgorod. At 10:00am, Rutskoy, Silayev, and Khasbulatov delivered a letter to Lukyanov demanding a medical exam of Gorbachev by the World Health Organization and a meeting between themselves, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, and Yanayev within 24 hours. Rutskoy later visited Patriarch Alexy II of Moscow, spiritual leader of the Russian Orthodox Church, and convinced him to declare support for Yeltsin. Meanwhile, in Leningrad, Military District Commander Viktor Samsonov ordered the formation of an emergency committee for the city, chaired by Leningrad First Secretary Boris Gidaspov, to circumvent Sobchak's democratically elected municipal government. Samsonov's troops were ultimately blocked by hundreds of thousands of demonstrators supported by the police, which forced Leningrad Television to broadcast a statement by Sobchak. Workers at the Kirov Plant went on strike in support of Yeltsin. Moscow First Secretary Yuri Prokofev attempted a similar maneuver in the capital but was rebuffed when Boris Nikolskii refused to accept the office of Mayor of Moscow. At 11:00am, RSFSR Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev held a press conference for foreign journalists and diplomats, and gained the support of most of the West for Yeltsin. Afternoon and evening That afternoon, Moscow citizens began gathering around the White House, erecting barricades around it. In response, Yanayev declared a state of emergency in Moscow at 4:00pm. He declared at a 5:00pm press conference that Gorbachev was "resting". He said: "Over these years he has got very tired and needs some time to get his health back." Yanayev's shaking hands led some people to think he was drunk, and his trembling voice and weak posture made his words unconvincing. Victoria E. Bonnell and Gregory Frieden noted that the press conference allowed spontaneous questioning from journalists who openly accused the GKChP of carrying out a coup, as well as the lack of censorship by news crews, who did not hide Yanayev's erratic motions the way they had with past leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev, making the coup leaders appear more incompetent to Soviet audiences.Bonnell Victoria E. Freidin Gregory 1993 Televorot: The Role of Television Coverage in Russia's August 1991 Coup https://www.jstor.org/stable/2499653 Slavic Review 52 4 810–838 10.2307/2499653 2499653 163397619 0037-6779 27 May 2021 27 May 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210527054709/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2499653 live subscription Gorbachev's security detail managed to construct a makeshift television antenna so he and his family could watch the press conference. After viewing the conference, Gorbachev expressed confidence that Yeltsin would be able to stop the coup. That night, his family smuggled out a videotape of Gorbachev condemning the coup. Yanayev and the rest of the State Committee ordered the Cabinet of Ministers to alter the five-year plan of the time to relieve the housing shortage. All city dwellers were each given 1/3 acre m2 -3 flip to combat winter shortages by growing fruits and vegetables. Due to the illness of Valentin Pavlov, the duties of the Soviet head of the government were entrusted to First Deputy Prime Minister Vitaly Doguzhiyev.https://online.lexpro.ru/document/2238 Распоряжение Кабинета Министров СССР от 19.08.1991 № 943р 23 March 2021 11 July 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210711145212/https://online.lexpro.ru/document/2238 live Meanwhile, the Soviet forces carrying out the coup began to suffer from mass defections to the RSFSR as well as soldiers refusing to obey orders to shoot civilians. Yeltsin asked his followers not to harass the soldiers and offered amnesty for any military servicemen who defected to oppose the coup.Kyriakodis 1991 335–336 Major Evdokimov, chief of staff of a tank battalion of the Tamanskaya Division guarding the White House, declared his loyalty to the leadership of the Russian SFSR."Izvestia", 18 August 2006 ru https://web.archive.org/web/20070310002630/http://www.izvestia.ru/hystory/article3095759 10 March 2007 Yeltsin climbed one of the tanks and addressed the crowd. Unexpectedly, this episode was included in the state media's evening news."Moskovskie Novosty", 2001, No. 33 http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2001-33-3 MN.RU: Московские Новости 2007-06-26 dead https://web.archive.org/web/20071127062600/http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2001-33-3 27 November 2007 ru Soviet Armed Forces officers loyal to the GKChP tried to prevent defections by confining soldiers to their barracks, but this only limited the availability of forces to carry out the coup.Kyriakodis 1991 341 Tuesday 20 August thumb|The position of the Supreme Soviets of the Republics and regions in relation to the GKChP (coup plotters) on 20 August 1991. #ff0000 Support for the GKChP #0000ff Resistance to the GKChP #b3b3b3 Neutrality or no reaction thumb|right|250px|Tanks in Red Square At 8:00am, the Soviet General Staff ordered that the Cheget briefcase controlling Soviet nuclear weapons be returned to Moscow. Although Gorbachev discovered that the GKChP's actions had cut off communications with the nuclear duty officers, the Cheget was returned to the capital by 2:00pm. However, Soviet Air Force Commander-in-Chief Yevgeny Shaposhnikov opposed the coup and claimed in his memoirs that he and the commanders of the Soviet Navy and the Strategic Rocket Forces told Yazov that they would not follow orders for a nuclear launch. After the coup, Gorbachev refused to admit that he had lost control of the country's nuclear weapons. At noon, Moscow military district commander General Nikolai Kalinin, whom Yanayev appointed military commandant of Moscow, declared a curfew in Moscow from 11:00pm to 5:00am, effective 20August.https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/597 Приказ Коменданта г. Москвы N 2 26 August 1991 13 August 2021 4 December 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211204043921/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/597 live This was understood as a sign that an attack on the White House was imminent. The defenders of the White House prepared themselves, most being unarmed. Evdokimov's tanks were moved from the White House in the evening.ru "Nezavisimoe Voiennoye Obozrenie" https://web.archive.org/web/20080107015607/http://nvo.ng.ru/history/2006-08-18/1_19aug91.html 7 January 2008 , 18 August 2006 The makeshift White House defense headquarters was headed by General Konstantin Kobets, a Russian SFSR people's deputy.http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1201 Усов Владимир Александрович warheroes.ru 26 June 2007 9 December 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20071209222956/http://www.warheroes.ru/hero/hero.asp?Hero_id=1201 livehttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsF4c06txHM The Soviet Coup: Day One, August 19th 1991 26 August 2011 YouTube 2021-12-04 23 September 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190923071323/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LsF4c06txHM live Outside, Eduard Shevardnadze, Mstislav Rostropovich, and Yelena Bonner delivered speeches in support of Yeltsin. In the afternoon, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Pugo finally decided to attack the White House. This decision was supported by other GKChP members (with the exception of Pavlov, who had been sent to his dacha due to drunkenness). Kryuchkov's and Yazov's deputies, KGB general Gennady Ageyev and Army general Vladislav Achalov, planned the assault, codenamed "Operation Grom" (Thunder), which would gather elements of the Alpha Group and Vympel elite special forces units, supported by paratroopers, Moscow OMON, Internal Troops of the ODON, three tank companies and a helicopter squadron. Alpha Group commander General Viktor Karpukhin and other senior unit officers, together with Airborne deputy commander Gen. Alexander Lebed mingled with the crowds near the White House and assessed the possibility of such an operation. Afterwards, Karpukhin and Vympel commander Colonel Boris Beskov tried to convince Ageyev that the operation would result in bloodshed and should be cancelled."Argumenty i Facty"June 2017 InternetArchiveBot yes , 15 August 2001 Lebed, with the consent of his superior Pavel Grachev, returned to the White House and secretly informed the defense headquarters that the attack would begin at 2:00am the following morning. While the events were unfolding in the capital, Estonia's Supreme Council declared at 11:03pm the full reinstatement of the independent status of the Republic of Estonia after 51 years. State-controlled TASS dispatches from 20August emphasize a hardline approach against crime, especially economic crimes and the Russian mafia, which the GKChP blamed on increasing trade with the West. Draft decrees were later discovered which would have allowed military and police patrols to shoot "hooligans," including pro-democracy demonstrators. Wednesday 21 August At about 1:00am, not far from the White House, trolleybuses and street cleaning machines were used to barricade a tunnel against arriving Taman Guards infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), commanded by Captain Sergey Surovikin,https://ria.ru/spravka/20110707/398468102.html Сергей Владимирович Суровикин. Биографическая справка 7 July 2011 RIA Novosti ru Sergey Vladimirovich Surovikin: Biography 12 October 2016 13 October 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20161013081932/https://ria.ru/spravka/20110707/398468102.html live who years later rose to army general and commander of Russian forces in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.2023-01-11 Ukraine war: Sergei Surovikin removed as commander of Ukraine invasion force en-GB BBC News https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64235713 2023-06-24 11 January 2023 https://web.archive.org/web/20230111221145/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64235713 live Three men were killed in the ensuing clash: Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov, and Ilya Krichevsky; several others were wounded. Komar, a 22-year-old Soviet-Afghan War veteran, was shot and crushed trying to cover a moving IFV's observation slit. Usov, a 37-year-old economist, was killed by a stray bullet while coming to Komar's aid. The crowd set fire to an IFV and Krichevsky, a 28-year-old architect, was shot dead as the troops pulled back. The three men were posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union.The Guardian Online Calls for recognition of 1991 Soviet coup martyrs on 20th anniversary 16 August 2011 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/16/soviet-coup-martyrs-anniversary 9 March 2018 9 March 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180309182722/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/16/soviet-coup-martyrs-anniversary liveA Russian site on Ilya Krichevsky http://amkworks113.ru/pbl/pbl-8.html Александр М. Кобринский, "Растянутое мгновение" 2010-12-25 dead https://web.archive.org/web/20110811105836/http://amkworks113.ru/pbl/pbl-8.html 11 August 2011. Accessed 15 August 2009. https://archive.today/20120527070658/http://amkob113.narod.ru/kobra/pbl/pbl-8.html Archived 17 August 2009. According to journalist and democracy campaigner Sergey Parkhomenko, who was in the crowd defending the White House, "those deaths played a crucial role: both sides were so horrified that it brought a halt to everything."The Moscow Times Russia's Brightest Moment: The 1991 Coup That Failed 19 August 2016 https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-forgotten-coup-55030 9 March 2018 20 March 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20170320184121/https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/the-forgotten-coup-55030 live Alpha Group and Vympel did not move to the White House as planned, and Yazov ordered the troops to pull out of Moscow. Reports also surfaced that Gorbachev had been placed under house arrest in Crimea.https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/21/world/the-soviet-crisis-gorbachev-reportedly-arrested-in-the-crimea.html The Soviet Crisis; Gorbachev Reportedly Arrested in the Crimea Serge Schmemann The New York Times 21 August 1991 15 October 2020 17 October 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201017055604/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/21/world/the-soviet-crisis-gorbachev-reportedly-arrested-in-the-crimea.html livehttps://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/21/gorbachev-reported-under-house-arrest/228b8d36-69c2-4df6-841d-1eae059afd8d Gorbachev Reported Under House Arrest Michael Dobbs The Washington Post 21 August 1991 15 October 2020 4 December 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211204044007/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/21/gorbachev-reported-under-house-arrest/228b8d36-69c2-4df6-841d-1eae059afd8d/ live During the final day of her family's exile, Raisa Gorbacheva suffered a minor stroke. At 8:00am, the troops began to leave Moscow. Between 8:00 and 9:00am, the GKChP members met in the Defence Ministry and, not knowing what to do, decided to send Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Anatoly Lukyanov, and Deputy CPSU General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko to Crimea to meet Gorbachev, who refused to meet them when they arrived. At 10:00am, the session of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR opened in the White House, at which President Yeltsin spoke. At 1:00pm, the Soviet Cabinet of Ministers circulated a statement about its non-involvement in the putsch. At 1:20pm, Kryuchkov, Yazov, Baklanov, Tizyakov, Lukyanov and CPSU Central Committee Deputy General Secretary Vladimir Ivashko left for the airport, getting stuck in a traffic jam created by the Taman Division armored vehicles returning to their base. At 2:00pm, the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat issued a statement demanding that the GKChP clarify the fate of the head of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev. At 2:30pm, Soviet Minister of Internal Affairs Boris Pugo signed the last GKChP ordera cypher telegram to the regional departments of internal affairs with a demand to strengthen the security of television and radio organizations and report on all violations of the GKChP Resolution on information control. At 4:08pm, the plane with the GKChP delegation landed in Crimea. Around 4:00pm, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, chaired by the heads of the chambers of the union parliament,http://vedomosti.sssr.su/1991/35/#01431 Заседание Президиума Верховного Совета СССР 10 August 2021 6 May 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210506003718/http://vedomosti.sssr.su/1991/35/#01431 live adopted a resolution in which it declared illegal the removal of the Soviet president from his duties and their transfer to the Vice President,http://gkchp.sssr.su/gkchp.pdf Заседание Президиума Верховного Совета СССР, ТАСС: 21 августа 1991 года 10 August 2021 21 November 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201121222908/http://gkchp.sssr.su/gkchp.pdf live and in this vein demanded that Yanayev cancel the decrees and emergency orders based on themЛукьянов А. И. Август 91-го. А был ли заговор? https://web.archive.org/web/20210810165143/http://www.x-libri.ru/elib/lukjn000/00000029.htm 10 August 2021 – М.: Алгоритм, Эксмо, 2010. – 240 с. as legally invalid from the moment they were signed.https://sergej-manit.livejournal.com/1043146.html Постановление Президиума Верховного Совета СССР от 21 августа 1991 года № 2352-I «О неотложных мерах по восстановлению конституционного порядка в стране» 10 August 2021 10 August 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210810164843/https://sergej-manit.livejournal.com/1043146.html live At 4:52pm, a group of Russian deputies and public figures led by RSFSR Vice President Alexander Rutskoy, as well as Soviet Security Council members Yevgeny Primakov and Vadim Bakatin, flew to Gorbachev's dacha in Foros. They were accompanied by 36 officers of the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs armed with machine guns, under the command of RSFSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Andrei Dunaev. Eight minutes later, at 5:00pm, the GKChP delegation arrived at the presidential dacha. President Gorbachev refused to receive it and demanded that communication to the outside world be restored. At the same time, Yanayev signed a decree dissolving the State Emergency Committeehttp://www.kommersant.ru/doc/278983 Геннадий Янаев: Горбачёва никто не арестовывал 18 August 2001 10 August 2021 24 May 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210524093142/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/278983 live https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/15381/ 10-я годовщина событий августа 1991 года 10 August 2021 5 December 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201205001803/https://echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/15381/ live and declaring all of its decisions invalid.http://www.newlookmedia.ru/?p=11427 КАЛИФ ЯНАЕВ 10 August 2021 21 January 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210121114131/http://www.newlookmedia.ru/?p=11427 live At 7:16pm, the plane of the Russian delegation led by Rutskoy landed in Crimea. At 8:00pm, the Soviet General Prosecutor's Office initiated a criminal case into the attempted coup. At 8:10pm, Rutskoy and his delegation went to see Gorbachev. According to eyewitnesses, the meeting was cordial and joyful, allowing them to momentarily forget divisions between Soviet and Russian authorities. From 9:40 to 10:10pm, Gorbachev received Lukyanov and Ivashko in the presence of Rutskoy and Primakov, accusing the USSR Supreme Soviet Speaker of treason, and the party deputy of inaction during the putsch. Around 10:00pm, RSFSR Prosecutor General Valentin Stepankov signed an arrest warrant for the Emergency Committee members. That day, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia declared its sovereignty officially completed with a law passed by its deputies, confirming the independence restoration act of 4May as an official act. http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=69512 Constitutional law on statehood of the Republic of Latvia 7 January 2008 Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR Supreme Council of the Republic of Latvia 21 August 1991 Latvijas Vēstnesis lv 9 May 2009 https://web.archive.org/web/20090509071056/http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=69512 live In Estonia, just a day after the restitution of the country's full independence, the Tallinn TV Tower was taken over by Soviet Russian airborne troops. But while television broadcasts were cut for a time, the radio signal was kept on the air after a handful of Estonian Defence League (the unified paramilitary forces of Estonia) members barricaded themselves in the tower's broadcasting studio.http://www.estonica.org/en/The_August_coup_and_Estonian_independence_1991/ The August coup and Estonian independence (1991) www.estonica.org 16 June 2018 15 June 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180615032856/http://www.estonica.org/en/The_August_coup_and_Estonian_independence_1991/ live That evening, as news from Moscow about the coup's failure reached Tallinn, the Russian paratroopers left the TV tower and the Estonian capital. Thursday 22 August thumb|22 August 1991 At one minute past midnight, Gorbachev, his family and assistants flew to Moscow on Rutskoy's plane. The GKChP members were sent back on a different plane; only Kryuchkov flew in the presidential plane, under police custody (according to Rutskoy, "they [would] definitely not be shot down with him on board"). Upon arrival, Kryuchkov, Yazov and Tizyakov were arrested on the airfield, which was illegal under Soviet law as officials representing the central government could only be arrested and tried under Soviet law, which prevailed over the laws of the constituent republics.Евгений Спицын о предателях народа или "ГКЧП. Как рушили СССР". 14 June 2022 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCeGDY9Bd1U en 2022-10-24 24 October 2022 https://web.archive.org/web/20221024093348/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MCeGDY9Bd1U&gl=US&hl=en live At 2:00am, when Gorbachev arrived at Moscow's Vnukovo Airport, television showed live footage of him walking down the airstairs wearing a knitted sweater. Later, he would be criticized for not going to the White House, but to rest at his dacha. At 6:00am, Soviet Vice President Yanayev was arrested in his office.Янаев Г. И. Последний бой за СССР https://web.archive.org/web/20180917121901/http://www.x-libri.ru/elib/janav000/00000028.htm 17 September 2018 . – М.: Эксмо, 2010. – 443 с. Boris Pugo and his wife died by suicide after being contacted by the RSFSR for a meeting over his role in the coup attempt.Synovitz Ron 2016-08-19 What Happened To The August 1991 Soviet Coup Plotters? en Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty https://www.rferl.org/a/what-happened-to-the-august-1991-coup-plotters/27933729.html 2023-06-24 4 July 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180704153717/https://www.rferl.org/a/what-happened-to-the-august-1991-coup-plotters/27933729.html live Friday 23 August Pavlov, Starodubtsev, Baklanov, Boldin, and Shenin would all be taken into custody within the next 48 hours. Aftermath thumb|Victims' place of death Since several heads of the regional executive committees supported the GKChP, on 21August 1991 the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR adopted Decision No. 1626-1, which authorized Russian president Boris Yeltsin to appoint heads of regional administrations,https://www.lawmix.ru/expertlaw/273389 Постановление Верховного Совета РСФСР от 21.08.1991 № 1626-I О дополнительных полномочиях Президента РСФСР по обеспечению законности деятельности Советов народных депутатов в условиях ликвидации последствий попытки государственного переворота в СССР 10 August 2021 10 August 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210810192432/https://www.lawmix.ru/expertlaw/273389 live although the Constitution of the Russian SFSR did not empower the president with such authority. The Russian Supreme Soviet passed another decision the following day declaring the old imperial colors Russia's national flag;http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=EXP&n=221423#cyoLifS8IMdtkgbx Постановление Верховного Совета РСФСР от 22 августа 1991 года № 1627/1-1 «Об официальном признании и использовании Национального флага РСФСР» 10 August 2021 4 December 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211204043927/http://www.consultant.ru/cons/cgi/online.cgi?req=doc&base=EXP&n=221423#cyoLifS8IMdtkgbx live it replaced the Russian SFSR flag two months later. On the night of 24August, the Felix Dzerzhinsky statue in front of the KGB building at Dzerzhinskiy Square (Lubianka) was dismantled, while thousands of Moscow citizens took part in the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Vladimir Usov and Ilya Krichevsky, the three citizens who had died in the tunnel incident. Gorbachev posthumously awarded them with the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin asked their relatives to forgive him for not being able to prevent their deaths. End of the CPSU Gorbachev initially tried to defend the CPSU, proclaiming at a 22August press conference that it still represented a "progressive force" despite its leaders' participation in the coup. Gorbachev resigned as CPSU general secretary on24August.http://www.illuminats.ru/component/content/article/29-new/1198-statement-by-mikhail-gorbachev-on-the-addition-of-duties-the-secretary-general-of-the-cpsu-24-august-1991?directory=29 Заявление М. С. Горбачева о сложение обязанностей генерального секретаря ЦК КПСС Statement by M. S. Gorbachev on the resignation of the duties of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU ru August 24, 1991 4 April 2021 21 July 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20180721014247/http://www.illuminats.ru/component/content/article/29-new/1198-statement-by-mikhail-gorbachev-on-the-addition-of-duties-the-secretary-general-of-the-cpsu-24-august-1991?directory=29 live Vladimir Ivashko replaced him as acting General Secretary, but resigned on 29August when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR suspended the activities of the party throughout the Soviet Union.http://constitution20.info/ckeditor_assets/attachments/490/1991_08_29_postvs_sssr.pdf Постановление Верховного Совета СССР от 29 августа 1991 г. № 2371-I «О ситуации, возникшей в стране в связи с имевшим место государственным переворотом» Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 29, 1991 No. 2371-I "On the situation that arose in the country in connection with the coup d'état that took place" August 29, 1991 ru 4 April 2021 14 July 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210714113935/http://constitution20.info/ckeditor_assets/attachments/490/1991_08_29_postvs_sssr.pdf live Свежие вакансии на сегодня по всей России. Найти работу на SpisokRabot http://constitution20.info/ckeditor_assets/attachments/490/1991_08_29_postvs_sssr.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20210714113935/http://constitution20.info/ckeditor_assets/attachments/490/1991_08_29_postvs_sssr.pdf 2021-07-14 2025-11-05 constitution20.info In a decree, Yeltsin ordered the transfer of the CPSU archives to the state archive authorities,http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/140 Указ Президента РСФСР от 24 августа 1991 г. № 83 «О партийных архивах» Decree of the President of the RSFSR of August 24, 1991 No. 83 "On Party Archives" August 24, 1991 ru 10 August 2021 10 August 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210810190639/http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/140 live and nationalized all CPSU assets in the Russian SFSRhttp://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/144 Указ Президента РСФСР от 25 августа 1991 г. № 90 «Об имуществе КПСС и Коммунистической партии РСФСР» Decree of the President of the RSFSR of August 25, 1991 No. 90 "On the property of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR" August 25, 1991 ru 10 August 2021 30 October 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201030125617/http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/144 live (these included not only party committee headquarters but also assets such as educational institutions and hotels).April 2021 The party's Central Committee headquarters were handed over to the Government of Moscow. On 6November, Yeltsin issued a decree banning the party in Russia.http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/385 Указ Президента РСФСР от 6 ноября 1991 г. № 169 «О деятельности КПСС и КП РСФСР» Decree of the President of the RSFSR of November 6, 1991 No. 169 "On the activities of the CPSU and the Communist Party of the RSFSR" November 6, 1991 ru 4 April 2021 1 March 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210301170411/http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/385 live The Dissolution of the Soviet Union Belavezha Accords Dissolution of the Soviet Union August 2016 Estonia had declared re-independence on 20August, Latvia the following day, while Lithuania had already done so on 11March the previous year. On 24August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev created the so-called "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" (Комитет по оперативному управлению народным хозяйством СССР), to replace the USSR Cabinet of Ministershttp://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_19391.htm Указ Президента СССР от 24.08.1991 N УП-2461 "О Кабинете Министров СССР" 4 April 2021 27 November 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201127002356/http://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/usr_19391.htm live headed by Valentin Pavlov, a GKChP member. Russian prime minister Ivan Silayev headed the committee. That same day, Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada adopted the Act of Independence of Ukraine and called for a referendum on support of the Act of Independence. On 25August, the Supreme Soviet of the Byelorussian SSR announced its Declaration of Sovereignty as a constitutional law.http://countrystudies.us/belarus/39.htm Belarus – Prelude to Independence 22 December 2007 Fedor Helen 1995 Belarus: A Country Study Library of Congress 10 October 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20171010070350/http://countrystudies.us/belarus/39.htm livehttps://belzakon.net/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD_%D0%A0%D0%91/199/2106 Закон Республики Беларусь от 25 августа 1991 г. №1017-XII "О придании статуса конституционного закона Декларации Верховного Совета Белорусской ССР о государственном суверенитете Белорусской ССР" 4 April 2021 4 December 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211204043937/https://belzakon.net/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%BE/%D0%97%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD_%D0%A0%D0%91/199/2106 live On 28August, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR dismissed Prime Minister Pavlovhttp://base.garant.ru/6334608/ Постановление Верховного Совета СССР от 28 августа 1991 г. № 2366-I «Об освобождении Павлова В. С. от обязанностей Премьер-министра СССР» 5 April 2021 31 January 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210131005854/http://base.garant.ru/6334608/ live and entrusted the functions of the Soviet government to the Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy.http://base.garant.ru/6334609/ Постановление Верховного Совета СССР от 28 августа 1991 г. № 2367-I «О недоверии Кабинету Министров СССР» 5 April 2021 13 April 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210413153355/http://base.garant.ru/6334609/ live The next day, Supreme Soviet Chairman Anatoly Lukyanov was arrested. On 27August, the Supreme Soviet of Moldova declared the independence of Moldova from the Soviet Union. The Supreme Soviets of Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan did the same on 30 and 31August, respectively. On 5September, the Congress of People's Deputies of the Soviet Union adopted Soviet Law No. 2392-1 "On the Authorities of the Soviet Union in the Transitional Period", replacing itself with the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union. Two new legislative chambersthe Soviet of the Union (Совет Союза) and the Soviet of Republics (Совет Республик)replaced the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities (both elected by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies). The Soviet of the Union was to be formed by the popularly elected USSR people's deputies and would only consider issues concerning civil rights and freedoms and other issues which did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Soviet of Republics. Its decisions would have to be reviewed by the Soviet of Republics. The Soviet of Republics was to include 20 deputies from each union republic and one deputy to represent each autonomous region of each union republic (both Soviet people's deputies and republics' people's deputies) delegated by the legislatures of the union republic. Russia, with 52 delegates, was an exception. However, the delegation of each union republic was to have only one vote in the Soviet of Republics. The laws were to be first adopted by the Soviet of the Union and then by the Soviet of Republics, which would set procedures for the central government, approve the appointment of central ministers and consider inter-republic agreements.http://pravo.levonevsky.org/baza/soviet/sssr0036.htm Закон СССР от 05.09.1991 N 2392-1 об органах государственной pravo.levonevsky.org 27 June 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20100713021550/http://pravo.levonevsky.org/baza/soviet/sssr0036.htm 13 July 2010 dead Also created was the Soviet State Council (Государственный совет СССР), which included the Soviet president and the presidents of union republics. The "Committee for the Operational Management of the Soviet Economy" was replaced by the USSR Inter-republic Economic Committee (Межреспубликанский экономический комитет СССР), also headed by Ivan Silayev. On 6September, the newly created Soviet State Council recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.http://www.rian.ru/history/20050906/41308028.html 6 сентября 5 September 2005 27 June 2007 27 November 2007 https://web.archive.org/web/20071127063649/http://www.rian.ru/history/20050906/41308028.html live On 9September, the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan declared the independence of Tajikistan from the Soviet Union. Also in September, over 99% percent of voters in Armenia voted for independence of the republic in a referendum. The immediate aftermath of the vote was the Armenian Supreme Soviet's declaration of independence on 21September. On27 October, the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenistan declared the independence of Turkmenistan from the Soviet Union. On 1December, Ukraine held a referendum, in which more than 90% of residents supported the Act of Independence of Ukraine. By November, the only Soviet Republics that had not declared independence were Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. That same month, seven republics (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan) agreed to a new union treaty that would form a confederation called the Union of Sovereign States. However, this confederation never materialized. On 8December, Boris Yeltsin, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevichthe leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus (which had adopted the name in August 1991)as well as the prime ministers of the three republics, met in Minsk, Belarus, to sign the Belovezha Accords. The accords declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist "as a subject of international law and geopolitical reality". It repudiated the 1922 union treaty that established the Soviet Union and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the Union's place. On 12December, the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR ratified the accords and recalled the Russian deputies from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Although this has been interpreted as the moment that Russia seceded from the union, Russia took the position that it was not possible to secede from a state that no longer existed. The lower chamber of the Supreme Soviet, the Council of the Union, was forced to halt its operations, as the departure of the Russian deputies left it without a quorum. Doubts remained about the legitimacy of the 8December accords, since only three republics took part. Thus, on 21December in Alma-Ata, the Alma-Ata Protocol expanded the CIS to include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova and the five republics of Central Asia. They also preemptively accepted Gorbachev's resignation. With 11 of the 12 remaining republics (all except Georgia) having agreed that the Union no longer existed, Gorbachev bowed to the inevitable and said he would resign as soon as the CIS became a reality (Georgia joined the CIS in 1993, only to withdraw in 2008 after its war with Russia; the three Baltic states were never a part of the commonwealth, instead joining both the European Union and NATO in 2004.) On 24December 1991, the Russian SFSRnow renamed the Russian Federationwith the concurrence of the other republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, informed the United Nations that it would inherit the Soviet Union's membership in the UNincluding the Soviet Union's permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf397.shtml https://web.archive.org/web/20031123143520/http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf397.shtml dead 23 November 2003 INFCIRC/397 – Note to the Director General from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation 23 November 2003 No member state of the UN formally objected to this step. The legitimacy of this act has been questioned by some legal scholars as the Soviet Union itself was not constitutionally succeeded by the Russian Federation, but merely dissolved. Others argued that the international community had already established the precedent of recognizing the Soviet Union as the legal successor of the Russian Empire, and so recognizing the Russian Federation as the Soviet Union's successor state was valid. On 25December, Gorbachev announced his resignation as President of the Soviet Union. The red hammer and sickle flag of the Soviet Union was lowered from the Senate building in the Kremlin and replaced with the tricolour flag of Russia. The next day, 26 December, the Soviet of Republics, the upper chamber of the Supreme Soviet, formally voted the Soviet Union out of existence (the lower chamber, the Council of the Union, had been left without a quorum after the Russian deputies withdrew), thus ending the life of the world's first and oldest socialist state. All former Soviet embassies became Russian embassies, and Russia received all nuclear weapons located in other former republics by 1996. A constitutional crisis in late 1993 escalated into violence, and the new Russian constitution that came into force at the end of the year abolished the last vestiges of the Soviet political system. Beginning of radical economic reforms in Russia Economic history of the Russian Federation On 1November 1991, the RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies issued Decision No. 1831-1 "On the Legal Support of the Economic Reform" whereby the Russian president (Boris Yeltsin) was granted the right to issue decrees required for economic reform even if they contravened existing laws. Such decrees entered into force if they were not repealed within 7 days by the Supreme Soviet of the Russian SFSR or its Presidium.Konsultant+ (Russian legal database)August 2011 Five days later, Boris Yeltsin, in addition to his duties as president, assumed those of the prime minister. Yegor Gaidar became deputy prime minister and simultaneously economic and finance minister. On 15November 1991, Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 213 "On the Liberalization of Foreign Economic Activity on the Territory of the RSFSR", whereby all Russian companies were allowed to import and export goods and acquire foreign currency (all foreign trade had previously been tightly controlled by the state). Following the issuance of Decree No. 213, on 3 December 1991 Boris Yeltsin issued Decree No. 297 "On the Measures to Liberalize Prices", whereby from 2January 1992, most previously existing price controls were abolished. Trial of GKChP members The GKChP members and their accomplices were charged with treason in the form of a conspiracy aimed at capturing power. However, by January 1993, they had all been released from custody pending trial.http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5308?isSearch=True Ъ-Власть – Стародубцев на воле. С Лениным в башке и подпиской в руке 15 June 1992 24 March 2021 23 November 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20171123045045/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/5308?isSearch=True live http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/36887 Ъ-Газета – Пресс-конференция по делу ГКЧП 27 January 1993 24 March 2021 5 April 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210405124652/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/36887 live The trial in the Military Chamber of the Russian Supreme Court began on 14 April 1993.https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/45138 Суд над членами ГКЧП 15 April 1993 13 August 2021 13 July 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210713195918/https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/45138 live On 23February 1994, the State Duma declared amnesty for all GKChP members and their accomplices, along with the participants of the October 1993 crisis.http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_7180/ Постановление Государственной Думы Федерального Собрания Российской Федерации от 23 февраля 1994 г. № 65-1 ГД «Об объявлении политической и экономической амнистии» 16 August 2021 9 October 2018 https://web.archive.org/web/20181009073115/http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_7180/ live They all accepted the amnesty, except for General Varennikov, who demanded the continuation of the trial and who was finally acquitted on 11August 1994. The Russian Procuracy also wanted to charge former Deputy Defense Minister Vladislav Achalov, but the Russian Supreme Soviet refused to lift his immunity. Additionally, the Procuracy refrained from charging numerous other individuals accused of complicity in the coup, including the Army Chief of Staff. Commemoration of the civilians killed thumb|Soviet stamps commemorating (from left to right) Ilya Krichevsky, Dmitry Komar and Vladimir Usov Thousands of people attended the funeral of Dmitry Komar, Ilya Krichevsky, and Vladimir Usov on 24August 1991. Gorbachev posthumously made the three Heroes of the Soviet Union for their bravery in "blocking the way to those who wanted to strangle democracy.".The New York Times SOVIET TURMOIL; Moscow Mourns And Exalts Men Killed by Coup 25 August 1991 https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/world/soviet-turmoil-moscow-mourns-and-exalts-men-killed-by-coup.html 8 March 2018 22 August 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20170822112309/http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/world/soviet-turmoil-moscow-mourns-and-exalts-men-killed-by-coup.html live Parliamentary commission In 1991, a parliamentary commission tasked with investigating causes for the attempted coup was established under Lev Ponomaryov, but was dissolved in 1992 at Ruslan Khasbulatov's insistence. Mysterious deaths of the participants of the coup On 24 August 1991, Sergey Akhromeyev was found dead in his office, serving as the Advisor to the president of USSR. On 26 August, Nikolay Kruchina was found dead near his residence in the morning, having jumped from the window of his apartment a few hours prior. He served as the Managing Director of the Central Committee of the CPSU. His predecessor, Georgiy Pavlov, followed the same fate on 6 October of the same year. On 17 October, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU Dmitriy Lisovolik was found dead, having also jumped from the window of his apartment.2004-11-12 Самоубийства высокопоставленных советских чиновников https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/524200 2024-06-21 www.kommersant.ru ru 25 August 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240825124951/https://www.kommersant.ru/common/socialnetworkblock live Said deaths have faced extensive scrutiny by historians and contemporaries, who noted the similarities with which these people died. International reactions Western Bloc and NATO countries thumb|George H. W. Bush, left, is seen with Mikhail Gorbachev in 1990. Bush condemned the coup and the actions of the "Gang of Eight". Australia: Prime Minister of Australia Bob Hawke said that "The developments in the Soviet Union ... raise the question as to whether the purpose is to reverse the political and economic reforms which have been taking place. Australia does not want to see repression, persecution or vindictive actions against Gorbachev or those associated with him." Canada: Several government members quickly reacted to the coup; Prime Minister Brian Mulroney huddled with top advisers over the toppling of Mikhail Gorbachev, but officials said the Prime Minister would likely react cautiously to the stunning development. Mulroney condemned the coup and suspended food aid and other assistance to the Soviet Union.Farnsworth Clyde H. 25 August 1991 Canadian Is Attacked for Remarks on Soviet Coup The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/world/canadian-is-attacked-for-remarks-on-soviet-coup.html 14 February 2017 10 November 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20161110172957/http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/25/world/canadian-is-attacked-for-remarks-on-soviet-coup.html live External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall suggested on 20August 1991 that "Canada could work with any Soviet junta that promises to carry on Gorbachev's legacy". Lloyd Axworthy and Liberal Leader Jean Chretien said Canada must join with other Western governments to back Russian President Boris Yeltsin, former Soviet Foreign Minister and Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze and others fighting for Soviet democracy." McDougall met with the chargé d'affaires of the Soviet embassy, Vasily Sredin.archives https://www.proquest.com/docview/436458189 thestar.com 11 July 2017 10 October 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20171010070350/https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/thestar/doc/436458189.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Aug+21,+1991&author=Tim+Harper+Toronto+Star&pub=Toronto+Star&edition=&startpage=A.4&desc=McDougall+hints+Ottawa+may+recognize+Moscow+junta 436458189 live As part of the NORAD defense network, the government acknowledged that any US-Soviet nuclear confrontation would directly impact Canada as well. Canadian leaders believed both the US and Canada would be treated as a single set of targets.Jockel, J.T. J.J. Sokolsky Canada's Cold War Nuclear Experience Queens Quarterly 1999 Special Issue 111 Israel: Israeli officials said they hoped Gorbachev's attempted removal would not derail the 1991 Israeli-Palestinian peace conference in Madrid (co-sponsored by the US and USSR) or slow Soviet Jewish immigration. The quasi-governmental Jewish Agency, which coordinated the massive flow of Jews arriving from the Soviet Union, called an emergency meeting to assess how the coup would affect Jewish immigration. "We are closely following what is happening in the Soviet Union with concern," Foreign Minister David Levy said. "One might say that this is an internal issue of the Soviet Union, but in the Soviet Union ... everything internal has an influence for the entire world." The Soviet Union restored ties with Israel on 26December 1991. Japan 1870: Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu ordered the Foreign Ministry to analyze developments. Kaifu himself said that it was highly likely that the coup was unconstitutional. Chief Cabinet Secretary Misoji Sakamoto said, "I strongly hope that the leadership change will not influence the positive policies of Perestroika and new-thinking diplomacy." In addition, Japanese aid and technical loans to the Soviet Union were frozen.R.C. Gupta. (1997) Collapse of the Soviet Union. p. 57. 9788185842813, Japan left open the question of the coup's legitimacy; government spokesman Taizo Watanabe said that "[the Soviet government has] the right to decide whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional. Japan notably differed from western states by not announcing an outright condemnation of the coup. " South Korea 1984: President Roh Tae-woo welcomed the coup's collapse as a symbolic victory for the Soviet people. He said "It was a triumph of the courage and resolve of the Soviet citizens towards freedom and democracy." United Kingdom: Prime Minister John Major met with his cabinet on 19August to deal with the crisis and said "There seems little doubt that President Gorbachev has been removed from power by an unconstitutional seizure of power. There are constitutional ways of removing the president of the Soviet Union; they have not been used. I believe that the whole world has a very serious stake in the events currently taking place in the Soviet Union. The reform process there is of vital importance to the world and of most vital importance of course to the Soviet people themselves and I hope that is fully clear. There is a great deal of information we don't yet have, but I would like to make clear above all that we would expect the Soviet Union to respect and honor all the commitments that President Gorbachev has made on its behalf." The British Government froze $80 million in economic aid to Moscow, while the European Community scheduled an emergency meeting to suspend a $1.5 billion aid program. In a 1991 interview, Major said he thought that "there are many reasons why [the coup] failed and a great deal of time and trouble will be spent on analysing that later. There were, I think, a number of things that were significant. I don't think it was terribly well-handled from the point of view of those organising the coup. I think the enormous and unanimous condemnation of the rest of the world publicly of the coup was of immense encouragement to the people resisting it. That is not just my view; that is the view that has been expressed to me by Mr. Shevardnadze, Mr. Yakovlev, President Yeltsin and many others as well to whom I have spoken to the last 48 hours. The moral pressure from the West and the fact that we were prepared to state unequivocally that the coup was illegal and that we wanted the legal government restored, was of immense help in the Soviet Union. I think that did play a part." United States: During his vacation in Walker's Point Estate in Kennebunkport, Maine, U.S. President George H. W. Bush made a blunt demand for Gorbachev's restoration to power and said the United States did not accept the legitimacy of the self-proclaimed new Soviet government. Bush rushed to the White House from his vacation home, receiving a letter from Kozyrev aboard Air Force One. He then issued a strongly-worded statement that followed a day of consultations with other Western alliance leaders amid a concerted effort to squeeze the new Soviet leadership by freezing economic aid programs. Bush decried the coup as a "misguided and illegitimate effort" that "bypasses both Soviet law and the will of the Soviet peoples." He called the overthrow "very disturbing" and put a hold on U.S. aid to the Soviet Union until the coup was ended. World reacts with shock to Gorbachev ouster Ishërwood Julian M. United Press International 19 August 1991 31 May 2017 http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/08/19/World-reacts-with-shock-to-Gorbachev-ouster/5234533009911/ 26 May 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190526035106/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/08/19/World-reacts-with-shock-to-Gorbachev-ouster/5234533009911/ live https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/20/world/the-soviet-crisis-bush-condemns-soviet-coup-and-calls-for-its-reversal.html The Soviet Crisis; Bush Condemns Soviet Coup and Calls For Its Reversal Andrew Rosenthal 20 August 1991 The New York Times 14 February 2017 5 May 2019 https://web.archive.org/web/20190505023327/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/20/world/the-soviet-crisis-bush-condemns-soviet-coup-and-calls-for-its-reversal.html live The Bush statement, drafted after a series of meetings with top aides, was much more forceful than the President's initial reaction that morning in Maine. It was in keeping with a Western effort to apply both diplomatic and economic pressure on the Soviet officials seeking to gain control of the country. On 2September, the United States re-recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania when Bush delivered the press conference in Kennebunkport.https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/03/world/soviet-turmoil-excerpts-bush-s-conference-strong-support-for-baltic-independence.html Soviet Turmoil; Excerpts From Bush's Conference: 'Strong Support' for Baltic Independence 3 September 1991 The New York Times 14 February 2017 13 January 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20170113161621/http://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/03/world/soviet-turmoil-excerpts-bush-s-conference-strong-support-for-baltic-independence.html live Secretary of State James Baker issued a statement warning "The whole world is watching. Legitimacy in 1991 flows not from the barrel of a gun but from the will of the people. History cannot be reversed. Sooner or later your effort will fail."Kyriakodis 1991 337 The coup also led several members of Congress such as Sam Nunn, Les Aspin, and Richard Lugar to become concerned about the security of Soviet weapons of mass destruction and the potential for nuclear proliferation in existing unstable conditions. Despite public opposition to further aid to the Soviet Union and ambivalence from the Bush administration, they oversaw the ratification of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, authorizing the Nunn–Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and providing funding to post-Soviet states for the decommissioning of WMD stockpiles.https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14743892.2019.1599627?journalCode=rach20 10.1080/14743892.2019.1599627 From Crisis to Split: The Communist Party USA, 1989–1991 2019 Rosenberg Daniel American Communist History 18 1–2 1–55 159619768 10 November 2021 10 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211110072241/https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14743892.2019.1599627?journalCode=rach20 live subscription Former president Ronald Reagan said: "I can't believe that the Soviet people will allow a reversal in the progress that they have recently made toward economic and political freedom. Based on my extensive meetings and conversations with him, I am convinced that President Gorbachev had the best interest of the Soviet people in mind. I have always felt that his opposition came from the communist bureaucracy, and I can only hope that enough progress was made that a movement toward democracy will be unstoppable." Meanwhile, CPUSA Chairman Gus Hall supported the coup, causing division within an already shrinking party. The CPSU had broken ties with the CPUSA in 1989 over the latter's condemnation of Perestroika. Denmark: Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen said the process of change in the Soviet Union could not be reversed. In a statement, he said "So much has happened and so many people have been involved in the changes in Soviet Union that I cannot see a total reversal." France 1974: President François Mitterrand called on the new Soviet rulers to guarantee the life and liberty of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, who was "Gorbachev's rival in the changing Soviet Union." Mitterrand added that "France attaches a high price to the life and liberty of Messrs. Gorbachev and Yeltsin being guaranteed by the new Moscow leaders. These will be judged by their acts, especially on the fashion in which the two high personalities in question will be treated." After the coup ended, Mitterrand was criticized for his hesitant reaction; this may have helped right wing opposition parties win the 1993 French legislative election.https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209614 Wilson Center Digital Archive Digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org 1991-08-24 2021-12-04 14 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211114190153/https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/209614 live Germany: Chancellor Helmut Kohl cut his Austrian vacation short and returned to Bonn for an emergency meeting. He said he was sure Moscow would withdraw its remaining 272,000 troops from the former East Germany on schedule.https://www.proquest.com/docview/436460688 archives thestar.com 11 July 2017 10 October 2017 https://web.archive.org/web/20171010071717/https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/thestar/doc/436460688.html?FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Aug+20,+1991&author=&pub=Toronto+Star&edition=&startpage=A.17&desc=Keep+up+reform,+Kohl+urges+Soviets 436460688 live Björn Engholm, leader of Germany's opposition Social Democratic Party, urged member states of the European Community "to speak with one voice" on the situation and said, "the West should not exclude the possibility of imposing economic and political sanctions on the Soviet Union to avoid a jolt to the right, in Moscow." Greece: Greece described the situation in the Soviet Union as "alarming". The Greek left was divided- the Alliance of the Left and former Socialist Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou issued statements condemning the coup. However, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Greece condemned Gorbachev for dismantling the Soviet State and reestablishing Capitalism.https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/27/world/soviet-turmoil-french-communist-chief-attacked-for-stance-on-soviet-coup.html Soviet Turmoil; French Communist Chief Attacked for Stance on Soviet Coup The New York Times 27 August 1991 Greenhouse Steven 22 July 2022 22 July 2022 https://web.archive.org/web/20220722051325/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/27/world/soviet-turmoil-french-communist-chief-attacked-for-stance-on-soviet-coup.html live Italy: Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti released a statement saying, "I'm surprised, embittered and worried. We all know the difficulties that Gorbachev encountered. But I don't know how a new president, who, at least for now, doesn't have (Gorbachev's) prestige and international connections, can overcome the obstacles." Achille Occhetto, head of the Democratic Party of the Left, the direct heir of the Italian Communist Party, called the ouster of Gorbachev "a most dramatic event of world proportions (which) will have immense repercussions on international life. I am personally and strongly struck, not only for the incalculable burden of this event, but also for the fate of comrade Gorbachev." Communist states thumb|A Soviet Stamp promoting Perestroika. For some Communist States, Gorbachev's reforms resulted in a drastic cutting of Soviet Aid. The coup's failure led to the abrupt end of any remaining Russian support for its former Communist allies. Many but not all of states still officially Marxist–Leninist (not former Warsaw Pact members that had begun transitioning to a multi-party system) had supported the coup, while others left ambivalent or unofficial support and reversed their position when the coup failed. Republic of Afghanistan (1987–1992): The failure of the coup resulted in the removal of Soviet political and military officers that favored continued aid to the People's Democratic Party government in Afghanistan. At the time, the Afghan regime was still completely dependent on the Soviet Union for its survival in the ongoing Afghan Civil War. The last Soviet military assistance arrived in October, with all Russian aid being halted by Boris Yeltsin in January 1992. Yeltsin hoped to repatriate Soviet prisoners of war still being held by the Mujahideen and was not interested in protecting a 'Soviet Legacy'.https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992384 3992384 The Third World and the Dissolution of the USSR Webber Mark Third World Quarterly 1992 13 4 691–713 10.1080/01436599208420305 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109071838/https://www.jstor.org/stable/3992384 live subscription In the aftermath of the coup, Mohammad Najibullah came to resent the Soviets for abandoning him, writing to former Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze "I didn't want to be president, you talked me into it, insisted on it, and promised support. Now you are throwing me and the Republic of Afghanistan to its fate." In the winter of 1992, newly independent Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan provided food aid to Mohammad Najibullah's of their own accord in an attempt to save the regime, also establishing contacts with the Mujahideen. The end of Soviet weapons deliveries caused the defection of militia leader Abdul Rashid Dostum from Mohammad Najibullah to Ahmad Shah Massoud, spelling the end of the DRA in April 1992.James L. Gibson Gibson Joshua James An Unsustainable Arrangement: The Collapse of the Republic of Afghanistan in 1992 2015 MA thesis Ohio State University http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1429894687 12 November 2022 25 August 2024 https://web.archive.org/web/20240825124944/https://etd.ohiolink.edu/acprod/odb_etd/etd/r/1501/10?clear=10&p10_accession_num=osu1429894687 live People's Socialist Republic of Albania: During the coup, Communist Party of Labour of Albania leader Ramiz Alia was still in power, having won the 1991 Albanian parliamentary election. Encouraged by the coup's unraveling, three opposition parties demanded expedited reforms. The 1992 Albanian parliamentary election resulted in a crushing defeat for the now-democratic Socialist Party of Albania, leading to Alia's resignation as president in favor of Sali Berisha. People's Republic of Angola: In December 1991, the ruling MPLA, in its party congress changed its ideology from Marxism–Leninism to Social Democracy and committed to multi-party democracy. Angola–Russia relations became less relevant to both countries after the coup. Angola's ability to enforce its rule on some of its territories diminished due to the end of Soviet weapons deliveries and departures of Cuban personnel. China: The Chinese government appeared to tacitly support the coup when it issued a statement saying the move was an internal affair of the Soviet Union and when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) released no immediate comment. Confidential Chinese documents have indicated that China's hardline leaders strongly disapproved of Gorbachev's program of political liberalization, blaming him for "the loss of Eastern Europe to capitalism." Western scholarship has alleged that Beijing had foreknowledge of the planned coup. This hypothesis is supported by two events: firstly, General Chi Haotian's Moscow visit between August5 and August12 to see GKChP member Dmitry Yazov, and secondly, the rapid and mostly positive coverage of the coup in Chinese media, which ignored the activities of Boris Yeltsin. When the coup began, top CCP leaders had gathered to celebrate paramount leader Deng Xiaoping's birthday. Upon hearing the news, CCP elder Bo Yibo cursed Gorbachev. Deng then said "The Soviet coup is a good thing but we must not visibly be pleased but only delighted at the bottom of our hearts." China pronounced a policy of non-interference but hoped 'stability' (i.e. a restoration of Communist rule) would return to the Soviet Union. Behind closed doors, the Chinese Politburo agreed the coup should be recognized as a 'Marxist' act and that Sino-Soviet relations should be strengthened. However, Deng also encouraged CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin to be cautious because the coup could fail. The GKChP was also interested in resolving the Sino-Soviet split and improving diplomatic relations, dispatching Vice Foreign Affairs Minister Alexander Belonogov to Beijing to request full recognition and support. Deng met with Belonogov and asked "what do you plan to do with Gorbachev" to measure the probability of the coup's success. After hesitating for a day, China was moments away from an official declaration of support for the GKChP when news of its end arrived. After the coup failed, Gorbachev suspended exchanges with China; allegedly the coup plotters attempted to flee to China, but this was flatly denied by both governments.Garver John The Chinese Communist Party and the Collapse of Soviet Communism The China Quarterly 1993 133 133 1–26 10.1017/S0305741000018178 654237 154647616 https://www.jstor.org/stable/654237 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109154856/https://www.jstor.org/stable/654237 live subscription Several Chinese people said that a key difference between the Soviet coup leaders' failed attempts to use tanks to crush dissent in Moscow and the hardline Chinese leaders' successful use of tank-led People's Liberation Army forces during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre was that the Soviet people had a powerful leader like Russian president Boris Yeltsin to rally around, whereas the Chinese protesters did not. The Soviet coup collapsed in three days without any major violence by the Soviet Army against civilians in June 1989, the People's Liberation Army killed thousands of people to crush the democracy movement.Southerl Daniel 23 August 1991 Chinese Dissidents Hail Moscow Events https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/23/chinese-dissidents-hail-moscow-events/6fea0a33-ccc8-4e93-b6d5-665faa846e64/ live The Washington Post 10 November 2016 10 November 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20161110173311/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/08/23/chinese-dissidents-hail-moscow-events/6fea0a33-ccc8-4e93-b6d5-665faa846e64/thumb|Fidel Castro at East Berlin 1972. Cuba relied upon the Soviet Union and throughout the Cold War was a steadfast ally. Castro systemically opposed Gorbachev's perestroika but he did not publicly support the August Coup in 1991. People's Republic of the Congo: Congo was already moving away from Marxism–Leninism and had organized a democratic conference in June.Noble Kenneth B. https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/25/world/congo-political-conference-gives-africa-a-democratic-model.html Congo Political Conference Gives Africa a Democratic Model The New York Times 1991-06-25 2021-12-04 8 October 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211008142304/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/25/world/congo-political-conference-gives-africa-a-democratic-model.html live All references to Communism were removed from the Congolese Constitution in April 1992, yet former Soviet protégé Denis Sassou Nguesso would later regain power and rule Congo through to the present day. Cuba: On August20, the Cuban Government issued a statement insisting on its neutrality, saying that the conflict was "not Cuba's to judge". In the same statement, Cuba also criticized the West for inciting divisions within the Soviet Union. A Western diplomat alleged that in private, Cuba's officials hoped the coup would succeed because the plotters would continue the special Soviet relationship with their country. In September 1991, three-quarters of Cuba's consumer goods came from the USSR, underlining the importance of Soviet events to Cuba's leaders.https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-09-08-op-2758-story.html The Last Days of the Soviet Lifeline : Now Cuba faces a midlife crisis Los Angeles Times 8 September 1991 10 November 2021 10 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211110055731/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-09-08-op-2758-story.html live As the Soviet coup unfolded, Cuban officials did not believe its leaders would prevail. While Gorbachev was in power, Fidel Castro never agreed with Perestroika and in July 1991 had reiterated his position that there would be no changes in Cuba, saying "In this revolution there will be no changes of name or ideas."https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-23-wr-1043-story.html World Report Extra : The Coup and Beyond : World View : Holding Out for Hammer and Sickle : There are still several orthodox Communist states in the world. Their reaction to the sudden fall – and return – of Mikhail Gorbachev. : Cuba : 'Option Zero' in Havana Los Angeles Times 23 August 1991 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109035418/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-23-wr-1043-story.html live The end of Soviet assistance sparked the Special Period crisis that would last ten years. North Korea 1948: As the coup began, newspapers published documents from the GKChP without comment or statements of support. Privately, the regime instructed its officials to support the coup to "defend Socialist achievements". North Korean diplomats were present in Moscow and kept informal contacts with Russians as events unfolded, including soldiers on the ground. By the end of the first day, North Korea's embassy in Moscow reported to Pyongyang that the coup would not succeed. At the time, there were changing attitudes in the north toward South Korea and a brief shootout at the DMZ border.https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-23-wr-1039-story.html World Report Extra: The Coup and Beyond : World View : Holding Out for Hammer and Sickle : There are still several orthodox Communist states in the world. Their reaction to the sudden fall – and return – of Mikhail Gorbachev : North Korea : Pyongyang's Odd Drama Los Angeles Times 23 August 1991 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109052706/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-23-wr-1039-story.html live After the coup's failure, Vice President Pak Song-chol said "The invincible might of our own style of socialism is being highly demonstrated," and the "North is basically stable" in a reference to Juche.https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/13/world/north-korea-tries-to-block-any-effects-of-failed-soviet-coup.html North Korea Tries to Block Any Effects of Failed Soviet Coup The New York Times 1991-09-13 2021-12-04 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109052706/https://www.nytimes.com/1991/09/13/world/north-korea-tries-to-block-any-effects-of-failed-soviet-coup.html live Pyongyang would later blame Perestroika for the fall of the USSR, calling "Gorbachev's wrong anti-socialist policy" a "revisionist" one. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23255885 23255885 North Korean Regime and Russian Political Power Mikheev Vasily V. The Journal of East Asian Affairs 1998 12 2 553–576 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109052706/https://www.jstor.org/stable/23255885 live The end of Soviet assistance was a direct cause of the Arduous March that began in 1994. Vietnam: The coup came at a time when promised Soviet aid was being slowed and later halted. Vietnamese Communists decided to not embrace a multi-party system in Vietnam due to the experience of Perestroika. An unnamed official said that "Vietnam would probably not feel sorry to see [the end of the Soviet president's career] because Gorbachev has made many mistakes... too many compromises with the West. He has also made the position and the role of the Soviet Union in the world weaker." The official also said that Vietnam would benefit from a return to Communist rule in the Soviet Union. "These changes would also affect positively Vietnam's economy because the West would carry out a hard policy towards the Soviet Union, then the latter would look for trade relations with such countries as Vietnam and China." https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-21-mn-905-story.html Pope Fears the Loss of Hard-Won Church Gains in Soviet Union : Reaction: John Paul's enthusiastic tour of Eastern Europe ends on a glum note Los Angeles Times 21 August 1991 10 November 2021 10 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211110191051/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1991-08-21-mn-905-story.html live After the coup, top Communist Party official Thai Ninh was asked by foreign press if Vietnam felt betrayed by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He answered, "It's better to let the Soviet people decide that".https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/09/09/vietnam-fears-effects-of-soviet-upheaval/8da962c3-49e6-493b-af1f-72420dfc5365/ Vietnam Fears Effects Of Soviet Upheaval The Washington Post 1991-09-09 2021-12-04 20 December 2020 https://web.archive.org/web/20201220133348/https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1991/09/09/vietnam-fears-effects-of-soviet-upheaval/8da962c3-49e6-493b-af1f-72420dfc5365/ live The failed coup prompted Vietnam to normalize relations with China in November, ending the Sino-Vietnamese conflicts of the 1980s. In a major political victory for China, Vietnam recognized the State of Cambodia (SOC). Increasingly, Beijing and Hanoi felt an ideological affinity with one another and a mutual desire to resist American-led Peaceful Evolution. Vietnam would look to ASEAN for new trading partners in the aftermath of the Soviet dissolution. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798159 25798159 New Thinking in Vietnamese Foreign Policy Yeong Mike Contemporary Southeast Asia 1992 14 3 257–268 9 November 2021 9 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211109083927/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798159 live Yugoslavia: The Coup was a profound event for all of Yugoslavia, United Press International reported reactions from ordinary Yugoslavs including economist Dragan Radic who said "Gorbachev has done a lot for world peace and helped replace hard-line communist regimes in the past few years.Yet, the West failed to support Gorbachev financially and economically and he was forced to step down because he could not feed the Soviet people." Officially, President Slobodan Milošević, in charge of Serbia, was silent. Unofficially, there were numerous interactions between Yugoslavia and the USSR leading up to the start of the coup. The violent breakup of Yugoslavia had begun the previous year. Political actors in both nations realized the similarities of their political situations. On the anti-communist side, separatists in the USSR were building relations with Yugoslavia's breakaway republics. At the end of July, Lithuania recognized Slovenia and in August, Georgia recognized Slovenia and Croatia's independence. On the side of hardliners, both nations had factions embracing a red-brown coalition between traditional communists and ultranationalists to maintain the territorial integrity of both the USSR and Yugoslavia. In the weeks leading up to the coup, conservatives in the USSR were using the precedence of Yugoslavia as an excuse to violently suppress uprisings of non-Russians. In fact, Yugoslavia may have been a major cause for the Gang of Eight to believe their actions were necessary to prevent the USSR's collapse. When Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Marković visited Moscow in early August, Gorbachev pointed out the parallels between problems looming in both countries. Croatian president Franjo Tuđman claimed in October that "Communist Yugoslav Generals" had openly supported the coup and that they had received instructions from Moscow. The victory of the democrats in the USSR had major implications for Yugoslavia. Yeltsin knew that Milošević had secretly supported Soviet conservatives and relations between the two were dismal. By the time the USSR collapsed, the problem of Yugoslavia had become a part of the Russian political landscape. Yeltsin and liberal elites would publicly take an even-handed approach and encourage international cooperation to solve the crisis. In contrast, post-Soviet conservatives looked to create advantages for Russia by supporting Orthodox Serbs in their struggle to control the remaining Yugoslav nations. Sociology Professor Veljko Vujačić assessed the similarities and differences between the breakup of Yugoslavia and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Both nations were multi-national Marxist–Leninist states with Slavic rulers facing major secessionist movements. In Serbia, patriotism was linked with statehood. Milošević told his nationalist followers that every generation of Serbs has had their own "Kosovo battle", dating back to the 14th century. In contrast, Russian nationalists including Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn drew a distinction between 'patriotic' Russian people and the 'oppressive' Russian state. Boris Yeltsin and his followers saw the USSR as an oppressor of Russia, thereby accelerating the mostly peaceful division of the former Soviet Union.https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/why-the-soviet-union-and-yugoslavia-collapsed-the-way-they-did-reexamining-russian-and-serbian Why the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia Collapsed the Way They Did: Reexamining Russian and Serbian Nationalism 14 May 2003 Wilson Center 2021-12-04 14 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211114224835/https://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/why-the-soviet-union-and-yugoslavia-collapsed-the-way-they-did-reexamining-russian-and-serbian live On 27April 1992, Yugoslavia formally disintegrated and with it vanished any mention of Marxist–Leninism in its Serbian and Montenegrin successor state. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40202977 40202977 Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership and Power Cohen Lenard J. International Journal 1994 49 4 814–845 10.1177/002070209404900405 147158781 14 November 2021 14 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211114213007/https://www.jstor.org/stable/40202977 live subscription Former Warsaw Pact members The Warsaw Pact had dissolved in July, and its members had rapidly changed, with Marxist–Leninist pro-Soviet governments deposed or elected out of office. As a result, all criticized or expressed weary sentiments about events in Moscow. Some former Warsaw Pact members deployed armed forces to strategically important areas. Bulgaria: President Zhelyu Zhelev stated that "Such anti-democratic methods can never lead to anything good neither for the Soviet Union, nor for Eastern Europe, nor for the democratic developments in the world." Czechoslovakia Czechoslovakia: President Václav Havel warned that his nation could potentially face a "wave of refugees" crossing its border with the Ukrainian SSR. However, Havel said "It is not possible to reverse the changes that have already happened in the Soviet Union. We believe democracy will eventually prevail in the Soviet Union." Interior Ministry spokesman Martin Fendrych said an unspecified number of additional troops had been moved to reinforce the Czechoslovak border with the Soviet Union. Hungary: Deputy Speaker of Parliament Mátyás Szűrös said, "Undoubtedly, the Soviet economy has collapsed but this has not been the result of Gorbachev's policy but of the paralyzing influence of conservatives," adding, "Suddenly, the likelihood of a civil war in the Soviet Union has increased." Poland: A statement released by the president Lech Wałęsa, whose Solidarity union helped prompt the collapse of communist regimes in Eastern Europe, appealed for calm. "May unity and responsibility for our state gain the upper hand." The statement, read on Polish radio by spokesman Andrzej Drzycimski, continued, "The situation in the USSR is significant for our country. It can affect our bilateral relations. We want them to be friendly." But Wałęsa emphasized that Poland would keep its hard-won sovereignty while pursuing economic and political reforms. Romania: Prime Minister Petre Roman said the coup was an attempt to re-establish hardline communism in the most Stalinist manner. Other sovereign states El Salvador: The end of the Salvadoran Civil War with the Communist FMLN was being negotiated. President Alfredo Cristiani voiced concern that the coup could encourage the FMLN to end negotiations, or that Cuba's relationship with the Soviet Union would be restored. Cuba had long been a supplier to the FMLN. Ernesto Altschul, Cristiani's deputy chief of staff, said, "Obviously, this can affect our situation." After the coup failed, the Chapultepec Peace Accords were signed in January 1992, ending twelve years of brutal conflict.https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1991/08/20/world-reaction/ Tampa Bay Times October 13, 2005 World Reaction 31 March 2022 31 March 2022 https://web.archive.org/web/20220331223547/https://www.tampabay.com/archive/1991/08/20/world-reaction/ live India: As the coup was ongoing, Indian leaders indicated a degree of sympathy for Soviet hardliners. Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao said "Mr. Gorbachev's ouster was a warning to people who favored reforms without controls." Likewise, India's ambassador in Moscow remarked that Gorbachev had "brought about the disintegration of the [Communist] party". Chief Minister of West Bengal and Communist Party of India (Marxist) cofounder Jyoti Basu wholeheartedly endorsed the coup. When the coup failed, India's government changed course, celebrating "the reassertion of democratic values and a triumph for the will of the people." Despite official support for Yeltsin's victory, Indian politicians feared that a spill-over effect from the dissolution of the Soviet Union would encourage secessionist movements at home. The loss of an economic partner and ideological friend upset the Rao Administration and India's leftist movement, as the Indian National Congress felt it shared some of the CPSU's values. The Christian Science Monitor wrote that "India feels orphaned – ideologically, strategically, economically" https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1007/07182.html Breakup of Soviet Union Leaves India Shaken Christian Science Monitor 7 October 1991 10 November 2021 10 November 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20211110070431/https://www.csmonitor.com/1991/1007/07182.html live Ba'athist Iraq: Saddam Hussein was a close ally of the Soviet Union until Gorbachev denounced the invasion of Kuwait that preceded the Gulf War, and relations between the two countries had grown tense. One Iraqi spokesman quoted by the official Iraqi News Agency said that "Iraq's right and steadfastness was one of the main reasons behind the fall [of Gorbachev]... because [Iraq] exposed [his] policy of treason and conspiracy. It is natural that we welcome such change like the states and people who were affected by the policies of the former regime." In other words, Hussein seemingly took credit for inspiring the coup. This position was echoed by the Jordanian Newspaper Al Ra'i. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Government radio quoted leader Muammar Gaddafi praising the coup leaders for their "brave historical action." Philippines 1986: President Corazon Aquino expressed "grave concern" saying, "We hope that the progress toward world peace... achieved under the leadership of President Gorbachev will continue to be preserved and enhanced further." South Africa 1982: Foreign Minister Pik Botha said, "I very much hope that [Soviet developments] will neither give rise to large-scale turbulence within the Soviet Union itself or more widely in Europe, nor jeopardize the era of hard-won international cooperation upon which the world has embarked." Supranational bodies and organizations Holy See: While celebrating Mass in Budapest, Pope John Paul II said in scripted remarks that he hoped the Soviet Union's reforms would survive Gorbachev's fall. "I particularly appreciated the sincere desire that guided him and the lofty inspiration that animated him in the promotion of human rights and dignity, as well as in his commitment for the well-being of the country and of the international community. May the process initiated by him not fall into decline." The Pope also prayed for the Soviet Union itself, asking that "our prayers become even more intense to ask God that that great country may be spared further tragedy." NATO: The alliance held an emergency meeting in Brussels condemning the Soviet coup. "If indeed this coup did fail, it will be a great victory for the courageous Soviet people who have tasted freedom and who are not prepared to have it taken away from them," said United States Secretary of State James A. Baker III. Baker also stated, "[i]t will also, to some extent, be a victory, too, for the international community and for all those governments who reacted strongly to these events." NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner also said, "We should see how the situation in the Soviet Union develops. Our own plans will take into account what happens there."https://www.chicagotribune.com/1991/08/21/natos-response-covers-all-bases/ Nato's Response Covers All Bases Chicago Tribune 21 August 1991 10 November 2016 11 November 2016 https://web.archive.org/web/20161111001957/http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-08-21/news/9103020365_1_foreign-ministers-kremlin-coup-coup-leaders live Palestine Liberation Organization: The Palestinian Liberation Organization was satisfied with the coup. Yasser Abed Rabbo, who was a member of the PLO Executive Committee, said he hoped the putsch "will permit resolution in the best interests of the Palestinians of the problem of Soviet Jews in Israel." Subsequent fate of GKChP Gang of Eight Gennadiy Yanayev, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, went on to head the Department of History and International Relations for the Russian International Academy of Tourismhttps://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8060046/Gennady-Yanayev.html Gennady Yanayev 12 October 2010 4 April 2018 8 March 2021 https://web.archive.org/web/20210308213451/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/politics-obituaries/8060046/Gennady-Yanayev.html live and died in 2010. Valentin Pavlov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, subsequently served as a financial expert for several banks and other financial institutions and became chairman of Free Economic Society, https://web.archive.org/web/20240825124943/https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2003-apr-01-me-pavlov1-story.html 25 August 2024 "LA Times", March 2015 dying in 2003. Vladimir Kryuchkov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, died in 2007. Dmitriy Yazov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, became adviser to the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Academy of General Staff;Simon Saradzhyan Coup Leader May Join Defense Team, "The Moscow Times", March 2015 he died in 2020. Boris Pugo died from a gunshot to the head on 22August 1991. His death was ruled as a suicide.1991-08-24 AFTER THE COUP; Phone Call, Then a Suicide (Published 1991) https://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/24/world/after-the-coup-phone-call-then-a-suicide.html 2025-08-06 en Oleg Baklanov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, later served as chairman of the board of directors for "Rosobshchemash"; he died in 2021. Vasiliy Starodubtsev, freed from arrest in 1992 due to health complications, served as deputy to the Federation Council of Russia (1993–95), governor of Tula Oblast (1997–2005), and then member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (since 2007)Rupert Cornwell https://web.archive.org/web/20171010070156/https://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/vasily-starodubtsev-politician-who-tried-to-topple-gorbachev-in-1991-6284480.html 10 October 2017"Vasily Starodubtsev: Politician who tried to topple Gorbachev in 1991", March 2015 until his death in 2011. Alexander Tizyakov, granted amnesty by the Russian State Duma in 1994, was later a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, founder of series of enterprises such as "Antal" (machine manufacturing), "Severnaya kazna" (insurance), "Vidikon" (electric arc furnace manufacturing) and "Fidelity" (fast-moving consumer goods production);Vladimir Socor https://web.archive.org/web/20150402130101/http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5407&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=217&no_cache=1#.VQGVXGSxNF9 2 April 2015"The Jamestown Foundation", March 2015 he died in 2019. In popular media The Man Who Doesn't Return is a drama film by Sergey Snezhkin in 1991. Three Days (1992 film) is a drama film by Šarūnas Bartas. Three Days in August (1992 film) is a co-production film between Russia and the United States by Jan Jung in 1992.June 2024 Sergey Medvedev's 2001 Channel One film Swan Lake, commissioned by the State Committee on the State of Emergency.http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/60n/n60n-s13.shtml "ЛЕБЕДИНОЕ ОЗЕРО" ВЫСОХЛО Новый телесезон начался с юбилея ГКЧП — но без балета ЖЕЛЕЗНОВА Мария August 23, 2001 Novaya Gazeta December 11, 2023 https://web.archive.org/web/20180929221858/http://2001.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2001/60n/n60n-s13.shtml September 29, 2018 Russian Yeltsin: Three Days in August (Ельцин. Три дня в августе) is a 2011 Russian film that dramatizes the coup. The Event (Событие) is a 2015 Russian documentary by Sergei Loznitsa that uses footage shot 19–24August 1991 by camera operators of the Saint Petersburg Documentary film studio to tell the story of the coup as it unfolded in Leningrad. Russia 1985–1999: TraumaZone is a BBC documentary television series in 2022. In "House Divided", a season 4 episode of For All Mankind, an alternate history TV series, the coup succeeds and Mikhail Gorbachev is overthrown. See also Soviet Union 1990s Politics Dissolution of the Soviet Union History of the Soviet Union 1993 Russian constitutional crisis Wagner Group rebellion State collapse Swan Lake January 6 United States Capitol attack Notes and references Bibliography See also: Bibliography of the Post Stalinist Soviet Union Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Bloc Bonnell Victoria E. Freidin Gregory 1993 Televorot: The Role of Television Coverage in Russia's August 1991 Coup https://www-leland.stanford.edu/~gfreidin/Publications/Televorot1.pdf Slavic Review en 52 4 810–838 10.2307/2499653 2499653 0037-6779 Breslauer George W. April 1992 Reflections on the Anniversary of the August 1991 Coup Soviet Economy en 8 2 164–174 10.1080/08826994.1992.10641350 0882-6994 Dunlop John B. 2003 The August 1991 Coup and Its Impact on Soviet Politics https://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/5/1/94/695771/152039703320996731.pdf Journal of Cold War Studies en 5 1 94–127 10.1162/152039703320996731 1520-3972 Gibson James L. September 1997 Mass Opposition to the Soviet Putsch of August 1991: Collective Action, Rational Choice, and Democratic Values in the Former Soviet Union American Political Science Review en 91 3 671–684 10.2307/2952082 2952082 0003-0554 Hamburg Roger 1992 After the Abortive Soviet Coup and 'What Is To Be Done?' The Post Soviet Military Journal of Political & Military Sociology 20 2 305–322 45294287 Kyriakodis Harry G. 1991 The 1991 Soviet and 1917 Bolshewk Coups Compared: Causes, Consequences and Legality https://wp.towson.edu/iajournal/files/2017/11/1991-AND-1917-COUPS-COMPARED-1j76ntt.pdf Russian History 18 1–4 317–362 10.1163/187633191X00137 0094-288X Lepingwell John W. R. July 1992 Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the August Coup World Politics en 44 4 539–572 10.2307/2010487 0043-8871 2010487 McNair Brian Getting the message: news, truth and power 1996 Routledge 978-0-415-07984-6 Eldridge John 1. publ., repr Communication and society London New York 53–72 Reform and restructuring in the Soviet media before and after the August 1991 coup Eldridge John Eric Matthee Heinrich 1991 A Breakdown of Civil-Military Relations: The Soviet Coup of 1991 https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/37368507.pdf Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies 29 10.5787/29-0-185 2224-0020 Meyer Stephen M. 1991 How the Threat (and the Coup) Collapsed: The Politicization of the Soviet Military International Security 16 3 5–38 10.2307/2539087 2539087 Ōgushi Atsushi The demise of the Soviet Communist Party 2008 Routledge 978-0-415-43439-3 BASEES/Routledge series on Russian and East European studies London; New York 144769250 Saar Andrus Joe Liivi 1992 Polling, Under the Gun: Political Attitudes in Estonia, Surveyed at the Height of the Soviet Coup Attempt, August 1991 Public Opinion Quarterly 56 4 519 10.1086/269341 Varney Wendy Martin Brian February 2000 Lessons from the 1991 Soviet coup https://documents.uow.edu.au/~/bmartin/pubs/00pr.html Peace Research 32 1 52–68 23607685 Charles Vogt William The Soviet coup of August 1991: why it happened, and why it was doomed to fail December 1991 MA Naval Postgraduate School https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/36721382.pdf Ziemele Ineta Ineta Ziemele State continuity and nationality: the Baltic States and Russia: past present and future as defined by international law M. Nijhoff 2005 978-90-04-14295-4 Leiden; Boston ocm57170584 Ziemele2005 Zlotnik Marc 2003 Yeltsin and Gorbachev: The Politics of Confrontation Journal of Cold War Studies en 5 1 128–164 10.1162/152039703320996740 1520-3972 Primary sources Gorbačev Michail Mikhail Gorbachev https://archive.org/details/augustcouptruthl00gorb The August Coup: The Truth and The Lessons 1991 HarperCollins Publisher 978-0-06-016890-2 New York, NY Includes transcript of the videotaped statement made 19/20August 1991 as his Foros dacha. https://books.google.com/books?id=njDmMpVGPGsC Russia at the Barricades: Eyewitness Accounts of the August 1991 Coup 1994 M.E. Sharpe 978-1-56324-272-4 Bonnell Victoria E. Armonk, NY Cooper Ann Freidin Gregory Includes the chronology of the coup, photos, and accounts from a broad cross-section of participants and eyewitnesses, including the editors. External links The August Coup texts https://web.archive.org/web/20251209051625/https://soviethistory.msu.edu/1991-2/the-august-coup/the-august-coup-texts/ 9 December 2025 Voices From An Attempted Soviet Coup. first person accounts and documents from both sides of the barricades. Compiled and edited by Anya Chernyakhovskaya, Dr John Jirik and Nikolai Lamm. IRC logs: Transcript of internet chat from the time of the coup TASS transmissions at the time of the coup (captured from short-wave radio transmissions, contains decoding errors) Andrew Coyne: Getting to the Roots of a Deserved Failure The St. Petersburg Times #696(63), 17 August 2001 The issue of The St. Petersburg Times devoted to the tenth anniversary of the coup attempt. The Collapse of Stalinism Chronology of the Coup The USSR in 1991: The Implosion of a Superpower by Dr Robert F. Miller Moscow Coup, August 1991, Anonymous: Memories of an anonymous Russian in Wiki Memory Archive Personal account and photographs of historian Douglas Smith, an eyewitness to the coup 8VAHy76QO7o Vadim Anatov, a programmer for Relcom (the first public ISP in the USSR) talking about the role of the Internet in resistance to the coup. Adventures of the "Nuclear Briefcase": A Russian Document Analysis, Strategic Insights, Volume III, Issue 9 (September 2004), by Mikhail Tsypkin Map of Europe showing areas affected by Soviet Coup Attempt United States (2021) Category:1991 conflicts Coup d'etat attempt Category:Military history of the Soviet Union Soviet Union Category:Attempted coups d'état in the Soviet Union Category:1991 in politics Category:Rebellions in the Soviet Union Category:Political scandals in Russia Category:1991 in Moscow Category:August 1991 in Russia Category:Attacks on legislatures in Europe Category:Attacks on government buildings and structures in Russia Category:Attacks on buildings and structures in 1991 Category:Communist Party of the Soviet Union Category:Communist rebellions