1963 Brazilian constitutional referendum

none Do you approve the Additional Act that instituted the parliamentary system? Brazil 1960 6 January 1963 2,073,582 9,457,448 755,145 18,565,277 Brazil rejects the parliamentary system. The office of Prime Minister of Brazil is abolished. President João Goulart becomes Head of State and Government. Plebiscito de 1963- campanha pelo fim do parlamentarismo.webm Video of the Federal Senate of Brazil with campaign materials and a jingle by Elizeth Cardoso A constitutional referendum was held in Brazil on 6 January 1963 to determine the country's form of government (parliamentarism or presidentialism). Voters were asked whether they approved of a constitutional amendment made in 1961 that transferred much of the president's power to the National Congress. The changes were rejected by the majority of voters, resulting in the choice of presidentialism, the end of the Parliamentary Republic established in 1961 and the restoration of the full powers of president João Goulart, also sworn in in 1961. The referendum's original date was April 1965, but it was brought forward. Goulart's inauguration had been the target of an attempt at a military veto and it was only possible due to a political compromise that resulted in the adoption of parliamentarism to weaken his powers. However, as soon as he took power, he sought to bring forward the plebiscite provided for by law and restore presidentialism. A broad front wanted the end of the still little consolidated parliamentary experience, even without necessarily supporting the president. Thus, state governors, presidential candidates, trade unionists, the military and others defended the anti-parliamentary cause. In 1962, political crises in July and September, both with general strikes and military pressure, allowed the president to obtain a favorable prime minister and intimidate Congress to bring forward the voting date. Goulart then received funding from businessmen for a strong election campaign, while the parliamentary cause had little support. The result at the polls was overwhelming in favor of presidentialism. The anti-parliamentary effort was the priority of the Goulart government in its first year, being related to the short duration of parliamentary cabinets, the deepening of the national economic crisis, the strengthening of trade unionism (with the founding of the General Command of Workers) and the deterioration of relations with the United States. Terminology In Brazilian terminology, a plebiscite is held before the legal or administrative act in question, while a referendum is held after it.https://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/plebiscitos-e-referendos/plebiscito-e-referendo Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - Plebiscitos e referendos 21 December 2020 Parliamentarism was instituted in 1961, with the act that instituted it providing for a "plebiscite" to be held on the matter, but the law that brought it forward called it a "referendum".https://www.tse.jus.br/eleicoes/plebiscitos-e-referendos/referendo-1963/referendo-de-1963 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral - Referendo de 1963 21 December 2020 Background Legality Campaign#Parliamentary solution On 24 August 1961, then president Jânio Quadros resigned, seeking to trigger a succession crisis against the inauguration of his vice-president João Goulart, who was on a trip to China. Through the high military command, Quadros intended to receive extraordinary powers from Congress to govern; however, his resignation was accepted by Congress and he could not regain the presidency, but a crisis ensued: the military ministers did not accept the presidential line of succession and vetoed Goulart's inauguration, while Leonel Brizola, governor of Rio Grande do Sul, rejected the veto of the military ministers. The Brazilian Army was not united on the matter, as the 3rd Army (from the South) of general Machado Lopes joined the cause of Goulart's inauguration.Skidmore 1982 252-264 The possibility of civil war arose, but "following an old national tradition" the solution was a compromise,Melo 2009 3 preserving the president's mandate but weakening his powers through the adoption of parliamentarism.Klein 2021 226 Constitutional Amendment No. 4 to the 1946 Constitution, also called the "Additional Act", implemented parliamentarism as a form of government, later regulated by Complementary Law No. 1 of 17 July 1962. The legislation provided for pure parliamentarism, with a weak president elected by Congress and power concentrated in the Council of Ministers, whose president was equivalent to a prime minister. However, Goulart's term, still elected by popular suffrage in the previous system in 1960, would be a transitional period with a hybrid character. The law still gave political influence to the president,Rubiatti 2008 108-109, 115-119 using ambiguous writing,Loureiro 2012 253 and the hybridity manifested itself in the actual functioning of the system. Goulart still had prestige,Rubiatti 2008 123 the Legislature did not use its new prerogatives,Rubiatti 2008 162 and the system had little written institutionalization and no tradition.Andrade 2018 45 The relationship between the branches of government had little real change and the cabinets functioned as presidential ministries.Rubiatti 2008 176 The new system had weaknesses from the start. It was discussed in a hurry and approved with a confusing text, removing powers from the president of the Republic in the full term of office. It was opposed by the political class from the beginning and had low popular acceptance. The measure had an ideological nature and irritated the left,Andrade 2018 43-36 for which it was a "white coup".Melo 2009 95 Its permanence was not decided, since it was stated in the Additional Act:Emenda Constitucional nº 4 https://www2.camara.leg.br/legin/fed/emecon/1960-1969/emendaconstitucional-4-2-setembro-1961-349692-publicacaooriginal-1-pl.html 19 August 2023 Portal da Câmara dos Deputados Article 25: The law voted under the terms of Article 22Article 22: "It will be possible to complement the organization of the parliamentary system of government now instituted, by means of laws voted, in both houses of the National Congress, by the absolute majority of its members". may provide for the holding of a plebiscite to decide whether to maintain the parliamentary system or return to the presidential system, in which case the plebiscite consultation must be held nine months before the end of the current presidential term. Goulart's ambitions and implications thumb|right|President Goulart (middle) and prime minister Tancredo Neves (right) Goulart's term would end on 31 January 1966, so the plebiscite was scheduled for April 1965.Benevides 1993 Since taking office, Goulart articulated the reversion to presidentialism,Klein 2021 226 and at the opening of the 1962 legislative works he explained his intention to regain his powers with an early plebiscite.Villa 2014 "Vamos jangar" The dispute for bringing the referendum forward, driven by trade unionism, military and political pressure, was then won in September by an anti-parliamentary coalition stronger than the parliamentary one — even Goulart's enemies wanted presidentialism.Melo 2009 103-104 Opposing forces, such as military ministers and trade unions, participated in this broad front.Nogueira 2006 18-19 The country went through two crises. The first, in July 1962, led to the inauguration of a prime minister subservient to the presidential agenda, and the second, in September, to the reschedule of the plebiscite.Loureiro 2012 318 In order restore presidentialism, Goulart needed to demonstrate fidelity to the legal order and enlist support to pressure Congress.Loureiro 2012 250-259 Cabinet instability and inflation marked the beginning of his government. In his first year in power, he concentrated his forces on bringing forward the plebiscite, and thus had no interest in strengthening the parliamentary regime or in stabilizing the economy through an unpopular fiscal adjustment.Spektor 2018 5-7 There were difficulties in applying economic policy from the dismissal of Tancredo Neves, in June, to the reschedule vote in September; instability made any stabilization program unfeasible in mid-1962. Monetary and fiscal aggregates were out of control during this period, especially in the crises of July and September.Loureiro 2012 308 Thus, Brazil was not in a position to satisfy the demands of the John F. Kennedy government in the United States, which was willing to negotiate financial assistance if the Brazilian government fought inflation and distanced itself from the left. In the 1962 congressional elections, the opposition received American funding.Spektor 2018 5-7 The U.S. Embassy was concerned about the use of the radical left in the unions to support the early referendum.Loureiro 2014 338 During this period, syndicalism strengthened its organization and even proved capable of acting against Goulart's wishes, although it did not have an "independent historical action".Melo 2009 215 This strengthening later diminished the government's freedom to determine its economic policy, making it difficult to implement the Triennial Plan in 1962.Loureiro 2012 250-251 At the same time, the president's political tactics strained his relationship with the business sector.Loureiro 2012 312 Some analysts attributed the success of the strikes to the protection provided by nationalist officers against state police repression. This support is confirmed by the sources in the case of general Osvino Ferreira Alves' 1st Army, but not in others, and yet the nationalist officers did not approve of the strikes.Melo 2009 7-8 e 120-121 But for Goulart, military support was crucial and was achieved by placing nationalist officers in key commands as part of the nominations and promotions policy.Skidmore 1982 271Loureiro 2012 258 At the very least, the neutrality of the Armed Forces was necessary so that popular pressure applied to Congress did not serve as a pretext for a coup d'état.Loureiro 2012 257 Dispute to bring forward the plebiscite Opinion of the political class The National Democratic Union (UDN) and the Social Democratic Party (PSD) voted in favor of the parliamentary amendment, while the Brazilian Labor Party (PTB), Goulart's party, was against it.Rubiatti 2008 106 However, even in 1961 some members of the UDN and PSD were already conferring with the military for the return of presidentialism.Andrade 2018 46 For parliamentarians, there were reasons to oppose the consolidation of parliamentarism, as it would lead to the centralization of legislative activity in parties, to the detriment of individual parliamentarians, and the delegation of powers to the cabinet to the detriment of the parliament.Rubiatti 2008 175-176 On the other hand, the PSD benefited from parliamentarism by being the largest party in Congress, and the UDN by weakening its enemy Goulart. For political scientist Argelina Figueiredo, UDN and PSD congressmen were mostly against parliamentarism, but a contrary argument is that, if this was the case, it would not have been necessary to apply so much pressure to bring forward the plebiscite. Goulart defeated offensives in Congress to consolidate parliamentarism, first in an attempt to pass a complementary law in September 1961, and then in administrative decrees that would strengthen the Council of Ministers.Loureiro 2012 250-259 The presidential candidates in the 1965 election, such as Juracy Magalhães (UDN), Juscelino Kubitschek (PSD) and Magalhães Pinto (UDN), wanted to get rid of parliamentarism as soon as possible.Melo 2009 129 Leonel Brizola (PTB), possibly interested in running in 1965, wanted Goulart to use full presidential powers in favor of his base on the left.Nogueira 2006 18-19 Magalhães was conservative, but he was part of the anti-parliamentary front on the left. Carlos Lacerda, from Magalhães party and also running for president, wanted to reverse parliamentary rule and is mentioned among its opponents, but he acted against the referendum.Melo 2009 213 In turn, state governors, among whom were Carlos Lacerda (from Guanabara) and Magalhães Pinto (from Minas Gerais), were unwilling to comply with Article 24 of the Additional Act,"The State Constitutions shall adapt to the parliamentary system of government, within the period established by law, which cannot be earlier than the end of the term of the current governors. The other federal, state and municipal terms are also respected until their end". which provided for the extension of parliamentarism to the states of the federation.Melo 2009 100 On 8 June, the governors met in Araxá, with the exception of Lacerda, and agreed to support the initiative to bring forward the plebiscite, on the initiative of Magalhães Pinto.Melo 2009 108-109 July strike and inauguration of Brochado da Rocha The Tancredo Neves cabinet resigned in June 1962 in order to participate in the October congressional elections.Melo 2009 110 This noncompliance was a presidential legal requirementRubiatti 2008 133 and a proposed elimination was defeated in the Senate.Loureiro 2012 278 Tancredo Neves was not dedicated to the preservation of parliamentarism, but his fall was the "beginning of the end" of the regime, as his cabinet, unlike the others that followed, was not formed with the commitment to bring forward the plebiscite and was not dependent on Goulart.Andrade 2018 46Rubiatti 2008 133 The president then maneuvered to discredit parliamentarism.Andrade 2018 46 On 27 June, he appointed San Tiago Dantas to succeed Tancredo; Dantas was known for the Independent Foreign Policy and was rejected by the right. After Dantas appointment was blocked by the UDN and PSD, Goulart appointed Auro de Moura Andrade, from the PSD's conservative wing, on the condition that he keep an undated resignation letter. Andrade was approved by Congress, but unionists called a general strike on 5 July to change the cabinet. On 4 July, the resignation letter was used to eliminate Andrade. With the impasse created by the nomination of Andrade and the attrition of two failed appointments, Congress accepted the nomination of Brochado da Rocha (PSD) on 10 July. Rocha was an inexpressive name, subordinate to the presidentRubiatti 2008 133-138 and committed to presidentialism.Andrade 2018 47 Pressure from the military apparatus, under the coordination of Amaury Kruel, was also used in the cabinet crisis. Between Andrade's resignation and Brochado's approval, Goulart, as commander of the Armed Forces, took the opportunity to nominate general Jair Dantas Ribeiro to command the 3rd Army; the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armies came into readiness. Costa e Silva's 4th Army was not to be trusted. However, according to Olímpio Mourão Filho, out of the eight generals subordinated to Ribeiro, only one accepted the idea of a declaration in favor of Goulart.Faria 2013 207-208Mourão was ready, in reaction to an attitude of the government (he imagined that Congress could be closed), to activate his "Junction Plan", with an offensive of his 3rd Infantry Division against Porto Alegre. Mourão Filho 2011 157–159. With support from the center and the left for a return to presidentialism, only that of the army was missing.Andrade 2018 47 In August, the three military ministers (army, navy and air force) declared their support for bringing forward the plebiscite.Skidmore 1982 271 The crisis left the country with 14 days without a cabinet, with negative political-administrative and economic impacts.Loureiro 2012 288 In the union environment, the strike schedule was maintained even with the fall of Andrade and the attempt by Goulart and his allies to prevent the strike, thus demonstrating capacity to act against the will of the president. The strike had a national scale and was centered on a General Strike Command, which would give rise to the General Workers Command (CGT) in August. The CGT was the strongest organization of extralegal/"parallel" trade unionism and had its guidelines dominated by the Communist Party.Melo 2009 112-113 e 123 September strike and legislative activity Goulart and his allies were waiting for the Superior Electoral Court to bring forward the plebiscite to 7 October, the day of the general elections. On 25 July the Court declared it had no jurisdiction to decide the date and pressure on Congress returned. The government wanted to delegate powers to the Council of Ministers to carry out the base reforms, and Brochado da Rocha threatened to resign if Congress did not vote on the plebiscite by 17 August. On that date, the period of "concentrated effort" in Congress ended and the parliamentarians would leave Brasília to conduct their electoral campaigns; if the cabinet fell, they would need to participate in the formation of a new one. An agreement was reached to avoid the resignation in exchange for another period of legislative "concentrated effort" from 10 to 15 September.Loureiro 2012 294-300 With the arrival of this period, the UDN and PSD managed to limit one of the advantages of the president — the absence of government during ministerial changes, which could lead to the postponement of the elections. On 12 September, the UDN and PSD approved the Capanema Law in the Chamber of Deputies, authorizing the president to appoint a provisional cabinet, and it was forwarded to the Senate. Meanwhile, on the 10th, the CGT made a series of demands: "to bring forward the plebiscite to 7 October, the delegation of powers to the Council of Ministers, the repeal of the National Security Law, a 100% increase in the minimum wage, the granting of the right to vote for illiterates and soldiers, the implementation of a "radical agrarian reform", the freezing of the prices of essential goods and the approval of the bill to regulate the right to strike". If they were not approved by the 15th, which was difficult or impossible, a general strike would break out.Loureiro 2012 304-305 Declaration of the 3rd Army On 11 September, general Peri Constant Bevilacqua was appointed to the 2nd Army and reinforced the 1st and 3rd armies support for presidentialism.Loureiro 2012 305 On 13 September, Jair Dantas Ribeiro declared himself incapable of maintaining order in the territory of the 3rd Army "if the people rise up" against Congress for not bringing forward the plebiscite. Minister of War Nélson de Melo disapproved of the attitude, but the 1st and 2nd armies supported the 3rd; only the 4th Army, now under the command of Castelo Branco, did not support it.Faria 2013 217-221 The 1st and 3rd armies were the strongest commands.Villa 2014 "João-Bom-Senso": "the two largest armies in men and arms were fully communing with Jango's wishes". Along with the request for a state of emergency in 1963, this was one of the two moments in which Goulart "made use of strong pressure mechanisms, frightening everyone and giving rise to speculation about any unconstitutional plans he might have". The meaning of this action was, according to historian Carlos Fico, "to lead the National Congress to vote with the government, this way we could perhaps speak of undue pressure, but not coup d'état"; "it is true that Goulart played hard".Fico 2017 9-10 Although there was social unrest, "it remains unclear" whether Jair Dantas Ribeiro's attitude was justified. Historian Moniz Bandeira considered it reasonable, as Brizola also stated at the time. However, it was an exaggeration for the mayor of Porto Alegre, the president of the state Legislative Assembly and Jair's subordinates.Faria 2013 217-221 Mourão was willing to act against his superior.Mourão Filho 2011 162 Ernesto Geisel, commander of the 5th Military Region, contested his superior, declaring that in his territory "complete tranquility reigned". Testimonies in História Oral do Exército deny unrest in the 3rd Army area and emphasize that its commander's statement was a political maneuvering.Atassio 2007 57-60 According to some sources, Goulart received proposals from the military for a coup. According to Hugo de Araújo Faria, from the Civilian Cabinet, Goulart told him that several military men offered to overthrow parliamentarism, but he refused. For Moniz Bandeira, general Amaury Kruel, head of the Military Cabinet, defended a coup d'état led by the president, and the commanders of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd armies wanted to intervene against parliamentarism. However, according to the testimony of San Tiago Dantas, Goulart would not accept an extralegal solution. Journalist Carlos Castelo Branco reported a conversation between Magalhães Pinto, mayor Ranieri Mazzilli and party leaders: according to Magalhães, Goulart would not stage a coup, but a military intervention against Congress was imminent, with or without the president's approval.Ferreira 2011 309Bandeira 1978 61-62 General Mourão Filho believed that Kruel had planned to close Congress if the plebiscite was not brought forward.Mourão Filho 2011 160 Fall of Brochado da Rocha On 13 September, the prime minister raised the "motion of confidence" before Congress regarding the delegation of more powers to the cabinet and the plebiscite. The "motion of confidence", typical of the parliamentary system, threatens resignation if a certain attitude is not taken. As there was no agreement, Brochado da Rocha resigned.Melo 2009 136Loureiro 2012 306 Union and military pressure was already decisive, with threats of a general strike and disorder in southern Brazil,Loureiro 2012 304-305 and now the fear of a left-wing cabinet, with general Osvino at the Ministry of War, weighed.Rubiatti 2008 146 With the mediation of senator Juscelino Kubitschek, the PSD-PTB alliance was reestablished and managed to bring forward the plebiscite. The general strike was launched in protest to the resignation of Brochado da Rocha, but it was weaker than in July.Loureiro 2012 306-307 According to Paulo Schilling, Brizola's adviser, the origin of the radicalizations (such as the declaration of the 3rd Army) was a conspiracy between Brizola, the CGT and officers like Jair Dantas Ribeiro. A series of radical laws would be presented to Congress by Brochado da Rocha, who would then resign. Under military and popular pressure, Congress would give its approval or be closed. As the prime minister resigned without presenting the ultimatum, the "progressive coup" plan failed.Melo 2009 133Schilling 1979 235-238 The law to bring forward the plebiscite The law originally discussed in August was the amendment by deputy Oliveira Brito (PSD). It would hand over constituent powers to the Congress elected in October, potentially facilitating reformsRubiatti 2008 145 (it would allow reform of the Constitution with a simple majority quorum),Loureiro 2012 308-309 but would also strengthen the LegislatureMelo 2009 133-134 and allow Congress to significantly delay the plebiscite. Goulart did not want to waste even more time in office and prioritized bringing forward the plebiscite.Rubiatti 2008 145 The law is interpreted as an opportunity to carry out base reforms or a strengthening of parliamentarism that would leave the plebiscite in the background.Melo 2009 133-134 In the first call, already in September, the Oliveira Brito amendment, supported by the center and left parties, obtained a 140–62 vote, an insufficient majority to be approved. It was then negotiated that this amendment would be defeated on the first call in exchange for approval of the Capanema-Valadares amendment or Complementary Law No. 2. It was an addition by senator Benedito Valadares to the complementary law modifying the Additional Act; under the 1946 Constitution, what was needed to change the date would have been a constitutional amendment. The new text dealt only with the plebiscite, without controversial constituent powers. The Oliveira Brito amendment was defeated in the second call, and Complementary Law No. 2 was approved in the early morning of the 15th by the votes of the center and left.Loureiro 2012 307Rubiatti 2008 146-147Melo 2009 137-138 Its article 2 read:BRASIL, Lei complementar nº 2, de 16 de setembro de 1962. Dispõe sôbre a vacância ministerial, e dá outras providências. Diário Oficial da União, Brasília, p. 9621, 17 de setembro de 1962. Constitutional Amendment No. 4 of 2 September 1961 will be submitted to a popular referendum on 6 January 1963. The left wanted the date of 7 October, coinciding with elections for Congress and ten state governors,Melo 2009 134-136 but this was resisted by conservative politicians who would be harmed by associating their candidacy with the unpopular "yes" option to parliamentarism.Melo 2009 128 Even so, 6 January preceded the start of legislative work in 1963, as the president wanted.Villa 2014 "João-Bom-Senso" The president's relations with Congress would be difficult in 1963. Congressmen accused the president of hypocrisy in his pursuit of reforms, as he discarded the Oliveira Brito amendment in favor of the Capanema-Valadares amendment.Loureiro 2012 308-309 The ballot would ask the voter: "Do you approve of the Additional Act that instituted parliamentarism?", with the options "Yes" and "No".Klein 2021 236 Campaign Positions The focus shifted to the referendum after the October elections, and presidentialism had broad support,Rubiatti 2008 155 uniting interests that were difficult to conciliate.Melo 2009 146 The controversy was not in the difference between the forms of government, but in the support or hostility to the figure of Goulart, to laborism, populism and the "Getulist legacy". The opposition linked the president to the communists,Benevides 1993 but the heterogeneous presidentialist coalition also had many anti-communist sectors that did not want to associate presidentialism with the left.Melo 2009 164 The presentation of the Triennial Plan, devised by economist Celso Furtado for the remaining years of Goulart's term, contributed to the campaign for a return to presidentialism.Loureiro 2012 320 Leonel Brizola and Juscelino Kubitschek toured the country campaigning for the "No" vote to parliamentarism,Melo 2009 156-157 and Magalhães Pinto organized a front of governors in support of presidentialism. Carlos Lacerda disagreed, as he did not accept collaborating with the president,Melo 2009 148 and worked to demoralize the referendum.Melo 2009 199 PTB supported presidentialism, PSD was dividedMelo 2009 200-202 and the UDN had a parliamentary majority. The hopes of the UDN politicians were the thesis of the insufficiency of the plebiscite to revoke the Additional Act and the expectation of low turnout; the latter was defeated when the Electoral Justice determined that voting was mandatory.Melo 2009 148 The Christian Democratic Party defended the "Yes" to parliamentarism,Melo 2009 187 and the Brazilian Socialist Party the "No".Melo 2009 177 The Liberator Party was based in Rio Grande do Sul and had a parliamentary tradition. Raul Pilla, one of its deputies, was the author of the parliamentary amendment of 1961. He recognized the defects of the system as implemented in 1961, but defended the blank vote or abstention, being a possible reason for the high rate of blank votes in Rio Grande do Sul (5.08%), the highest among states.Klein 2021 The trade union movement supported Goulart on the condition that he fulfill his promise in September, especially an increase in the minimum wage. Thus, with the delay in compliance, this support was at risk. Just a few days before the referendum, in 1963, the president raised the minimum wage by 75% (below the 100% required by the CGT), securing support.Melo 2009 144 e 147 The Instituto de Pesquisas e Estudos Sociais preferred presidentialism, although it did not actively participate in the anti-parliamentary front;Melo 2009 189 for the organization, interested in deposing Goulart, presidentialism allowed attributing the country's ills directly to him.Melo 2009 213 The Episcopal Conference of Brazil recommended the participation of the electorate, in practice supporting the "No", but some conservative clerics disagreed.Melo 2009 153-155 The press, although mostly opposed to Goulart, publicized the pro-presidential campaign and did not invest in the defense of parliamentarism.Melo 2009 159-161 The left in general defended presidentialism. However, the null vote was defended by Francisco Julião, representative of the Peasant Leagues, the Communist Party of Brazil (PCdoB, newly created and opposed to the PCB) and the Trotskyist Revolutionary Workers Party. Julião believed in parliamentarianism and criticized the position behind the government, but he was isolated and received much criticism for choosing an option similar to that of Carlos Lacerda.Melo 2009 177-179 Funding The campaign for presidentialism was "long and costly, financed by bankers and contractors linked to the interests of the PSD-PTB party alliance". "The propaganda machine set up by those in favor of the return of presidentialism, the millions of cruzeiros — denounced by UDN parliamentarians — the posters, jingles, newspaper articles, appeals" worked.Benevides 1993 José Luiz de Magalhães Lins, nephew of the governor of Minas Gerais and president of the National Bank of Minas Gerais, coordinated the finances, hiring five advertising agencies. The chief of the Civilian Cabinet went to France to study the 1958 referendum.Melo 2009 155-156 Propaganda for the "No" came to rely on the use of public machinery, such as Brazilian Air Force planes that transported agents of this campaign.Klein 2021 236-237 Propaganda for presidentialism blamed inflation and the social crisis on the parliamentary system, making it necessary to empower the president to act against extreme poverty, illiteracy, landlessness and political crises.Melo 2009 155-156 It associated the victory of presidentialism with the implementation of basic reforms.Rubiatti 2008 156 At the behest of Darcy Ribeiro's Ministry of Education, the Instituto Superior de Estudos Brasileiros published the pamphlet "Why vote against parliamentarism in the plebiscite?", which was the object of criticism from the UDN and O Globo; Lacerda sought to confiscate it with his Department of Political and Social Order. In addition to this pamphlet, the Guanabara police raided print shops and offices and seized other campaign materials. Diário Carioca, supported by the Nationalist Parliamentary Front and the communists, denounced Lacerda's coup intentions. The 1st Army, Navy and Air Force prepared a military device to guarantee the holding of the referendum in Guanabara, but it was not necessary.Melo 2009 161-175 Parliamentarism supporters had their backers, but they were not as strong.Benevides 1993 Historiography usually accepts the position of Hermes Lima, the last prime minister, that there was no campaign for "Yes",Melo 2009 159 and the most traditional parliamentarians (Raul Pilla and the Liberator Party) defended abstention, but there was a modest parliamentary campaign. One of the parliamentary acts was a talk given by Juarez Távora over the radio.Melo 2009 186-188 The Electoral Justice determined compulsory voting, defining the defense of abstention as an electoral crime and deadlines for advertising the referendum on radio and television, without allowing criticism of people and authorities.Melo 2009 151-152 Results Voter turnout was 66%, lower than the October 1962 elections (80%), with 82% of eligible voters against the 1961 constitutional amendment, but the large proportion (4–5:1) of "No" votes against the "Yes" ones gave it a number of voters (more than 9 million) greater than those of Jânio Quadros (5,636,623) and Goulart (4,547,010) in the 1960 presidential election. Constitutional Amendment No. 4 of 23 January revoked Constitutional Amendment No. 6 and restored the presidential system of the 1946 constitution.Melo 2009 209-211 9457448 2073582 284444 470701 18565277 Nohlen 2005 189 By state and territory State or territoryForAgainstValidvotesVotes%Votes% Acre17.47 82.53 Alagoas7.80 92.20 Amazonas19.16 80.84 Bahia7.78 92.22 Brasília7.05 92.95 Ceará11.10 88.90 Espírito Santo22.36 77.64 Goiás10.89 89.11 Guanabara22.82 77.18 Maranhão4.92 95.08 Mato Grosso8.01 91.99 Minas Gerais23.30 76.70 Pará14.82 85.18 Paraíba9.81 90.19 Paraná23.59 76.41 Pernambuco8.14 91.86 Piauí10.34 89.66 Rio de Janeiro14.59 85.41 Rio Grande do Norte6.96 93.04 Rio Grande do Sul29.52 70.48 Santa Catarina39.41 60.59 São Paulo14.30 85.70 Sergipe5.73 94.27 Territory of Amapá6.74 93.26 Territory of Roraima7.74 92.26 Territory of Rondônia3.47 96.53 Total 17.98 82.02 Source: Tribunal Superior Eleitoralhttps://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/++theme++justica_eleitoral/pdfjs/web/viewer.html?file=https://www.justicaeleitoral.jus.br/arquivos/referendo-de-1963/@@download/file/planilha-referendo.pdf Resultado Geral do Referendo de 1963 26 February 2023 Tribunal Superior Eleitoral Superior Electoral Court Aftermath Goulart, having achieved full presidential powers, started his Basic Reforms plan (Reformas de Base), which led to a military coup d'état in April 1964. See also 1993 Brazilian constitutional referendum Notes References Citations Bibliography Books Bandeira Moniz Moniz Bandeira 1978 O Governo João Goulart: As Lutas Sociais no Brasil (1961-1964) https://docvirt.com/docreader.net/bibliotbnm/3836 Civilização Brasileira 4 Rio de Janeiro Ferreira Jorge 2011 João Goulart: uma biografia Civilização Brasileira Rio de Janeiro 4 Memórias: A Verdade de um Revolucionário Mourão Filho Olympio Olímpio Mourão Filho Porto Alegre L&PM 2011 Nohlen Dieter Dieter Nohlen 2005 Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook: Volume 2 South America Oxford University Press Schilling Paulo R. 1979 Como se coloca a direita no poder 1 https://www.docvirt.com/docreader.net/bibliotbnm/1601 São Paulo Global Skidmore Thomas Thomas Skidmore 1982 Brasil: de Getúlio a Castello https://www.docvirt.com/docreader.net/bibliotbnm/10556 Paz e Terra 7 São Paulo Spektor Matias Matias Spektor The United States and the 1964 Brazilian Military Coup 2018 Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Latin American History Jango: um perfil (1945-1964) Villa Marco Antonio Marco Antonio Villa Globo Livros 2014 São Paulo 1 Articles and academic works Andrade Isaac Sandro Pinheiro 2018 Reforma política no Brasil: o caso da implementação do parlamentarismo https://www.repository.utl.pt/bitstream/10400.5/16160/6/DISSERTA%c3%87%c3%83O%20-%20ENTREGA.pdf ISCSP Lisboa 8 November 2021 Atassio Aline Prado 2007 https://repositorio.ufscar.br/handle/ufscar/1483 21 December 2020 São Carlos A batalha pela memória: os militares e o golpe de 1964 Universidade Federal de São Carlos Benevides Maria Victoria 1993 http://www.scielo.br/scielo.php?script=sci_arttext&pid=S0102-64451993000100004 O plebiscito de 1993 à luz do precedente de 1963 21 December 2020 Lua Nova 28-29 Faria Fabiano Godinho 2013 João Goulart e os militares na crise dos anos de 1960 http://objdig.ufrj.br/34/teses/855888.pdf https://web.archive.org/web/20211110164735/http://objdig.ufrj.br/34/teses/855888.pdf 10 November 2021 UFRJ Rio de Janeiro 10 November 2021 Fico Carlos 2017 Ditadura militar brasileira: aproximações teóricas e historiográficas https://www.redalyc.org/pdf/3381/338151136002.pdf Tempo e Argumento 9 20 5–74 21 December 2020 Klein Paulo Eduardo Fasolo 2021 Raul Pilla e o referendo de 1963 https://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ojs/index.php/mosaico/article/view/83332 Mosaico 3 20 223–241 8 November 2021 Loureiro Felipe Pereira 2012 Empresários, trabalhadores e grupos de interesse: a política econômica nos governos Jânio Quadros e João Goulart, 1961-1964 https://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/8/8137/tde-22082012-105827/publico/2012_FelipePereiraLoureiro_VRev.pdf USP São Paulo 17 November 2021 Loureiro Felipe Pereira 2014 The Alliance For or Against Progress? US-Brazilian Financial Relations in the Early 1960s Journal of Latin American Studies https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-latin-american-studies/article/abs/alliance-for-or-against-progress-usbrazilian-financial-relations-in-the-early-1960s/F9B46E5945FF4ED1949BC42273A7CE24 46 2 323–351 26 July 2021 Melo Demian Bezerra de 2009 O plebiscito de 1963: inflexão de forças na crise orgânica dos anos sessenta https://www.historia.uff.br/stricto/teses/Dissert-2009_Demian_Bezerra_de_Melo-S.pdf 21 December 2020 UFF Niterói Nogueira Marcelo D'Alencourt 2006 As relações políticas de João Goulart e Leonel Brizola no governo Jango (1961-1964) https://app.uff.br/riuff/bitstream/handle/1/8206/Disserta%c3%a7%c3%a3o%20de%202006%20Marcelo%20D%27Alencourt%20Nogueira.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y 18 November 2021 UFF Niterói Rubiatti Bruno de Castro 2008 Relação entre o Executivo e o Legislativo no periodo parlamentarista no Brasil (1961-1963) https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/296846986.pdf Campinas Unicamp 17 November 2021 Category:Fourth Brazilian Republic Category:Referendums in Brazil Category:1963 in Brazil Brazil Category:Constitutional referendums Brazil