1985 Greek constitutional crisis

none April 2026 April 2026 1985 Greek constitutional crisis 6 March – July 1985 Greece Removal of Konstantinos Karamanlis as head of state Election of a new president under dubious procedures Constitutional amendments, strengthening the powers of the Prime Minister at the expense of the President, were passed Andreas Papandreou Christos Sartzetakis Konstantinos Mitsotakis Konstantinos Karamanlis The Greek constitutional crisis of 1985 was the first constitutional dispute to occur in the newly formed Third Hellenic Republic after the fall of the country's military government in 1974. The crisis arose following a political gamble by the Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, who suddenly announced he would not support the re-election of Konstantinos Karamanlis, President of Greece, for a second term. Papandreou had proposed constitutional amendments that would further increase the powers of the Prime Minister by reducing the presidential powers, which were acting as checks and balances against the executive branch. Papandreou supported the presidential candidacy of Supreme Court justice Christos Sartzetakis, who was popular with left-leaning voters for his investigation of the politically motivated murder of Grigoris Lambrakis in 1963. The Hellenic Parliament elected Sartzetakis amid tensions and confrontations stemming from constitutionally questionable procedures initiated by Papandreou. The opposition, New Democracy, Karamanlis' former party that was led by Konstantinos Mitsotakis, deemed the vote illegal and threatened to remove Sartzetakis from the presidency if New Democracy won the upcoming elections, intensifying the crisis. The polarized confrontation continued into the general election campaigns. Sartzetakis' election to the presidency helped Papandreou and his socialist party PASOK win the general election despite Papandreou's failure to address Greece's economic decline. After the election, all political parties accepted Sartzetakis as president, ending the constitutional crisis. The Greek constitutional amendment of 1986 transformed the liberal democracy of Greece based on the constitution of 1975 into a populist democracy with a majoritarian parliamentary system and a prime minister acting as a "parliamentary autocrat". Soon after the constitutional amendments took effect, Papandreou's premiership was engulfed by corruption scandals, the most significant of which was the Koskotas scandal. With no constitutional restraints, Papandreou abused his position to prevent the Koskotas case from advancing in the courts, and he promised to deplete the state's finances to his loyal supporters. After losing the June 1989 general election, a coalition government consisting of conservative New Democracy and united leftist parties under Synaspismos, indicted Papandreou and four of his ministers. The new government also ended the state's monopoly on the mass media, and partially dismantled the state's surveillance capabilities to prevent any future prime minister from exploiting them for political advantage. Since then, constitutional scholars have suggested partially reversing the removal of presidential powers to mitigate the negative effects of majoritarian politics while avoiding potential conflicts between the president and prime minister. Brief history of Constitutional crises in Greece Constitutional history of Greece National Schism Early constitutional struggles thumb|General Dimitrios Kallergis on horseback approaching King Otto and his wife Amalia at the windows of the Old Royal Palace to demand for a Greek constitution. thumb|Constantine I of Greece and Eleftherios Venizelos, their disagreement caused the National Schism that echoed over decades in the history of Greece. Since gaining independence in 1821, modern Greece has experienced persistent instability. Early governments were weak and burdened by debt from the independence struggle,Kofas 2005 97 while rivalries among elites and limited political cohesioni led to conflict with Prime Minister Ioannis Kapodistrias, ending in his assassination.Clogg 2013 267–268 Soon after, foreign creditors and the European Great Powers imposed a foreign monarchy with absolute authority.iiKoliopoulos Veremis 2009 34 Throughout the 19th century, tensions deepened between citizens seeking broader political participation and elites aligned with the crown and external interests, contributing to repeated military interventions and a series of coups into the 20th century.Liakos Doumanis 2023 259 Early military movements secured reforms, notably the 3 September 1843 Revolution, which established a constitutional monarchy. The 1909 Goudi coup brought Eleftherios Venizelos to power, modernized the country and expanded its territory.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 36–37, 66–67 However, his clash with King Constantine I over Greece's entry into World War I divided Greek society and the armed forces, and became known as the National Schism.Curtis 1995 44–54 This turmoil produced a short-lived republic (1924–1935) before the monarchy was restored, followed by further authoritarian rule under Ioannis Metaxas in 1936.Clogg 2013 115 Conservative rule (1946–1963) The Axis occupation of Greece in World War II and the 1944–49 Civil War between the Communist-led uprising against the monarchist establishment caused severe economic damage and deep social divisions.Clogg 2013 142Gallant 2016 261 After martial law ended, weak post-civil-war governments relied heavily on U.S. aid through the Marshall Plan and focused on containing communism during the Cold War.Kofas 2005 97–98 Political dialogue in the following decades revolved around shifting power from the right to the center, however, reconciliation remained a lower priority than economic reconstruction.Clogg 2013 142–146 Shifting control of the military from the king to the elected government was another difficult subject.Close 2014 107–108 The 1952 Constitution, though based on that of 1911, was effectively a new constitution. It established a parliamentary monarchy with the monarch as head of state and the army, based on the principle of the separation of powers.Spyropoulos Fortsakis 2017 52–53 The prime minister was elected as the leader of the government and to carry out executive functions. However, the king retained significant powers to control the government, including the power to dissolve parliament and appoint and dismiss ministers.Spyropoulos Fortsakis 2017 52–53Greek Constitution 1952 6 The latter led to confusion since two prime ministers in the 1950s asked whether the king or the prime minister governed the country, echoing the disagreements between Venizelos and Constantine I during the National Schism.Dervitsiotis 2019 240 From 1955 to 1963, the governorship of Konstantinos Karamanlis brought relative stability and economic prosperity to Greece.Clogg 1975 334 He also sought to reduce the monarch's prerogatives but failed to gain sufficient political support to overcome the king's resistance.Clogg 1975 334–335 By the early 1960s, repressive postwar policies were increasingly questioned, especially after the death of left-wing Member of Parliament (MP) Grigoris Lambrakis, which implicated state officials in the assassination or in its cover-up.Clogg 1975 334–335 Although not blamed, Karamanlis resigned and went into self-exile in France.Clogg 1975 335 Rise of center-left and friction with the king Georgios Papandreou and his political party, Center Union, had a moderate reformist platform; it gained considerable traction and rose to power in the parliamentary elections of 1963 and 1964.Clogg 1975 334Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 137 Papandreou advocated for the liberalization of Greek society, which was rapidly urbanizing, resulting in large salary increases for police, judges, and teachers. Papandreou's government also released all political prisoners as a first step toward reconciliation from the Civil War. Resentment toward Papandreou from the military grew because they were excluded from salary increases.Curtis 1995 70Lagos 2021 47 He also attempted to bring parts of the military that operated independently under government control. This action alarmed many officers without weakening them.Tsarouhas 2005 6Mouzelis 1978 126 Papandreou's move created friction with King Constantine II, who wanted the monarchy to retain command of the army.Curtis 1995 70 At the same time, the son of Georgios Papandreou, Andreas Papandreou, who had joined Greek politics after a 23-year academic career in the United States,Clive 1985 491 was campaigning on an anti-monarchy and anti-American platform, destabilizing the political equilibrium.Close 2014 109Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 84 Andreas Papandreou's uncompromising militant stance made him a target of conspiratorial accusations from ultra-rightists, who feared that following new elections, which the nearly 80-year-old Georgios Papandreou would likely win, his son would be the focus of power in the party.Clogg 1996 383 These incidents caused a dispute between Georgios Papandreou and King Constantine II, leading to the resignation of the former.Clogg 2013 158–159 thumb|Andreas Papandreou in exile For the next twenty-two months, Greece had no elected government, and hundreds of demonstrations took place, with many being injured and killed in clashes with the police.Close 2014 108 The king, potentiallyiii acting within his constitutional rights but politically dubious approach,Clogg 2013 158–159 tried to gain support from members of the Center Union party and form a government, leading to the Iouliana (July events) of 1965.Close 2014 108–109 Constantine temporarily succeeded in gaining the support of 45 members, including Konstantinos Mitsotakis, who were later called "apostates" by supporters of the elder Papandreous.Close 2014 108Hatzivassiliou 2006 129–130 To end the political deadlock, Georgios Papandreou attempted a more-moderate approach with the king, but Andreas Papandreou publicly rejected his father's effort and attacked the whole establishment, attracting the support of 41 Center Union members in an effort to gain the party's leadership and prevent any compromise.Close 2014 109Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 140 The prolonged political instability between the parliament and the monarchy led to a military coup in which a junta of colonels seized power and ruled Greece for seven years.Close 2014 107–109, 114 The junta expelled prominent political figures, including Andreas Papandreou, Mitsotakis, and King Constantine.Kathimerini May 2017Miller 2009 136Kallivretakis 2018 237 The political world almost universally blamed Andreas Papandreou, and even his father disowned him,iv as the person primarily responsible for the end of Greek democracy.Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 84Miller 2009 136, 144 In exile, the younger Papandreou, cut off from those working for the restoration of democracy in Greece, developed and disseminated an anti-American, conspiratorialv narrative of events in which he was a victim of larger forces.Miller 2009 144–146 Following the junta's collapse, caused by its failure to handle the Turkish invasion of Cyprus,Clogg 1996 384 the dominant political figure, Karamanlis, returned to restore democratic institutions in Greece.Close 2014 123 Restoration of democracy and Constitution of 1975 Metapolitefsi Return of Karamanlis With the return of civilian rule under Karamanlis, the new government issued a "Constituting Act" that voided the junta's Constitution of 1973.Karamouzi 2015 23 Pending a referendum on a new constitution, the 1952 constitution was temporarily restored, "except for the articles dealing with the form of the State"; the last phrase referred to whether the monarchy would be restored.Karamouzi 2015 23 In the meantime, the functions of the monarch were to be carried out by the incumbent President, Phaedon Gizikis, whom the junta had appointed as a nominal figurehead.Liakos Doumanis 2023 306 Features of the new constitution and first objections In the November 1974 parliamentary election, Karamanlis received 54.37% of the vote and a mandate to set the foundations of the new state. In the following month's republic referendum,vi 69% of voters chose a parliamentary republic with a president as head of state and commander-in-chief of the armed forces,Clive 1985 491–492 effectively ending 150 years of monarchical rule.Kaloudis 2000 48 This led to the foundation of the Third Hellenic Republic with the new Constitution of 1975, which reinforced the executive branch's power, represented by the prime minister, while the president would act as the head of state with sufficient reserve powers, the right to call elections, appoint a government, dissolve Parliament, and call referendums on important national questions. The president could also veto any legislation that did not reflect the popular will, and this veto could only be overturned by a three-fifths parliamentary majority.Clive 1985 491–492Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 155 The presidential powers, which exceeded those of the monarch under the 1952 Constitution, were inspired by the recent Gaullism reforms in France.Clive 1985 491–492 Despite vocal resistance from leftist parties, which wanted a purely parliamentary system with a ceremonial president, Karamanlis insisted these powers would act as checks and balances to avoid an omnipotent prime minister who could accumulate executive and legislative powers with no restraint.Grigoriadis 2017 20–21 Parliament adopted the new constitution and it was promulgated on 11 June 1975. Andreas Papandreou, along with the communists, boycotted the promulgation; he publicly described it as "totalitarian", advocating instead for a socialist constitution.Clogg 1985 106Clive 1985 491–492 Reforms by Karamanlis thumb|Konstantinos Tsatsos, the first president of the Third Hellenic Republic From 1975 to 1980, Karamanlis and his close associate Konstantinos Tsatsos governed Greece as prime minister and president, respectively. The reconciliation of the Civil War was becoming urgent; Karamanlis had legitimized the Communist Party of Greece (KKE),vii which was outlawed since November 1947 during the Civil War, re-ratified the European Convention on Human Rights,Spyropoulos Fortsakis 2017 55 and allowed exiled Greeks who had fled the junta and Civil War, including Melina Mercouri, Mikis Theodorakis, and Cornelius Castoriadis, to return home.Liakos Doumanis 2023 307 Approximately 25,000 Greeks returned from 1974 to 1981.Siani-Davies Katsikas 2009 569 Karamanlis' governments, however, maintained the country's anti-communist stance.viii Minister of Interior Konstantinos Stefanopoulos said: "Greeks would never forgive those who had taken up arms against the Nation".Fytili Avgeridis Kouki 2023 14 EEC membership and rise of PASOK Papandreou and his newly formed political party, PASOK, rose in popularity due to pressure from the 1973 and 1979 oil crises on the Greek economy, and Papandreou's radical, mostly anti-American and anti-EEC. In 1980, after Karamanlis secured the entry of Greece into the European Economic Community (EEC), he became president and Georgios Rallis became prime minister. Andreas Papandreou won the 1981 Greek parliamentary election and became prime minister.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 158–159 In the views of Greece's allies, Karamanlis, as president, would act as a restraining factor on radical departures in foreign and domestic affairs if Papandreou realized his campaign promises.Nafpliotis 2018 517Larrabee 1981 164 Reforms by Papandreou Papandreou took further steps toward social reconciliation by allowing the potential return of another 22,000 Greeks by ending security screening; the most notable was Markos Vafiadis.Siani-Davies Katsikas 2009 569 In 1985, Papandreou introduced a law allowing civil servants dismissed for political reasons to restore their pensions.Siani-Davies Katsikas 2009 569 All formal Civil War commemorations were abolished.Fytili Avgeridis Kouki 2023 1079–1080 The first, 1949 law recognizing the Greek Resistance excluded left-leaning partisan groups that fought against the Greek State in the Civil War. On 20 September 1982, Papandreou's government abolished this exception, allowing EAM/ELAS members war-veteran status and pension rights.Siani-Davies Katsikas 2009 569 Papandreou, unlike Karamanlis's inclusive approach, instrumentalized Greece's divided past by regularly invoking the memories of the Civil War ("right the wrongs of the past") and "revenge of the losers [of the Civil War]" (el "η ρεβάνς των ηττημένων") to maintain the support of left-leaning supporters by demonstrating to them PASOK's faithfulness to its campaign promises and left-wing roots.Siani-Davies Katsikas 2009 569Liakos Doumanis 2023 310 For Papandreou, polarization was necessary to distract his supporters from his mishandling of the chronic stagflation of the Greek economy, despite the country receiving economic aid from the EEC.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 169 Nevertheless, the cohabitation of the two men from 1981 to 1985 was successful because Papandreou's governance was more pragmatic compared to his radical, polarizing rhetoric, and many of his campaign promises were reversed.Curtis 1995 219 Constitutional crisis right Bezoek premier Karamanlis van Griekenland Van Agt in gesprek met Karamanlis, Bestanddeelnr 929-6548 (cropped).jpg 151 Christos Sartzetakis (1989) cropped.jpg 157 Presidents of the Hellenic Republic, Konstantinos Karamanlis (left) and Christos Sartzetakis (right) First stage On 6 March 1985, New Democracy announced it would support Karamanlis' second Presidency term, while on the same day, the KKE party announced it would put forward its candidate. The press anticipated Papandreou would also support Karamanlis,Clogg 1985 105 because he had personally assured Karamanlis of his support.Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 86 Papandreou, however, changed his mind at the last moment, siding with the left wing of PASOK, which did not want Karamanlis, and instead backed Christos Sartzetakis, a Supreme Court judge known for his principled handling of the 1963 murder of left-wing deputy Grigoris Lambrakis and favorably viewed by the left.Clogg 1985 105Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 86 The announcement occurred at the Central Committee of PASOK on 9 March.Clogg 1985 105 This move surprised some of Papanderou's ministers, much of his party's rank-and-file, and Sartzetakis himself, who was not consulted in advance.Clogg 1985 105 Later, it was revealed that the supposedly spontaneous change of mind was to camouflage Papandreou's long-held constitutional designs because Sartzetakis knew about it well in advance, and because two other judicial figures had rejected Papandreou's offer.McDonald 1985 134 At the same time, Papandreou announced plans for a constitutional reform, which restarted the debate about the form of the republic, and further polarized the political environment by damaging the consensus between the two dominant political parties, PASOK and New Democracy, that existed between 1981 and 1985.Grigoriadis 2017 43 Papandreou also argued it would be illogical for Karamanlis to preside over any constitutional reform because he had influenced much of the 1974 constitution.Clogg 1985 106 Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of creating a constitutional crisis to remove Karamanlis from office and establish a totalitarian constitution.Clogg 1985 107 Papandreou informed Karamanlis of his decision via his deputy, Antonios Livanis el Αντώνης Λιβάνης, because he could not bring himself to do so in person.Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 114 In response, Karamanlis resigned from the Presidency on 10 March 1985, two weeks before the end of his term, and was replaced by PASOK's Speaker of the Hellenic Parliament, Ioannis Alevras, as acting president.Clogg 1985 106 Scholars differ on the motive behind Papandreou's actions. According to the historians John Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis el Θάνος Βερέμης, and political scientist Kevin Featherstone, the crisis was motivated by Papandreou's desire to divert the Greek electorate's attention from the worsening state of the Greek economy; unemployment increased under PASOK from 2.7% in 1980 to 7.8% in 1985,IMF, Greece's unemployment annual inflation of the order of 20%,IMF, Greece's inflation rate widening trade deficits.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 164–166Featherstone 1990b 108 According to a public-opinion survey by Eurobarometer, the number of Greeks who believed the economic situation worsened increased from 37.7% in 1983 to 70.2% in 1985, while those who believed the economy improved fall from 31.5% to 12.8% in the same period.Pappas 2014 32 Constitutional scholar Aristovoulos Manesis el Αριστόβουλος Μάνεσης argued that the constitutional revision was a pretext to justify the removal of Karamanlis, which would remind left-leaning voters, as the elections were approaching, that PASOK remained faithful to its revolutionary left-wing origins.Manesis 1989 13–14 Vote eligibility of the acting president The opposition questioned whether Alevras could participate in the parliamentary vote for his successor, requesting to be precluded from the presidential vote and his deputy rights while acting president. The Constitution of 1975 states the president's office is incompatible with any other office (Article 30). Constitutional scholars supported this view. Academic Nikolaos Saripolos said only the Constituent Assembly could determine whether Alevras could vote. PASOK said there was no explicit provision in the constitution, so this issue should be resolved in Parliament, an opinion from Grigorios Kasimatis el Γρηγόριος Κασιμάτης, a friend of Papandreou.Clogg 1985 108–109 Ultimately, the PASOK-dominated parliament decided to allow the vote, and New Democracy deputies vacated the chamber.Clogg 1985 108–109 PASOK deputy Agamemnon Koutsogiorgas later said in Parliament the issue raised by constitutional scholars on Alevras' ineligibility to vote due to Article 30 in the Constitution applies only to elected presidents, and therefore did not apply to Alevras.Clogg 1985 108–109 Parliamentary votes for president and colored ballots 1985 Greek presidential election According to the Constitution of 1975, up to three rounds of a parliamentary vote were permitted for presidential candidates; the first two rounds required more than 200 votes out of 300 MPs, and in the third round, 180 votes out of 300.Greek Constitution 1975 631 If all three rounds failed, new elections would be held. Papandreou, who since 1981 had expelled six PASOK MPs for criticizing him, could only rely upon approximately 164 MPs; 13 MPs from the KKE, and five independent MPs (about 182). The first two rounds, which took place on 17 and 23 March, failed to elect Sartzetakis as president. The elections were carried out in conditions of high political tension; at one point, a New Democracy deputy momentarily grabbed the ballot box.Clogg 1985 108–109 As in the previous rounds, in the third round on 29 March, colored ballots in blue for Sartzetakis and semi-transparent envelopes were used.Alivizatos 2011 530–531Clogg 1985 109Pantelis 2007 183 New Democracy chairman Mitsotakis accused Papandreou of violating the constitutional principle of secret ballot (Article 32),Greek Constitution 1975 631 by forcing his deputies to cast their vote with colored ballots.ixClogg 1985 109Kalyvas 1997 97 However, Mitsotakis' concern was dismissed in Parliament.Clogg 1985 109 Mitsotakis and Papandreou argued verbally; Mitsotakis said Papandreou had no respect for the Parliament, and Papandreou responded by invoking Mitsotakis' role in the Iouliana and said Mitsotakis was the last person entitled to speak about respect.xClogg 1985 109 Despite vigorous protests from the opposition, PASOK members used colored ballots under strict surveillance to spot potential defectors.Clogg 1985 109–110Kalyvas 1997 97 PASOK supporters chanted outside the Parliament building.Clogg 1985 109–110 Sartzetakis was voted president with a decisive vote from Alevras because two MPs from Papandreou's party, whom Papandreou accused of taking bribes from Mitsotakis' party, defected.Clogg 1985 109–110 Mitsotakis considered the vote illegal and said that if New Democracy won the elections, Sartzetakis would not be president, by bringing the legality of the process to the Council of State (el Συμβούλιο Επικρατείας), further deepening the constitutional crisis.Clogg 1985 110–111Kalyvas 1997 97 Foreign policy dimension Foreign observers were worried that Papandreou had taken a risk with potentially dire consequences for Greece and its allies. According to McDonald, a victory for Mitsotakis in the upcoming elections would destabilize Greece over the presidency question.McDonald 1985 133 Alternatively, an electorally-weakened Papandreou might lead to a collaboration with the communist party to form a government, which according to John C. Loulis, a conservative Greek political analyst, "raised a potential danger to the balance of power in the Mediterranean" due to the possibility of communists shaping Greece's foreign policy and disrupting the communications in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).Washington Post May 1985 Constitutional proposals and debate Greek constitutional amendment of 1986 With Sartzetakis as president, Papandreou could formally submit the constitutional amendment proposals by adding to the previous one the removal of the secret ballot for president.Clogg 1985 110 In contrast with constitution violations raised in Sartzetakis's election,Manesis 1989 66 PASOK's procedure for proposing constitutional amendments complied with the constitution.McDonald 1985 134 The surprising announcement of constitutional reform under already tense political conditions and limited input from constitutional scholars on the nature of amendments increased the possibility of the crisis becoming widespread.Manesis 1989 7 Papandreou's proposals were designed to ease future changes to the constitution's Article 110 by requiring the approval of amendments by a parliamentary majority in one rather than two successive parliaments, and reducing the powers of the President.Clogg 1987 104–105 The former proposal was eventually abandoned due to its controversial nature,Clogg 1987 104–105 but Papandreou was determined to eliminate the presidential powers. Papandreou cited the hypothetical case of an activist president, mimicking the tendency of monarchs to intervene in political life since the creation of the modern Greek state.Alivizatos 1993 66 PASOK minister Anastasios Peponis introduced the constitutional amendment package to the Parliament with the following argument: Invoking the lack of use of some provisions, their lack of implementation is by no means an argument to keep them in the current constitution. The question is what is our guiding principle? When provisions directly or indirectly contradict the principle of popular sovereignty, we object to them. [...] We support that the president is neither directly appointed by nor elected by the people. We are not a presidential, we are a parliamentary democracy. It is not the president who resorts to the people, so that the people deliver a verdict by majority voting. It is the legitimate government. It is the political parties. If the president resorts to the people, then he inevitably either sides with one party against others or attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution. Nevertheless, as soon as he attempts to substitute himself for the parties and impose his own solution, then he embarks upon the formation of his own decisions of governmental nature. Then the government, directly or indirectly, fully or partially, is abolished.Grigoriadis 2017 43–44 Scholars considered such constitutional changes unnecessary because no president had used these powers in the course of the Third Hellenic Republic until Papandreou raised the issue.Katsoudas 1987 27–28Alivizatos 1993 66 Anna Benaki-Psarouda, New Democracy's rapporteur, presented in the parliament the following argument against the proposed reforms: And this is the achievement of the 1975 Constitution: A miraculous balance between the Parliament, the Government and the President of the Republic, namely these state organs which express popular sovereignty and always pose the risk of de facto usurping it. [...] It is also interesting to see where these competencies of the President of the Republic are transferred. They are removed from him, but where do they go? To popular sovereignty and the Parliament, as the parliamentary majority claims? Dear colleagues, all of them go to the government, either directly or indirectly through the parliamentary majority controlled by it. Because the parliament is now subjugated to the parliamentary majority through party discipline. [...] Dear colleagues, the conclusion from the amendments suggested by the government or the parliamentary majority is the following: Power is transferred completely to the government. Hence, we have every reason to be afraid and suspect and mistrust about the future of Greece. [...] I want to stress the following, so that we, the Greek people, understand well: that with the suggested amendments you turn government and government majority into superpowers.Grigoriadis 2017 44 Benaki-Psarouda said this type of majoritarianism would damage Greek democracy.Grigoriadis 2017 44 Scholars also noted the proposed changes would make the prime minister the most powerful position in the Greek state because there would no constitutional restraints.Katsoudas 1987 28Featherstone 1990 183 Election campaign of 1985 1985 Greek parliamentary election thumb|The logo of PASOK depicts a rising sun. Papandreou implied in his election campaign in 1985 that PASOK represented the "forces of light" while the opposition the "forces of darkness". The confrontation from the presidential election continued into the general election campaigns and increased the political polarization in Greek society.Close 2004 267Carabott Sfikas 2004 267 Papandreou invoked memories of the Civil War (1946–1949) and Junta (1967–1974), associating New Democracy with the authoritarian right of the past, with the slogan: "Vote PASOK to prevent a return of the Right".Clogg 1987 108 The communists, persecuted by the right in the 1950s, protested against Papandreou's dwelling on the past, saying the 1980s were not the same as the 1950s.Clogg 1987 108 Papandreou further characterized the upcoming elections as a fight between light and darkness in his rallies, implying PASOK represented the "forces of light" because its logo was a rising sun.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 166 On the other side, Mitsotakis said: "In voting, the Greek people will also be voting for a president",Clogg 1985 110 and warned that there was a danger of moving toward an authoritarian, one-party state.Clogg 2013 194 Two days before the elections, Karamanlis urged Greeks to be cautious with their votes, saying PASOK had brought "confusion and uncertainty".Clogg 1985 111 Karamanlis' statement was not broadcast on television or radio, which were controlled by the state and PASOK, the governing party.Clogg 1985 111 In the election, PASOK was re-elected with 45.82% of the vote, losing approximately 2.3% of its support from 1981, while New Democracy increased its share of the vote by 4.98% to 40.84%.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 166–167 Papandreou's gamble worked to his benefit because he gained from far-left voting blocks, covering the losses from centrist voters, and appealed to socialist voters who rejected Karamanlis's perceived hindrance of PASOK's policies.Clogg 1985 111–112McDonald 1985 134 Papandreou held an advantage over Mitsotakis by portraying him as a threat to the existing constitutional order and suggesting that Mitsotakis intended to place the former king Constantine as the head of state,Clogg 1987 115–116 convincing a significant fraction of Greek voters.McDonald 1985 134Clogg 1987 116 Historian Richard Clogg said the large-scale rally by Mitsotakis on 2 June at Syntagma Square may have panicked communists into voting for PASOK;Clogg 1987 113 the communist parties lost a significant share of the vote.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 167 Aftermath After the election results, Mitsotakis accepted Sartzetakis as president and head of state.Clogg 1985 112 Papandreou's constitutional proposals took effect in 1986.Greek Constitution 1986 Court ruling The case reached the courts. The plenary session of the Council of State ruled the direct judicial review of the election of the President was inadmissible.Plenary ruling of Council of State The Athens One-member Magistrates' Court's ruling in passing that the election of the President was irregular and "amounted to an abrogation of popular sovereignty",xi while it held that the political legitimacy granted by PASOK's 1985 election victory did not negate the unconstitutionality of the act.xii Constitutional scholar Christos Papastylianos called the latter an example that displays the limits of judicial jurisdiction in Greece; the courts can deem an action as unconstitutional but are unable to prevent it.Papastylianos 2023 25 Disillusionment and abuse of power Papandreou began his second administration with a comfortable majority in parliament and increased powers granted by the amended constitution. However, economic and social conditions in Greece deteriorated. His premiership was interspersed with financial and corruption scandals, such as the Koskotas scandal, a money-laundering operation that threatened the PASOK government because it implicated Papandreou and many senior PASOK ministers.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 170 In 1985, Papandreou accepted a loan from the EEC and implemented austerity measures as a condition of the loan. After two years, Papandreou, shaken by PASOK's waning popularity, reversed the austerity measures, resulting in a further deterioration of the Greek economy.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 167Siani-Davies 2017 35Close 2014 158–159 The repeal of anti-terrorism legislation in the early 1980s and controversial foreign policy decisions led to a significant rise in terrorist incidents in Greece.Stergiou 2021 166–169Kassimeris 1993 299–300 Despite rising public frustration with the government, Papandreou abused his position to remain in power because there were no constitutional restraints. Notable actions include: Papandreou changed the electoral law shortly before the June 1989 general election, a move designed to prevent New Democracy from winning an absolute majority.xiiiMagone 2003 172Gallant 2016 293Clogg 2013 196 Bestowing public appointments to about 90,000 people to gain additional votes six months before the 1989 election; Close 2014 159 the party Synaspismos called this a "recruitment orgy".Featherstone 1990 112 Papandreou's blatant patronage, which had been burdening the economy throughout the 1980s,Liakos Doumanis 2023 316–317 was exemplified by him, at one of his rallies, publicly commanding his Minister of Finance Dimitris Tsovolas to "give it all [to them]" (el Τσοβόλα δώσ'τα όλα) and ordering, "Tsovolas, empty the coffers [of the state]", and the crowd chanted these back.Pappas 2019 247Siani-Davies 2017 35 During judicial inquiries into the Koskotas scandal, it was revealed that Papandreou used the Junta's surveillance infrastructure, including filing and wiretapping, against any Greek citizen who was not loyal to him.Close 2014 158–159Koutsoukis 2006 131Samatas 1993 44–47 The list of "suspected terrorists", according to Papandreou, included prominent politicians across the political spectrum, his ministers, publishers, police chiefs, and PASOK's governmental spokesman.Samatas 1993 44, 68 Judicial independence was damaged when Papandreou passed a law via emergency procedures despite opposition from lawyers, judges, and clerks, to prevent the judicial investigation of the Koskotas scandal from advancing to the Athens Appeals Court.Magalhaes Guarnieri Kaminis 2006 185 Catharsis thumb|Two Greek communists and two conservative politicians (L-R: Leonidas Kyrkos, Charilaos Florakis, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, Konstantinos Stephanopoulos) discuss a time after the Papandreou indictment for the Koskotas scandal. Papandreou called them the "gang of four". Papandreou lost the June 1989 election, mainly due to the Koskotas scandal.Dobratz Whitfield 1992 167–180 Mitsotakis' party won 43% of the vote, but it was insufficient to form a government because Papandreou's last-minute change of the electoral law required a party to win 50% of the vote to govern alone. Papandreou hoped that while PASOK might come second in voting, it could form a government with the support of the other leftist parties, but he was rejected.Clive 1990 115–116 Instead, the right-wing New Democracy collaborated with the united leftist parties under Synaspismos, led by Charilaos Florakis, to form a government. Although they belonged to opposite ideological camps and had fought one another in the Civil War, both parties sought a "catharsis": an investigation into PASOK's corruption and a trial.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 170Close 2014 159Clogg 2013 197 The new government indicted Papandreou and four of his ministers. To avoid political exploitation by any future omnipotent prime minister, the new government dismantled some of the junta's surveillance infrastructure and, as a counterbalance to state media, granted the first private television broadcast license to publishers critical of PASOK.Papathanassopoulos 1990 394Samatas 1993 47 In the election of April 1990, Mitsotakis received sufficient support to form a government, and Papandreou became the leader of the opposition,Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 170 marking the end of PASOK's political dominance in its first era.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 171 Constitutional crisis evaluation and political consensus Comparison to previous constitutional crises In 1989, contemporary constitutional scholar Aristovoulos Manesis el Αριστόβουλος Μάνεσης provided a detailed assessment of the constitutional crisis and made an extensive comparison with previous constitutional crises.Manesis 1989 6–102 While the 1985 constitutional revision was not the result of a violent confrontation, nor did it lead to one, as happened in the revisions of 1911 with the Goudi coup, in 1952 after the Civil War, and in 1975 after the military coup, all of these constitutional revisions were imposed by the governing political party without the participation or consent of the minority parties.Manesis 1989 11–12, 17–18 Manesis also made the following distinctions in this comparison. While all political parties were invited and participated in the creation of the Constitution of 1975, in the end, due to the disagreement on the extent of presidential powers, the minority political parties (PASOK and the communist parties) did not vote,Manesis 1989 11–12 leaving Karamanlis, as he said, "debating with absentees."Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 160 In this narrow sense, Manesis argued, the Constitution of 1975 was imposed by a single political party but asserts that Karamanlis had a sufficiently strong mandate.Manesis 1989 11–12 The constitutional revision in 1985, apart from dubious constitutional procedures in the presidential election that were necessary for the revision to take place, also features characteristics of single-party imposition since the objections of the minority, this time Karamanlis' former party (New Democracy), were sidelined.Manesis 1989 11–12 Constitution legitimacy and populist democracy Manesis considered the manner in which the presidential election was announced and conducted, and the nature of the constitutional amendments, had the potential of political rupture, while the latter also decreased the Constitution's democratic character due to the concentration of power in the prime minister's position, along with the emerging statist bureaucracies and technologies aimed at controlling the popular will.xivManesis 1989 6–102 At the end of his criticism, Manesis advocated for strengthening individual rights and institutions as a counter to the executive branch led by the prime minister.Manesis 1989 100–102 Nikos Alivizatos, a constitutional scholar, considered the methods PASOK used to elect Sartzetakis in 1985 unacceptable; he did not blame the change in the presidency in 1985 for the "corruption and moral crisis" that became apparent in the following years, and said the removal of constitutional restraints caused PASOK "to neglect the rules of the parliamentary game",Alivizatos 1993 68 and that PASOK "would not hesitate to overcome any obstacle in its aim to retain power".Alivizatos 2020 112 The political scientist Stathis Kalyvas and the historian Richard Clogg note that Papandreou's actions did not directly threaten the democratic form of the constitution, but they undermined its long-term legitimacy.Kalyvas 1997 97Clogg 1985 112 The political scientist Dimitrios Katsoudas wrote that the constitutional revision was unnecessary and damaged the constitution's established legality,Katsoudas 1987 26, 28 and said Papandreou had long-term constitutional designs to reinforce his government party against an impotent parliament.Katsoudas 1987 27–28 Takis Pappas, a political scientist, stated PASOK's general strategy in the 1980s involved state grabbing, institution bending, and political polarization.Pappas 2014 28–29 According to Pappas, the constitutional reform was state grabbing, while the presidential election was bending or disregarding liberal institutions to the will of popular sovereigntyPappas 2014 28–29 that gradually changed Greece from a liberal democracy based on the Constitution of 1975 into a "populist democracy".Pappas 2014 36 Political polarization became most prominent during elections through political mobilization, which was aided by the press, and state-controlled television and radio, creating divisions in society.Pappas 2014 29 Proposed constitutional reforms As a result of the 1985 crisis, Greek constitutional reformers commonly include in their proposals the return of some prerogatives to the president to reduce the negative effects of majoritarian politics, i.e., "winner takes all", while avoiding conflicts between the president and prime minister in the executive branch.Alivizatos 2020 112–113 In a collaboration headed by former Finance Minister Stefanos Manos involving Alivizatos and others, it was proposed the president would have the right to dissolve Parliament to counterbalance the omnipotent prime minister.Alivizatos Vourloumis Gerapetritis Ktistakis 2016 6–7 Under this plan, the president's term would be six years long and non-renewable.Alivizatos Vourloumis Gerapetritis Ktistakis 2016 25 Political norms The 1985 crisis became a reference point regarding the process of choosing a presidential candidate. In the 1990 Greek presidential election, Parliament (with only New Democracy votes) elected Karamanlis to a second term as president after five rounds of voting. PASOK and Synaspismos supported their candidates.Proto Thema Jan. 2025 Following this, a political consensus that the governing party should choose a presidential candidate who is acceptable to the opposition (i.e., is not a party pick) has been publicly speculated, especially following the election of Konstantinos Tasoulas in the 2025 presidential election.Naftemporiki Jan. 2025in.gr Jan. 2025 Tasoulas, who had been elected as President of the Hellenic Parliament in 2019,Ναυτεμπορική 2019 was deemed in 2025 undesirable by the opposition because of his alleged interference or inaction in the investigation into the wiretapping scandal, the Pylos migrant boat disaster and the causes of the Tempi train crash.ERT news 2026Avgi 2026 Kostas Tsoukalas, PASOK's press spokesperson invoked the norm, accusing the Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis of acting "in a one-party manner" and "breaking with political traditions".Capital 2025 Adonis Georgiadis, speaking on government's behalf, rejected the existence of such a norm.Naftemporiki Jan. 2025 Overall, presidents have consistently been elected either with the backing of the governing coalition or through broad agreement between the country's two principal parties. This consensual, cartel-like approach to presidential selection is considered a stabilizing aspect of Greece's party system.Bértoa Weber 2024 Notes lower-roman 30em i The integration of the liberated Greek people into the newly formed state was slow, leaving parts of rural Greece outside state control. Of particular concern was the activity of irregular troops, some of whom acted as bandits, e.g., livestock rustling, robbery, and kidnapping of foreigners for ransom;Pappas 2018 182–183 the most notable incident was the Dilessi murders of 1870, which inspired the 1980 movie Alexander the Great by Theo Angelopoulos. ii The first royal family was King Otto from Bavaria. However, he was deposed in 1862, and the Great Powers replaced him with George I from Denmark.Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 42–45 iii Scholars are cautious in taking sides regarding the constitutionality of the king's actions. Of those who take a side, there are two schools of thought: the strict and legal interpretation of the Constitution (the letter of the law) and the emphasis on the constitutional conventions and principles (the spirit of the law). In the former school of thought, the king acted within his constitutional rights, while in the latter, the king's actions violated the Constitution of 1952.Anastasiadis 1981 139 iv Andreas Papandreou admits that his father, on the night of the Colonels' coup, blamed Andreas for the coup, and Andreas himself wondered whether he had crossed the line with his radical campaign.Papandreou 1971 24, 312Featherstone Papadimitriou 2015 84 v There is a long-standing debate on whether the Johnson administration gave the green light for the 1967 coup in Greece.Klarevas 2006 471–508 Andreas Papandreou and his academic colleagues frequently accused the US administration of being responsible for the coup, and since then, Andreas Papandreou and other Greek elites have sold this to the masses as part of nurturing anti-American sentiment, making it a widespread belief among Greeks.Michas 2002 94Larrabee 1981 160Miller 2009 114 Others are more skeptical due to the lack of smoking gun evidence. Louis Klarevas, based on the declassified documents of the US government and an extensive literature review, concluded that there was no official action for the coup; however, additional evidence is required to determine any unofficial activities.Klarevas 2006 471–508 vi The referendum of December 1974 was the sixth one on the issue of the Crown in the twentieth century (1920, 1924, 1935, 1946, and 1973).Koliopoulos Veremis 2009 154 vii The legitimation of the communist party had far-reaching implications.Close 2014 142 In the following years, a whole range of institutions that were founded for the persecution of Communists that had existed since the 1920s disappeared.Close 2014 142 Police, along with vigilante groups and spies whom they had employed, could no longer threaten everyone's civil rights or stigmatize them on ideological grounds.Close 2014 142 viii For example, it was challenging to get a civil-service job as a communist.Fytili Avgeridis Kouki 2023 14 ix According to constitutional scholar Aristovoulos Manesis, the constitutional principle of the secret ballot was violated in three different ways: by PASOK's use of colored ballots, by the opposition refusing to vote but being present, and by the last ballot of Alevras.Manesis 1989 66 x While Andreas Papandreou and Konstantinos Mitsotakis started from the same political party, and both competed for the leadership of the Center Union,Clogg 2013 190 Andreas had vilified Mitsotakis for Iouliana of 1965 (siding with the king and in the view of Andreas betraying his father) as a "traitor" and a "nightmare" effectively stigmatizing the life-long career of Mitsotakis in Greek politics.Curtis 1995 232Washington Post Mar. 1985 In 1984, Mitsotakis became leader of New Democracy because he was the only active politician (Karamanlis was President at the time) who could rival Andreas Papandreou.Curtis 1995 232 From 1984 until 1990, the political conflict between Papandreou and Mitsotakis was both personal and polarized.Clogg 2013 190 After winning the elections of 1990, Mitsotakis lacked the political capital and sufficient majority to implement his policies, despite his long-term ministerial experience, resulting in Mitsotakis's tenure being short.Liakos Doumanis 2023 345 xi "[...] κατάργηση στη συγκεκριμένη περίπτωση του Εκλογικού Σώματος ως οργάνου εξουσίας και κατάλυση στην πράξη της αρχής της λαϊκής κυριαρχίας."Magistrate's Court ruling 563–574 xii "[...] ανεξάρτητα του ζητήματος της θεμελίωσης της νομιμοποιήσεως της εξουσίας του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας στη κανονιστική δύναμη των πραγμάτων που ρύθμισαν οι εκλογές και της αναγνωρίσεως του αποτελέσματος της ρυθμίσεως".Magistrate's Court ruling 574 xiii While it is frequent in Greek history for the governing party to change the electoral law for its purposes, Papandreou's electoral law change in 1989 was unique as it personally benefited him to avoid an indictment for the Koskotas scandal and be sentenced to life in prison if convicted.New York Times Jan. 1992 xiv Minas Samatas also highlighted PASOK's use of the junta's military surveillance for political gains.Samatas 1993 47 This was accompanied by populist rhetoric and patronage networks aimed at mobilizing and controlling the masses, ultimately safeguarding Andreas Papandreou's position both within the party and as prime minister.Samatas 1993 47 Footnotes 20em Sources Constitutions of Greece National Printing Office Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 1/1952 Greek Constitution of 1952 el https://search.et.gr/el/fek/?fekId=659990 Greek Constitution 1952 National Printing Office Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 111/1975 Greek Constitution of 1975 el https://search.et.gr/el/fek/?fekId=685799 Greek Constitution 1975 National Printing Office Government Gazette (Greece) ΦΕΚ A 23/1986 Greek Constitution of 1986 el https://search.et.gr/el/fek/?fekId=709872 Greek Constitution 1986 Proposed Constitutions for Greece Alivizatos Nicos C. Nikos Alivizatos Vourloumis Panagis Panagis Vourloumis Gerapetritis Georgios Giorgos Gerapetritis Ktistakis Yannis :de:Ioannis Ktistakis Stefanos Manos Stefanos Manos Spyropoulos Philippos Ένα Καινούργιο Σύνταγμα για την Ελλάδα: Κείμενα Εργασείας An Innovative Constitution for Greece: Working Papers Athens Μεταίχνιο 2016 https://constitutions.albasio.eu/wp-content/uploads/syntagma_20160605.pdf Court rulings 2862/1985 Plenary decision Council of State 1985 Plenary ruling of Council of State 84464/1985 Αρχείον Νομολογίας Magistrate's Court (Μονομελούς Πλημμελειοδικείου Αθηνών) 1985 Magistrate's Court ruling Books 30em yes Alivizatos Nikos Το Σύνταγμα και οι εχθροί του στη νεοελληνική ιστορία 1800-2010 2011 ΠΟΛΙΣ Athens el 9789604353064 https://books.google.com/books?id=3IxqygAACAAJ Manesis Aristovoulos Η συνταγματική αναθεώρηση του 1986 Constitutional resivion of 1986 1989 Παρατηρητής Athens el 9789602603543 https://www.protoporia.gr/manesis-aristovoulos-i-suntagmatiki-anatheorisi-tou-1986-33854.html?srsltid=AfmBOoqP0jLoVSN03E2ikAhf_C3m_g9NYYBPVqTvzDRq0LtYHFbGtLjq Anastasiadis George Ο διορισμός και η παύση των κυβερνήσεων στην Ελλάδα: από την "αρχή της δεδηλωμένης" στο Σύνταγμα του 1975 The appointment and dismissal of governments in Greece: From the 'principle of declared confidence' to the 1975 Constitution 1981 University Studio Press Athens el 9780001208902 https://www.politeianet.gr/books/anastasiadis-ol-georgios-university-studio-press-o-diorismos-kai-i-pausi-ton-kuberniseon-stin-ellada-62795 Carabott Philip Sfikas Thanassis D. The Greek Civil War: essays on a conflict of exceptionalism and silences 2004 Ashgate Surrey en 9780754641322 https://books.google.com/books?id=VvocAAAAYAAJ Close David Carabott Sfikas The road to reconciliation 257–278 2004 Clogg Richard Richard Clogg Parties and elections in Greece: the search for legitimacy 1987 Duke University Press North Carolina en 0822307944 https://books.google.com/books?id=nia7QgAACAAJ Clogg Richard Richard Clogg Greece, 1981–89: The Populist Decade 1993 Palgrave Macmillan London & New York en 9781349230563 https://books.google.com/books?id=PzdAjwEACAAJ Alivizatos Nikos C. Nikos Alivizatos Clogg The Presidency, Parliament and the Courts in the 1980s 65–77 1993 Clogg Richard Richard Clogg A Concise History of Greece 2013 Cambridge University Press Cambridge en 9781107656444 https://books.google.com/books?id=M492AgAAQBAJ Close David H. Greece since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society 2014 Taylor & Francis en London & New York 9781317880011 https://books.google.com/books?id=4kugBAAAQBAJ Curtis Glenn E. Greece, A Country Study 1995 Library of Congress Maryland en 1490436235 https://books.google.com/books?id=QcW0zwEACAAJ Dervitsiotis Alkis Η έννοια της Κυβέρνησης 2019 P.N. Sakkoulas SA Athens el 9789604208005 https://books.google.com/books?id=dwvbDwAAQBAJ Featherstone Kevin Katsoudas Dimitrios K. Political change in Greece: Before and after the colonels 1987 Taylor & Francis London & New York en 9781000992144 https://books.google.com/books?id=DR7QEAAAQBAJ Katsoudas Dimitrios K. Featherstone Katsoudas The Constitutional framework 14–33 1987 Featherstone Kevin Papadimitriou Dimitris Prime Ministers in Greece, The Paradox of Power 2015 Oxford University Press Oxford en 9780198717171 https://books.google.com/books?id=lO6kCQAAQBAJ Featherstone Kevin Sotiropoulos Dimitri A. The Oxford Handbook of Modern Greek Politics 2020 Oxford University Press Oxford en 978-0198825104 https://books.google.com/books?id=TZr9DwAAQBAJ Alivizatos Nikos C. Nikos Alivizatos Featherstone Sotiropoulos Greek constitutionalism and patterns of government 103–116 2020 Gallant Thomas W. Thomas Gallant (historian) Modern Greece: From the war of independence to the present 2016 Bloomsbury Publishing London en 9781350014510 https://books.google.com/books?id=eXWbzwEACAAJ Garrard James Newell John Scandals in past and contemporary politics 2006 Manchester University Press Manchester en 9780719065514 https://books.google.com/books?id=nDksFA0DYVAC Koutsoukis Kleomenis S. Garrard Newell Political scandals and crisis management in Greece, 1821-2001 123–136 2006 Grigoriadis Ioannis N. Democratic transition and the rise of Populist Majoritarianism: Constitutional Reform in Greece and Turkey 2017 Palgrave Macmillan Cham en 9783319575551 https://books.google.com/books?id=FXzFAQAACAAJ Grigoriadis Ioannis N. Grigoriadis The Rising Tide of Populist Majoritarianism in Greece 41–52 2017 Grigoriadis chapter Gunther Richard Diamandouros Nikiforos Nikiforos Diamandouros Sotiropoulos Dimitri Democracy and the state in the new southern Europe 2006 Oxford University Press Oxford en 9780191513961 https://books.google.com/books?id=GQVREAAAQBAJ Magalhaes Pedro C. Guarnieri Carlo Kaminis Yorgos Gunther Diamandouros Sotiropoulos Democratic consolidation, judicial reform, and the judicialization of politics in Southern Europe 138–196 2006 Hatzivassiliou Evanthis :el:Ευάνθης Χατζηβασιλείου Greece and the Cold War Front Line State, 1952-1967 2006 Taylor & Francis London & New York en 9781134154883 Dyl9AgAAQBAJ Koliopoulos John S. John S. Koliopoulos Veremis Thanos M. :el: Θάνος Βερέμης Modern Greece A History Since 1821 2009 Wiley-Blackwell Oxford en 9781444314830 qumwwKbI0TQC Kofas Jon V. Independence from America: global integration and inequality 2005 Ashgate Burlington en 9780754645085 0DSFAAAAIAAJ Lagos Katerina Othon Anastasakis The Greek Military Dictatorship Revisiting a Troubled Past, 1967-1974 2021 Berghahn Books New York & London en 9781800731752 bCkgEAAAQBAJ Lagos Katerina Lagos Othon The political and ideological origins of the Ethosotitios Epanastasis 34–72 2021 Liakos Antonis :el:Αντώνης Λιάκος Doumanis Nicholas Nicholas Doumanis The Edinburgh History of the Greeks, 20th and Early 21st Centuries: Global Perspectives 2023 Edinburgh University Press Edinburgh en 978-1474410847 HD3WsgEACAAJ Magone José The Politics of Southern Europe Integration Into the European Union 2003 ABC-CLIO Santa Barbara en 9780313051678 ElDeEAAAQBAJ Miller James The United States and the Making of Modern Greece 2009 The University of North Carolina Press Chapel Hill en 978-1469622163 3jvKhwWHem4C Mouzelis Nicos P. Modern Greece: facets of underdevelopment 1978 The Macmillan Press Ltd London en 978-0333226155 WES5AAAAIAAJ Pantelis Antonis Εγχειρίδιο Συνταγματικού Δικαίου Constitutional Law handbook Livanis Publications 2007 el https://www.eplopublications.eu/sites/default/files/digital_public_files/2024-10/Pantelis%20A_Handbook%20Constitutional%20Law_EPLO.pdf Papandreou Andreas Andreas Papandreou Democracy at Gunpoint 1971 Deutsch New York en 9780233963013 https://archive.org/details/democracyatgunpo0000papa Pappas Takis Populism and crisis politics in Greece Palgrave Macmillan New York 2014 el 9781137410580 7mIGBAAAQBAJ Pappas Takis S. Populism and liberal democracy: A comparative and theoretical analysis 2019 Oxford University Press Oxford en 9780192574893 nTGPDwAAQBAJ Papastylianos Christos 2023 Σύνταγμα, Ερμηνεία κατ' άρθρο, Άρθρο 120 Constitution, Interpretation per Article, Article 120 el https://www.syntagmawatch.gr/to-syntagma-mou/syntagma-kata-arthro-ermineia/ Pridham Geoffrey Securing Democracy, Political Parties and Democratic Consolidation in Southern Europe 1990 Routledge London & New York 9780415023269 u2L2Fq5I404C Featherstone Kevin Pridham Political Parties and democratic consolidation in Greece 179–202 1990 https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9780203403761-13/political-parties-democratic-consolidation-greece-kevin-featherstone Siani-Davies Peter Crisis in Greece 2017 Oxford University Press Oxford en 9780190911539 pWlNDwAAQBAJ Spyropoulos Philippos C. Fortsakis Theodore P. Constitutional Law in Greece 2017 Wolters Kluwer Netherlands en 9789041192448 lI2WDwAAQBAJ Stergiou Andreas Greece's Ostpolitik Dealing With the 'Devil' 2021 Springer International Publishing Cham en 9783030611293 WrUYEAAAQBAJ Journals 30em yes Bértoa F.C Weber T. 2024 Presidential elections and European party systems (1848–2020) British Journal of Political Science 54 3 874–891 10.1017/S0007123423000704 Clive Nigel Government and Opposition 20 4 488–503 1985 The 1985 Greek Election and its Background 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1985.tb01100.x https://www.jstor.org/stable/44483257 44483257 subscription Clive Nigel Government and Opposition 25 1 115–122 1990 The Dilemmas of Democracy in Greece 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1990.tb00750.x https://www.jstor.org/stable/44482490 44482490 subscription Clogg Richard Richard Clogg Government and Opposition 10 3 332–255 1975 Karamanlis's cautious success: the background 10.1111/j.1477-7053.1975.tb00644.x https://www.jstor.org/stable/44483305 44483305 subscription Clogg Richard Richard Clogg The Journal of Modern Hellenism 2 1 103–112 1985 The 1985 Constitutional Crisis in Greece https://journals.sfu.ca/jmh/index.php/jmh/article/download/51/45 Clogg Richard Richard Clogg Mediterranean Politics 1 3 382–387 1996 Andreas Papandreou – A political profile http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629399608414596 10.1080/13629399608414596 subscription Dobratz Betty A. Whitfield Stefanie European Sociological Review 8 2 167–180 1992 Does Scandal Influence Voters' Party Preference? The Case of Greece during the Papandreou Era https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036630 10.1093/oxfordjournals.esr.a036630 522295 subscription Featherstone Kevin West European Politics 13 1 101–115 1990b The 'party-state' in Greece and the fall of Papandreou 10.1080/01402389008424782 http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402389008424782 subscription Fytili Magdalini Avgeridis Manos Kouki Eleni Contemporary European History 1365–1383 2023 Heroes or Outcasts? The Long Saga of the State's Recognition of the Greek Resistance (1944–2006) 33 4 10.1017/S0960777323000395 free Kallivretakis Leonidas The King, the Junta and the “Impartial Broker”: A microscopic approach to the Johnson-Constantine meeting on 11 September 1967 2018 The Historical Review/La Revue Historique 14 211–240 10.12681/hr.16301 https://ejournals.epublishing.ekt.gr/index.php/historicalReview/article/view/16301/14524 free Kaloudis George International Journal on World Peace 17 1 35–39 2000 Transitional democratic politics in Greece https://www.jstor.org/stable/20753241 20753241 Kalyvas Stathis N. Stathis Kalyvas Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 23 1 83–104 1997 Polarization in Greek Politics: PASOK's First Four Years, 1981-1985 https://scholarship.tricolib.brynmawr.edu/collections/854b17c3-d5c6-4a19-9fec-b125e0d78bf4 Klarevas Louis Were the eagle and the phoenix birds of a feather? The United States and the Greek coup of 1967 2006 Diplomatic History 30 3 471–508 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00562.x 10.1111/j.1467-7709.2006.00562.x 24915022 subscription Karamouzi Eirini Cahiers de la Méditerranée 90 11–24 2015 A strategy for Greece: Democratization and European integration, 1974-1975 90 https://journals.openedition.org/cdlm/7858 10.4000/cdlm.7858 subscription Kassimeris George 1993 The Greek state response to terrorism Terrorism and Political Violence 5 4 288–310 10.1080/09546559308427230 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559308427230 subscription Larrabee F. Stephen Foreign Policy 45 158–174 1981 Dateline Athens: Greece for the Greeks 45 10.2307/1148318 https://www.jstor.org/stable/1148318 1148318 subscription McDonald Robert The World Today 41 7 133–136 1985 Greece after PASOK's Victory https://www.jstor.org/stable/40395748 40395748 Michas Takis The National Interest 67 94–102 2002 America the despised 67 https://www.jstor.org/stable/42897404 42897404 Nafpliotis Alexandros 18 4 509–528 2018 From radicalism to pragmatism via Europe: PASOK's stance vis-à-vis the EEC, 1977-1981 Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 10.1080/14683857.2018.1519686 free Papathanassopoulos Stylianos Media, Culture & Society 12 3 387–397 1990 Broadcasting, politics and the state in Socialist Greece https://doi.org/10.1177/016344390012003007 10.1177/016344390012003007 subscription Pappas Nicholas C. Journal of History 4 3 179–183 2018 Brigands and brigadiers: the problem of banditry and the military in nineteenth-century Greece 10.30958/AJHIS.4-3-2 186900394 free Samatas Minas Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 19 1 31–70 1993 The Populist Phase of an Underdeveloped Surveillance Society: Political Surveillance in Post-Dictatorial Greece https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317837964 Siani-Davies Peter Katsikas Stefanos Journal of Peace Research 46 4 559–575 2009 National reconciliation after civil war: The case of Greece 10.1177/0022343309334611 https://www.jstor.org/stable/25654436 25654436 subscription Tsarouhas Dimitris Southeast European Politics 6 1 1–13 2005 Explaining an activist military: Greece until 1975 https://gpsg.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/2005-P2-Tsarouhas1.pdf Newspapers and magazines Jonathan C. Randal Jonathan Randal 13 March 1985 The Washington Post Greek Opposition Leader Gladdened by Papandreou's Shift https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/03/14/greek-opposition-leader-gladdened-by-papandreous-shift/4d76307a-de5f-4740-9797-64c46dfefe40 Washington Post Mar. 1985 Jonathan C. Randal 29 May 1985 The Washington Post Leader of Greek Communist Party Assails Ruling Socialists, Opposition https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1985/05/30/leader-of-greek-communist-party-assails-ruling-socialists-opposition/313fa088-7bec-4012-a82f-ac728d42c161/ Washington Post May 1985 Marlise Simons 17 January 1992 Greek Ex-Premier Not Guilty in Bank Scandal The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/1992/01/17/world/greek-ex-premier-not-guilty-in-bank-scandal.html New York Times Jan. 1992 Nellas Demetris Kathimerini 29 May 2017 Former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis dies https://www.ekathimerini.com/news/218805/former-greek-prime-minister-constantine-mitsotakis-dies Kathimerini May 2017 18 July 2019 Πρόεδρος της Βουλής με 283 ψήφους ο Κώστας Τασούλας https://www.naftemporiki.gr/politics/660086/proedros-tis-voulis-me-283-psifous-o-kostas-tasoulas/ 2026-07-06 Η Ναυτεμπορική el Ναυτεμπορική 2019 15 January 2025 Μητσοτάκης: Μία εξαετή θητεία για τον Πρόεδρο της Δημοκρατίας – Η πρόταση ενόψει συνταγματικής αναθεώρησης in.gr https://www.in.gr/2025/01/15/politics/politiki-grammateia/mitsotakis-mia-eksaeti-thiteia-gia-ton-proedro-tis-dimokratias-protasi-enopsei-syntagmatikis-anatheorisis/ el in.gr Jan. 2025 15 January 2025 Κ. Τσουκαλάς: Το ΠΑΣΟΚ θα προτείνει δικό του πρόσωπο για την Προεδρία της Δημοκρατίας https://www.capital.gr/politiki/3896032/k-tsoukalas-to-pasok-tha-proteinei-diko-tou-prosopo-gia-tin-proedria-tis-dimokratias/ 2026-07-06 Capital el Capital 2025 16 January 2025 Αδ. Γεωργιάδης για ΠτΔ: Όταν ο Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου πρότεινε τον Χρήστο Σαρτζετάκη, ήταν από άλλη παράταξη; Νaftemporiki https://www.naftemporiki.gr/politics/1883711/ad-georgiadis-gia-ptd-otan-o-andreas-papandreoy-proteine-ton-christo-sartzetaki-itan-apo-alli-parataxi/ el Naftemporiki Jan. 2025 Μιχάλης Στούκας 19 January 2025 Proto Thema Από τον Μιχαήλ Στασινόπουλο στον Κωνσταντίνο Τασούλα - Όλοι οι ένοικοι του Προεδρικού Μεγάρου el https://www.protothema.gr/stories/article/1589564/oi-proedroi-tis-ellinikis-dimokratias-meta-ti-metapoliteusi/ Proto Thema Jan. 2025 16 January 2025 Κωνσταντίνος Τασούλας / Ο ρόλος του στη συγκάλυψη του σκανδάλου υποκλοπών και της τραγωδίας των Τεμπών https://www.avgi.gr/politiki/499354_o-rolos-toy-sti-sygkalypsi-toy-skandaloy-ypoklopon-kai-tis-tragodias-ton-tempon 2026-07-06 Η Αυγή el Avgi 2026 12 February 2025 Οι αντιδράσεις των κομμάτων της αντιπολίτευσης για την εκλογή του Κ. Τασούλα στο αξίωμα του Προέδρου της Δημοκρατίας ERT https://www.ertnews.gr/eidiseis/ellada/politiki/oi-antidraseis-ton-kommaton-tis-antipoliteysis-gia-tin-eklogi-tou-k-tasoula-sto-aksioma-tou-proedrou-tis-dimokratias/ 2026-07-06 ertnews.gr el ERT news 2026 Web and other sources Greece's unemployment (%) https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/LUR@WEO/GRC?zoom=GRC&highlight=GRC International Monetary Fund IMF, Greece's unemployment Greece's inflation rate (%) https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/PCPIPCH@WEO/GRC International Monetary Fund IMF, Greece's inflation rate Further reading Tassopoulos Ioannis New trends in Greek contemporary constitutional theory: a comment on the interplay between reason and will 1999 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 2328-9708 10 223 https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1228&context=djcil Nikos Alivizatos Nikos Alivizatos Kathimerini How powerful a president does our political system want? 29 January 2025 https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1260018/how-powerful-a-president-does-our-political-system-want/ en none Category:1985 in law Category:1986 in law Category:1985 in Greece Category:1986 in Greece Category:1985 in politics Category:1986 in politics Category:1980s in Greek politics Category:History of Greece since 1974 Category:Andreas Papandreou Category:Konstantinos Karamanlis Category:Konstantinos Mitsotakis Category:Constitutional crises Category:Constitution of Greece Category:PASOK