1995 São Tomé and Príncipe coup d'état

Military coup in Central Africa 1995 São Tomé and Príncipe coup d'état Sao Tome and Principe-CIA WFB Map.png Map of São Tomé and Príncipe Map of São Tomé and Príncipe 15–22 August 1995 São Tomé and Príncipe The military agrees to restore civilian rule after receiving several concessions. Government of São Tomé and Príncipe Junta of National Salvation Miguel Trovoada Carlos Graça Manuel Quintas de Almeida Fernando Sousa Pontes Presidential guards Armed forces 1 guard killed 1 soldier killed in an accident On 25 August 1995, the armed forces of São Tomé and Príncipe, led by second lieutenants Manuel Quintas de Almeida and Fernando Sousa Pontes, launched a coup d'état against the country's government, led by President Miguel Trovoada and Prime Minister Carlos Graça. Several government officials, including Trovoada and Graça, were detained by the military, and Quintas de Almeida declared a Junta of National Salvation. It was the first military coup in the country's history. The coup leaders were motivated by the poor condition of the military, which had been underfunded since São Tomé and Príncipe's liberalisation and transition towards democracy in 1990–1991. Angola, a key ally of São Tomé and Príncipe, acted as a mediator between the two sides during negotiations. The military handed power back to the civilian government after receiving several concessions regarding the structure of the armed forces and government involvement in military affairs. Background thumb|upright|alt=Miguel Trovoada in 1995|Miguel Trovoada in 1995 Miguel Trovoada became the first democratically elected president of São Tomé and Príncipe in 1991.Ewoh Andrew Ikeh Emmanuel From unfree labor to neo-colonial extraction in Sao Tome and Principe https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003017486-5/unfree-labor-neo-colonial-extraction-sao-tome-principe-andrew-ikeh-emmanuel-ewoh Oritsejafor Emmanuel O. Cooper Allan D. Africa and the Global System of Capital Accumulation 17 April 2021 Routledge Abingdon 978-1-000-38458-1 30 March 2025 93 10.4324/9781003017486-5 en The country had been under the one-party rule of the Movement for the Liberation of São Tomé and Príncipe (MLSTP) since its independence from Portugal in 1975.Sao Tome and Principe country profile https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14093493 BBC News 30 March 2025 9 July 2011Strieker Gary Tiny nation struggles with democracy http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9509/sao_tome/ 20 September 1995 CNN dead https://web.archive.org/web/20190105094159/http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9509/sao_tome/ 5 January 2019 30 March 2025 en Trovoada was himself a former leader of the MLSTP, but he fled into exile in 1981 after falling out of favour with then president Manuel Pinto da Costa.Seibert Gerhard Everything you need to know about São Tomé and Príncipe's presidential elections https://africanarguments.org/2016/07/everything-you-need-to-know-about-sao-tome-and-principes-presidential-elections/ 30 March 2025 African Arguments 14 July 2016 He returned in time to contest the 1991 presidential election and was elected unopposed.Nohlen Dieter Krennerich Michael Thibaut Bernard Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook 22 July 1999 Oxford University Press 978-0-19-829645-4 748 https://books.google.com/books?id=enoSDAAAQBAJ 30 March 2025 en He later founded the Independent Democratic Action (ADI) political party in 1994.Ação Democrática Independente (ADI) https://www.dw.com/pt-002/a%C3%A7%C3%A3o-democr%C3%A1tica-independente-adi/t-19476754 5 April 2025 Deutsche Welle 16 January 2025 Tensions between the São Toméan government and military had been growing since the country's democratic transition in 1990–1991. Funding for the military declined after the transition period, and in 1992 local papers began publishing articles questioning the necessity of the army. Trovoada announced in October of that year that three commissions had been looking into reforming the military as a whole.Seibert Gerhard Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in São Tomé and Príncipe 1 May 2006 Brill Publishers 978-90-474-0843-7 https://brill.com/display/title/11036 30 March 2025 259–260 en Reforms to the military from 1992 to 1995 were slow and marred by disagreements between the Trovoada government and military leadership, often culminating in threats by the latter.Seibert 2006 261–263 For example, the army threatened to start a rebellion on 31 January 1993 if their demands for better working conditions and increased pay were not met. The Trovoada government offered a 40 percent pay increase across the board but was met with rejection by the military leadership, which had asked for a 300 percent increase.Seibert 2006 261 The São Toméan military was in a difficult state by the time of the 1995 coup. Soldiers had not been paid for six months, with the monthly salary of a second lieutenant (the lowest junior officer rank) being only 24,000 São Toméan dobras, or about 14 US dollars. The army was ill-equipped with only two armoured vehicles, and many young men ignored their calls for compulsory military service.Seibert 2006 264 Trovoada was unpopular among the military rank and file, and the two leaders of the 1995 coup, second lieutenants Manuel Quintas de Almeida and Fernando Sousa Pontes, blamed him for the poor conditions.Seibert 2006 264–265 While there had been coup attempts in São Tomé and Príncipe before 1995, the military had until then kept itself outside of the country's politics.Seibert 2006 259 Quintas de Almeida, then second-in-command of the coast guard, and Sousa Pontes, then in charge of the mortar battery on São Tomé Island, later claimed that 90 percent of the military had been involved in the coup, but senior officers were not among the participants. Unlike their younger, lower-ranked counterparts, senior officers had benefited somewhat from their positions, and many were on unpaid leave so that they could engage in small businesses.Seibert 2006 264–265 Events Detainment of government officials thumb|alt=The Presidential Palace in 2019|The Presidential Palace in 2019 Forty young military recruits under the command of Sousa Pontes departed their barracks and made their way to the Presidential Palace in the early morning hours of 15 August 1995. After their arrival, all but one of the presidential guards surrendered; his resistance led to his death at the hands of the rebel soldiers.Seibert 2006 257Seibert Gerhard The Bloodless Coup of July 2003 in São Tomé e Príncipe Lusotopie 2003 10 1 246 https://www.persee.fr/doc/luso_1257-0273_2003_num_10_1_1557 2 April 2025 After a failed two-hour search for Trovoada, Sousa Pontes forced Trovoada's wife to call the president and threatened to kill his family if he did not surrender. Trovoada subsequently emerged from hiding, still in his pajamas and nightgown, and was taken to the barracks of the rebels, where he was guarded by a 600-strong army.Seibert 2006 257–258 After the president's capture, Quintas de Almeida announced via radio at 8 am the establishment of a military juntathe Junta of National Salvation. A second radio communiqué at 1 pm imposed an 8 pm curfew, closed the country's borders until further notice, prohibited communications with the press without the military's approval, and assured the safety of diplomatic missions.Seibert 2006 258 Three state-run banks were temporarily closed to avoid the flight of foreign currency, while other institutions were ordered to carry on business as usual. However, markets remained closed for the rest of the day and the scheduled flight from Lisbon, Portugal, did not arrive.Seibert 2006 258–259 thumb|upright|alt=Carlos Graça in 2013|Carlos Graça in 2013 Meanwhile, soldiers commanded by Quintas de Almeida rounded up and detained other government officials. Prime minister Carlos Graça was flown back by the military to São Tomé from Príncipe, where he had been attending the annual feast of Saint Lawrence, and was immediately placed under house arrest.Seibert 2006 258 António Taty da Costa, the head of the immigration department, was brought to the rebels' barracks alongside Alfredo Marçal Lima, the military's head of public relations and cooperation. It became evident that the coup was the initiative of junior officers and not the military leadership.Seibert 2006 258 Other ministers and their families sought refuge in the Portuguese embassy.Seibert 2006 258 However, the junta unexpectedly allowed the ministers to continue working in their offices and did not occupy any state institution aside from the three banks.Seibert 2006 259 International reactions and backtracking by the military The coup took both São Toméans and international observers by surprise and elicited strong condemnation from São Tomé and Príncipe's allies.Seibert 2006 259 Portugal, France, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Gabon, South Africa, the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations all immediately released statements denouncing the coup and calling for the restoration of the civilian government.Seibert 2006 259 Some of these countries, who were major financial donors to São Tomé and Príncipe, threatened to suspend their aid. Angolan president José Eduardo dos Santos threatened to cut off his country's oil supplies, but he also offered to mediate between the two sides.Seibert 2006 259 Gabonese president Omar Bongo meanwhile proposed a military intervention by the international community similar to Operation Uphold Democracy, which ousted the military dictatorship in Haiti in 1994. France supported Bongo's proposal, but he later changed his mind and offered to mediate instead.Seibert 2006 259, 266 Under international pressure, Quintas de Almeida moderated the coup's objectives, suspending the junta and calling for a government of national unity to be formed. In a press conference held on 16 August, he insisted that the military did not aim to seize power, with Sousa Pontes adding that political parties would not be dissolved.Seibert 2006 266 Graça was released from house arrest that day, and the coup leaders met with representatives of São Tomé and Príncipe's three major political partiesthe MLSTP, ADI, and the Democratic Convergence Party (PCD-GR)to negotiate the country's future.Seibert 2006 266–267 The coup leaders proposed forming a government of national unity for three to twelve months, immediately after which early elections would be held.Seibert 2006 266 All three parties rejected the proposal and demanded that the civilian government be restored. Trovoada refused to participate in any government involving the military, while Graça, who had previously advocated a government of national unity, said he was ready to participate in such a government if it was led by him and his party. Finding themselves at an impasse, both sides accepted mediation by Angola.Seibert 2006 266–267 De-escalation, negotiations, and end The military gradually undid the restrictions it had imposed on the first day of the coup. Quintas de Almeida announced on 17 August that the military would depart the banks it had occupied, lift the evening curfew, and reopen the country's airspace. He reiterated his claim that the military did not seek to overthrow the government but sought an end to political conflict and corruption. He denounced the living conditions in the country, particularly of the soldiers, whom he described as living like "beggars", and invited donor countries to visit São Tomé and Príncipe to see the situation for themselves.Seibert 2006 267 On 18 August, Trovoada, who had been on a hunger strike to force his release, was permitted to receive visitors and make phone calls. However, he was still confined to the barracks and forbidden from making any public announcements.Seibert 2006 268 A five-member delegation from Angola led by foreign minister Venâncio da Silva Moura arrived in São Tomé and Príncipe that day, and Da Silva Moura was able to negotiate Trovoada's transfer to a government residence.Seibert 2006 267–268 Quintas de Almeida set up and led a five-member military commission to negotiate with the Angolan mediators. The commission presented several key demands upon the Angolans' arrival: a general amnesty for everyone involved in the coup, a constitutional change that would remove the president's role as supreme commander of the armed forces, the appointment of the defence minister by the armed forces rather than the civilian government, the restructuring of the army and state bureaucracy, and the removal of corrupt government officials.Seibert 2006 268 During the next day of negotiations on 19 August, the military commission insisted on the first two demands, as the coup plotters had become increasingly isolated both domestically and internationally. Many politicians expressed apprehension towards a resolution which would free the rebels from punishment, but some, like foreign minister Guilherme Posser da Costa, expressed hope that they would not be punished.Seibert 2006 268 Although negotiations continued on 20 August, life on the islands had returned almost to normal, with the army withdrawing nearly all of its troops from the public eye, except a few who were guarding Trovoada.Seibert 2006 268 Angolan-mediated negotiations concluded on 21 August, with the military agreeing to restore the civilian government in exchange for a blanket amnesty.Seibert 2006 268 The National Assembly unanimously approved the amnesty at 7:15 pm, and representatives from the military, the civilian government, and the Angolan delegation signed a memorandum of understanding the next day. The civilian agreement agreed to all of the military commission's demands, with Angola being given the responsibility of supervising the progress.Seibert 2006 269 Quintas de Almeida expressed his content with the outcome of the negotiations and announced that the rebellion was over, marking the end of the country's first military coup.Seibert 2006 269Kittichaisaree Kriangsak Judicial Responsibility and Coups d'État: Judging Against Unconstitutional Usurpation of Power 10 February 2023 Taylor & Francis 978-1-000-83629-5 167 https://books.google.com/books?id=HOufEAAAQBAJ 2 April 2025 enFrynas Jędrzej George Wood Geoffrey de Oliveira Ricardo M. S. Soares Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe: from cocoa monoculture to petro-state African Affairs 1 January 2003 102 406 78 10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a138811 https://academic.oup.com/afraf/article-abstract/102/406/51/8850 2 April 2025 0001-9909 subscription Aftermath Trovoada addressed the nation immediately after his release and return to the presidential palace. He denied the accusations levied against him by the military and denounced the coup as a conspiracy by those seeking to prevent his reelection in 1996. He drew parallels to his 1979–1981 imprisonment by Pinto da Costa, who, being Trovoada's main political rival at the time of the coup, denied any involvement.Seibert 2006 269 Shortly after the coup ended, defence minister Alberto Paulino was replaced by Carlos Paquete Carneiro da Silva, a reserve captain who had left the army in 1982 for personal reasons and pursued a career in private business. Army commander António Paquete was succeeded by António Nascimento, who had previously led the national police, on 15 September. Lieutenant Justino Lima, one of the coup plotters, was appointed second-in-command of the army thanks to pressure from his fellow junior officers.Seibert 2006 269–270 On 19 September, António Taty da Costa, the chief negotiator of the military commission, publicly accused Trovoada through an open letter of having prior knowledge of the coup and not preventing it because he believed the military's target would be Graça instead of him. Trovoada denied the accusations and domestic observers suspected it was a defensive move by Taty da Costa, as he feared dismissal by Trovoada and could claim the veracity of his accusations as the basis of his removal. An inquiry into Taty da Costa's claims by the civilian government was stopped by the military, which viewed it as an attack on one of their own and therefore the entire military.Seibert 2006 270–271 The political parties of São Tomé and Príncipe aimed but failed to form a government of national unity within 30 days. Negotiations were marred by differing priorities and disagreements over key ministries, and the parties decided to abandon such efforts until after the 1996 presidential election. Even Graça gave up on such a government, despite having been a vocal supporter before and during the coup, and resigned as prime minister.Seibert 2006 271–272 The new ADI-dominated cabinet created after the 1996 presidential election, which Trovoada won, was criticised by the opposition (particularly the PCD-GR) and local press for its lavish spending, particularly the purchase of 18 brand-new Renault luxury vehicles for the government's use.Seibert 2006 273 The government's deadlock continued unresolved into the 21st century, leading to another military coup in 2003 that also ended with a blanket amnesty, a memorandum of understanding, and promises to improve the armed forces.Seibert 2006 271–273, 279–281 See also History of São Tomé and Príncipe 2022 São Tomé and Príncipe coup attempt References São Tomé and Príncipe Coup d'état Category:Coups d'état in São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and Príncipe São Tomé and Príncipe